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CHAPTER I
Introduction
This dissertation comprises three distinct essays on aging and human capital. The
first two essays examine how the prospect of widowhood and cognitive decline in-
fluence the division of labor of older couples, particularly with respect to financial
knowledge and decision-making. The third essay discusses the selectivity of internet
surveys for an older population. As a whole, this dissertation highlights the impor-
tance of cognition, one facet of ability that affects investments in and the productivity
of human capital.
The first essay provides a new interpretation for an old pattern–that women tend
to have lower levels of financial literacy than men. Women also tend to outlive their
husbands, so they will eventually need to take over the management of family fi-
nances. Using a new survey of older couples, I find that women acquire additional
financial literacy as they approach widowhood. These results are consistent with a
model in which the household division of labor breaks down when a spouse dies. The
model shows that women have incentives both to delay acquiring financial knowledge
and also to begin learning before widowhood. This essay is the first empirical exam-
ination of the financial literacy of both members of couples and provides a life-cycle
interpretation of the gender gap in financial literacy.
1
2The second essay, written with Robert Willis, complements the first by investi-
gating a different source of uncertainty affecting the division of labor and the man-
agement of household finances. Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias cause pro-
gressive declines in cognition that lead to a complete loss of functional capacities.
These declines pose enormous financial risk to the household due to the high costs of
care and the potential for financial mismanagement by an impaired decision-maker.
Therefore, the early detection of Alzheimer’s, in spite of the incurability of the dis-
ease, can potentially yield large benefits if it enables preparation prior to the loss
of mental faculties. In this essay we analyze the impact of information about cog-
nitive decline on the choice of financial respondent in a large-scale survey of older
Americans. We find that couples with investments that are individually controlled
are much more responsive to a diagnosis of a memory-related disease than couples
who passively receive their retirement income. This finding is consistent with a
model of the value of information: households with the most to gain financially from
preparation are most responsive to information about cognitive decline.
The final essay, written with Gwenith Fisher and Robert Willis, addresses a chal-
lenge in the use of new technologies in survey research. Fielding surveys over the
internet provides many benefits over traditional survey modes like mail question-
naires and telephone interviews, including lower cost, greater speed, and ease of
customization. This essay discusses the implications of surveying older populations
using the internet, focusing on selectivity problems. Using a survey in which some
variables are collected in a single mode to web users and non-users alike, we find
that for an older population, an internet sample selects on age and education, as
one might expect, but also on cognition. An internet-only sample would miss an
increasing number of persons, particularly those with lower fluid and crystallized in-
3telligence, at older ages. Because of selection, an internet-only sample would lead to
an overestimate of level of intelligence and an underestimate of the rate of cognitive
decline with aging.
CHAPTER II
Aging and Strategic Learning:
The Impact of Spousal Incentives on Financial Literacy
2.1 Introduction
Empirical studies have found that women tend to have, on average, lower levels
of financial literacy than men (Fonseca et al., 2010; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008;
Kotlikoff and Bernheim, 2001). This gap may reflect a division of labor within the
household such that men are responsible for financial matters. However, women also
tend to outlive their husbands, so they will eventually need to take over this task.
Women therefore have an incentive both to delay acquiring financial knowledge and
also to begin learning prior to widowhood. Financial literacy is a critical form of
financial knowledge that is linked to important economic outcomes. Economists view
investment in human capital as a purposive process, and in this chapter, I show that
the acquisition of financial literacy is no different.
This chapter presents a model of the human capital investment process of longer-
lived spouses over the life cycle and tests the model’s predictions using innovative
new data on financial literacy and financial decision-making. The management of
household finances is likely to both be subject to a division of labor and to be
taken care of by men, who will most likely be survived by their wives. I show that
the prospect of widowhood provides an incentive for women to accumulate financial
4
5literacy. In particular, the model generates three results. First, if the household
finances are managed by their husbands, women may rationally delay learning about
finances. Secondly, investments in financial knowledge should increase as widowhood
becomes more imminent; lastly, longer durations of widowhood provide additional
incentives for accumulating more human capital.
While I analyze the model specifically for women and financial literacy, the model
is generalizable to any task specialized in by the shorter living spouse. Using a cross-
sectional sample that links husbands and wives, I use variation in the husbands’
life expectancies to analyze how women accumulate human capital relative to their
husbands (who do not have this incentive to increase learning in old age) as women
approach widowhood. I find that women increase their financial literacy as they
approach widowhood. At an estimated increase of 0.04 standard deviations per year
approaching widowhood, 80 percent of women in my sample would catch up with
their husbands prior to the expected onset of widowhood.
Financial knowledge is critical due to its relationship to economic outcomes and
its policy implications. Financial literacy is linked to financial decision-making and
outcomes, including more effective wealth management (Hilgert et al., 2003), better
management of credit and debt (Hilgert et al., 2003; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009),
retirement planning (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007, 2009), increased saving (Kotlikoff
and Bernheim, 2001; Carlin and Robinson, 2010), and higher stock market partic-
ipation (Delavande et al., 2008; van Rooij et al., 2007). Given these links, having
sufficient financial literacy is becoming even more important since the responsibility
for retirement planning has shifted to individuals. Wealth management has become
increasingly complex as predictable streams of retirement income from defined benefit
pensions have been replaced by defined contribution plans that need to be managed
6both before and after retirement (Mitchell and Schieber, 1998). In addition, finan-
cial literacy has become a prominent policy issue. While the government identified
increasing financial literacy as a policy goal in 2003 (Fair and Accurate Transaction
Act), this goal has become an even higher priority in the wake of the 2008 economic
crisis. The large numbers of foreclosures, defaults, and debt problems that arose
during the housing and financial crisis highlight the costs of financial illiteracy for
individuals with low and high levels of wealth. Furthermore, policy proposals to pri-
vatize Social Security would introduce further individual responsibility for retirement
planning and require even more knowledge.
This chapter makes a number of contributions. This is, to my knowledge, the first
study to analyze investments in financial knowledge in a life-cycle framework. While
a number of studies have shown that women have lower levels of financial literacy
than men, I show that women accumulate knowledge as they approach widowhood,
suggesting that a gender gap in financial literacy may reflect strategic responses of
women to incentives over the life cycle.
Second, this chapter is the first to link the financial knowledge of the two members
of a couple. By using the spousal gap in financial literacy rather than differences
between women and men in different households, I can investigate how financial
knowledge relates to the division of labor over the life cycle. I also use a detailed set
of cognitive measures to show that the narrowing of the wife-husband gap in financial
knowledge reflects advances on the part of women and is not merely an artifact of
men’s cognitive decline.
This chapter combines ideas about the household division of labor with human
capital theory. Section 2.2 provides additional background on financial knowledge
as human capital in the context of the household division of labor and widowhood.
7Section 2.3 presents a theoretical model of the timing of a woman’s investment in
financial human capital over her lifetime. Section 2.4 describes the data used, and
Section 2.5 presents evidence that older women acquire financial knowledge as wid-
owhood approaches. These effects remain even when controlling for the cognitive
decline of the husband. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Financial literacy, human capital, and specialization
The management of household finances is an important type of non-market pro-
duction that requires its own form of human capital. One major component of this
human capital is financial literacy. There is increasing public and scholarly interest
in financial literacy and informed financial decision-making, in part because of the
poor financial outcomes that are associated with low levels of financial literacy: prob-
lems with debt (Lusardi and Tufano, 2009) and lack of retirement planning (Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2007, 2009), among others. At the same time, studies have found that
Americans tend to display low levels of financial literacy (Bernheim, 1998; Hilgert et
al., 2003; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009). In particular, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) find
that financial illiteracy is widespread among older Americans. Recent government
policies, including the establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
aim to increase financial literacy among the public.
Studies have shown that women tend to have lower levels of financial literacy than
men (Fonseca et al., 2010; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; Kotlikoff and Bernheim, 2001).
This is true even for younger women (Lusardi et al., 2009a; Chen and Volpe, 2002),
in spite of the gains in educational attainment younger women have made relative
to men. Low levels of financial literacy may not be problematic if one’s partner has
higher literacy and specializes in managing household finances. As Becker (1985)
8shows, under a number of assumptions, it is efficient for members of a household to
specialize in particular tasks. However, such reliance on a partner can have serious
consequences when one is unable to divide tasks among household members either
before the formation of a household or during widowhood.
In American households, men are usually primarily responsible for household fi-
nances.1 In the Cognitive Economics Study used in this chapter, only 16 percent of
couples report that the woman is the most financially knowledgeable person in the
household. A person may become the financial specialist in a couple for a number of
reasons. First, the person with a greater stock of financial knowledge when entering
the marriage might be more likely to specialize; this could favor the older member of
the couple, typically the man. This advantage may arise from past experience with
money and finances, possibly through one’s occupation. Educational sorting may
play a role, if college-educated women were more likely to major in non-quantitative
fields. Second, in addition to the initial stock of knowledge however acquired, an-
other factor may simply be interest or enthusiasm on the part of the specialist, or
fear or avoidance on the part of the non-specialist. Third, the division of labor may
also be a product of intra-household bargaining. Whatever the root causes, women
tend to be less financially literate than men. Since women are likely to outlive men,
this leads again to the question of what happens when this division of labor is no
longer sustainable.
Indeed, some economists have shown that the expected duration of a household
affects how labor is divided. Johnson and Skinner (1986) find that greater divorce
risk increases the labor supply of women, and Stratton (2005) shows that cohabi-
1Another form of non-market production is the management of health and medical matters. In the United States,
women tend to specialize in these matters. Studies show between 60 to 80 percent of women are primary decision
makers about health care (including selecting doctors and health insurance) for their families, with an additional 18
to 22 percent reporting making joint decisions with partners or spouses (Salganicoff et al., 2002, 2005). Critically,
however, men are much less likely to outlive a spouse and be tasked with replicating this knowledge.
9tating couples, whose relationships are typically shorter in duration than those of
married couples, have less intra-household specialization in housework than married
couples. While widowhood is a completely different form of relationship termination,
it operates similarly by ending a person’s ability to reap the benefits of specialization.
This suggests that the nature of the division of labor within a household changes
over time and therefore calls for continued investment.
Widowhood is a very likely outcome for most married women, who not only face
longer life expectancies than men but are also typically younger than their husbands.
According to 1995 marital status life tables, 75 percent of marriages not ending in
divorce end in widowhood (Schoen and Standish, 2001). Furthermore, the mean
duration of widowhood in the Health and Retirement Study is about nine years
(author’s own calculations). Although the gender disparity in life expectancies has
changed over time, widowed women still outnumbered widowed men four to one in
2003 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). The prospect of many years without the couple’s
financial specialist creates incentives for women to prepare by acquiring financial
knowledge.2
The notion that financial knowledge is a form of human capital was introduced in
Delavande et al. (2008), which related the production of human capital to portfolio
choice. Human capital accumulation is purposive based on its costs and benefits, and
likewise, financial illiteracy or lack of financial knowledge can be costly for widows
for a number of reasons. Even a widow who plans to delegate the management of her
finances to a professional or a relative needs enough knowledge to choose someone
2This chapter focuses on the incentives created by the prospect of widowhood faced by women. Incentives may
arise from other aspects of gender differences in aging and mortality. For example, a woman may plan on being
responsible for finances when her husband becomes cognitively or physically impaired due to aging, if she believes
these her husband’s decline will occur before her own. Chapter III examines the role of cognitive decline and
Alzheimer’s disease on financial decision-making using a longitudinal dataset. Because the empirical analysis in this
chapter employs a single cross-section, I cannot identify declines of husbands relative to declines of wives.
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trustworthy and to recognize if she is being bilked. If she manages her own finances,
she needs to be knowledgeable enough to distinguish fraudulent offers from legitimate
ones. On the other hand, a widow who recognizes her lack of knowledge but does
not trust any individuals or financial institutions may lose potential gains by keeping
all of her money in cash. Lack of financial knowledge can also lead to anxiety about
money. A woman with insufficient financial knowledge may find herself in widowhood
without a firm understanding of how much she can afford to spend, what her holdings
are, or how quickly to decumulate during widowhood.
Since investment decisions and payoffs are realized over the life cycle, an important
aspect of human capital accumulation is the timing of such investments. Mincer and
Polachek (1974) argue that the human capital investments and time allocation of
individuals will be influenced by expectations of future family and market activities.
In most applications such as formal education and on the job training (Ben-Porath,
1967), it is advantageous to invest early to capture the longest stream of benefits.
On the other hand, some investments (such as religious devotion as investment in
the afterlife, studied by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975)) do not usually yield benefits
until much later in life, so that the payoffs to such investments should increase with
age. Similarly, household specialization creates delays in the returns to investing in
knowledge related to the spouse’s tasks. The time horizon for the payoffs also affects
the benefits to human capital investments; Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009)
investigate the effect of a sudden drop in maternal mortality in Sri Lanka and find
that this increase in women’s life expectancy increases human capital investments in
girls.
In this chapter, I develop a model to help explain the timing of human capital
investments in the spouse’s tasks and the effects of differing time horizons arising
11
from gender differences in life expectancies. Using an innovative new dataset, I study
the financial knowledge of husbands and wives, and in doing so I am able to learn
more about an aspect of household production that is not well understood. One
theme underpinning the human capital literature is that investments are purposive,
and I show that the timing of investments in financial human capital is purposive as
well.
2.3 Theoretical framework
This section presents a simple model, assuming no uncertainty, to build intuition
for the effects at play. To model the woman’s decision to accumulate human capital
related to something in which she does not specialize, consider a time span that
begins with marriage (t = 0) and lasts until the end of the wife’s life in period T .
The woman will outlive her husband, who passes away at time t = D (see Figure 2.1).
Therefore, widowhood spans from time D to T . Assume the husband specializes in
household finances from the beginning of the marriage. The marital match is taken
as exogenous.
Assume further that non-wage financial resources can only be used if at least
one person in the household has financial knowledge. A new widow with no finan-
cial knowledge will not be able to access any non-wage financial resources until she
acquires some financial knowledge.3 In this case, smoothing of consumption (or earn-
ings) implies that a widow will want at least some financial knowledge at the time
of widowhood. This is most realistic in a situation in which the husband was wholly
responsible for all household financial matters.
A woman only begins to use this financial knowledge after her husband dies, after
3Or, one could hire a professional to manage finances, which incurs a monetary rather than time cost. Doing so
also requires enough knowledge to evaluate the abilities or trustworthiness of potential advisors and to monitor their
activities.
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which the returns to her stock of financial human capital K are v(K) annually until
her death. The present discounted value (after depreciation) of a marginal unit of
financial human capital over the course of her life is then:
Pt =


[β(1− δ)]D−t
T−D∑
j=0
βjv′(Kt) if t < D
T−t∑
j=0
βjv′(Kt) if t ≥ D
where β is the subjective discount factor and δ is the depreciation rate of human
capital. Prior to widowhood, the value of a marginal increase in financial human
capital is the present value of the stream of annual benefits realized during widow-
hood for a total of T −D years, discounted by the number of years a woman must
wait until the stream begins (D − t years). At time zero, the present value of the
benefits are low due to the D-year delay until widowhood. The value increases as a
woman approaches widowhood, at which point it declines because of the decreasing
number of years the knowledge can be used.
Assuming that units of human capital have a constant marginal product of one,
and that it is independent of the number of units newly acquired or of the current
stock of knowledge, the time path of Pt follows Figure 2.2. Pt can therefore be
interpreted as the demand for financial human capital at time t.
This demand is time variant, so a marginal cost curve is required to pin down
the time-path of human capital investments. Time allocated to acquiring financial
knowledge will be at the expense of other activities. In its simplest form, assume
that this marginal cost curve is upward sloping and fixed over time, with its position
determined by underlying ability. In this case, as Pt shifts upward, a woman will
acquire more human capital until widowhood (with the rate of accumulation increas-
13
ing with age), after which point she will no longer acquire more units, as the costs
exceed the benefits. She will therefore use whatever human capital she acquired by
time D for the duration of widowhood.
The derivative of Pt with respect to the time to widowhood D is
dPt
dD
= [β(1− δ)]D−t 1
1− β
(
βT lnβ + (β − βT+1−D)ln[β(1− δ)]) < 0. (2.1)
The negative sign of this derivative confirms the intuition that one approaches wid-
owhood, the marginal benefit increases.
The derivative with respect to the length of widowhood (holding D constant):
dPt
d(T −D) = −[β(1− δ)]
D−t 1
1− ββ
T+1−Dlnβ > 0. (2.2)
Therefore, the shorter the time to widowhood, the greater the demand for financial
human capital. The longer the duration of widowhood, the greater the demand for
financial knowledge.
The ratio of the magnitude of the two derivatives is
−dPt
dD
dPt
d(T−D)
=
βT lnβ + (β − βT+1−D)ln[β(1− δ)]
βT+1−Dlnβ
. (2.3)
Assuming β = 0.97 4 and δ = 0.03, with T −D the length of widowhood and D
the time to widowhood, the mean ratio in my sample ranges from 1.53 to 3.28 (see
Table 2.1). The ratio is larger the more imminent widowhood is and the longer the
duration of widowhood. The ratio is also larger the greater the depreciation rate of
human capital and the lower the discount factor β. Therefore, the effect of the time
to widowhood on the acquisition of financial literacy should be greater in magnitude
than the effect of the duration of widowhood.
4Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate a structural model using U.S. CEX data and find that high school
graduates have a discount factor of 0.96 and college graduates have a discount factor of 0.97.
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Lastly, a large depreciation rate δ of human capital also increases the incentive to
delay the investment. In the context of financial knowledge, depreciation may take
the form of specific knowledge becoming obsolete as financial institutions and rules
change.
In sum, the model predicts that a woman will acquire financial knowledge very
slowly at the beginning of the marriage and delay larger investments in human capi-
tal. The rate of investing will increase as the expected time of widowhood approaches.
After her husband dies, she takes charge of the finances and accrues payoffs to her
financial knowledge.
This framework is described in terms of financially specializing husbands and
their wives, but it can easily apply to any couple in which one person outlives the
other and the shorter living spouse specializes in at least one task. The fact that
women have longer life expectancies than men and are typically younger than their
husbands makes it easier to test the implications of such a model. Had the longer-
living spouse specialized in household finances from the beginning of the match, the
time-path of human capital investments related to finances would more closely follow
the Ben-Porath prediction5 — front-loaded investments that decline over time.
2.4 Data
The data for the empirical analysis come from the Cognitive Economics Survey
(CogEcon),6 which is an innovative new survey of a national sample of persons 51
and older and their spouses regardless of age. The first wave, administered in the
5The Ben-Porath model includes a key feature that I have dropped for simplicity: the ability of the current capital
stock to increase the productivity of subsequent investments. This feature allows his model to generate a time path
that begins with full time learning and drops sharply, in contrast to the smooth concave function generated by mine.
6The Cognitive Economics Survey is supported by NIA program project P01 AG026571, “Behavior on Surveys
and in the Economy Using HRS,” Robert J. Willis, PI. In addition to Willis, University of Michigan faculty Gwen
Fisher, Miles Kimball, Matthew Shapiro, and Tyler Shumway and graduate students Brooke Helppie and Joanne
Hsu had roles in designing and fielding the CogEcon study.
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spring and summer of 2008, includes a twenty-five question battery on financial
literacy, detailed measures of income, wealth and portfolio allocation plus measures
of risk tolerance, self-assessed financial knowledge, use of records and other sources
of information and several questions on decision-making. An additional survey was
administered to these respondents in 2009 to follow up after the onset of the economic
downturn beginning in the fall of 2008.
These respondents also participated in the Cognition and Aging in the USA study
(CogUSA),7 which includes an extremely detailed cognitive assessment. In addition,
respondents were asked questions about their subjective expectations, including their
subjective survival probabilities. The combined survey allows for the linking of cogni-
tive and economic measures. Furthermore, unlike many other studies that designate
one financial respondent in a household, this study collects measures of financial
decision-making and financial knowledge from both husbands and wives.
Because the model predicts that women will increase their financial knowledge ac-
quisition prior to the death of their spouses, the empirical analysis requires measures
of the expected time of widowhood. Life expectancies and survival probabilities for
CogEcon respondents are drawn from 2004 period life tables published by the Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics at the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services and the National Vital Statistics System at the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention.8 Alternative survival measures employ subjective survival questions
as well as objective survival probabilities predicted using the Health and Retirement
Study, a much larger scale longitudinal survey of similarly-aged individuals.9 These
7The CogUSA Study is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging, grant number R37 AG007137, “Assessing
and Improving Cognitive Measurements in the HRS,” John J. McArdle, PI.
8The life tables by age and sex used in my analysis are found in Tables 2 and 3 from Arias (2007). These 2004
life tables were the most up-to-date versions published by the National Center for Health Statistics at the time the
CogEcon Survey was fielded.
9The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging (grant number NIA
U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan. Some variables were provided by the RAND HRS
Data file (RAND HRS Data, 2010). See http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu for more information.
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measures are described in more detail in Section 2.5.4.
2.4.1 Sample and demographics
CogEcon collects information from 748 unique households10, defined as couples
or individuals without partners. The analysis sample includes 233 couples in which
both members have participated in the survey (466 respondents). 286 unmarried
respondents also participated in the survey. An additional 229 respondents have
partners about whom we have partial or no information due to complete or partial
non-response. Further information about response rates and the derivation of the
analysis sample can be found in Appendix 2.7.
Table 2.2 reports the demographic characteristics of all respondents with spouses
in the sample. The average age of women is 60.5 years, with men about 2.5 years
older. According to life tables, these women face a life expectancy of 24 years, while
their husbands have a mean life expectancy of about 19 years. Men have slightly
more years of education than their wives in this sample. Only 16 percent of wives
report being most knowledgeable about finances.
2.4.2 Outcomes of interest: financial knowledge
General financial literacy
The survey includes a financial literacy battery of 25 questions. Each of these
questions is a statement, and the respondent is asked whether s/he thinks the state-
ment is true or false, and how sure s/he is of that that response on a twelve-point
scale based on her/his degree of certainty (see Figure 2.3). Whether a respondent
sees the true or false version of a question is randomized. Questions are converted to
the true version so that the scale can be interpreted as “0% surely (correct answer)”
10Three same-sex households are excluded as there are no established patterns that indicate that the shorter-living
member is more likely to be the financial specialist in such couples.
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to “100% surely (correct answer).” The responses are re-scaled to a zero-one scale.11
An individual’s financial sophistication score is calculated by taking each respon-
dent’s mean score across questions in the battery and normalizing across all survey
respondents. A within-couple relative score is computed using the wife-husband
difference in normalized mean scores.
Topics covered include interest compounding, diversification and risk, financial
terms, stock market concepts, taxation, and inflation. For the full text of each
question, see Appendix 2.7.3. To account for the fact that not all respondents may
participate in the stock market, some analyses will employ a financial literacy score
that excludes the fifteen stock related questions. As can be seen in the summary
statistics in Table 2.3, men have, on average, higher levels of financial literacy than
women whether or not stock questions are included.
Additional outcomes
While financial literacy is the central measure of financial knowledge in this chap-
ter, I also replicate the analysis with several other measures to see if similar patterns
hold with respect to the imminence and expected duration of widowhood. The 2008
survey asks each respondent to rate on a six point scale his ability to deal with day-
to-day financial matters as well as his understanding of the stock market. In 2009,
respondents were asked how often they follow the stock market, as well as whether
they think stock returns have exceeded bond returns over the last 100 years. Re-
spondents’ beliefs about stock market returns, as well as the extent to which they
follow the market, complement financial literacy as measures of general knowledge
11The re-scaling is based on the assumption that respondents have in mind a probability that the statement in the
question is true, and they select their answer choice by rounding off their probability to the nearest choice on our
12-point scale. We can then construct intervals within which a respondent would round to each answer choice, and
the point-value we assign is the midpoint of this interval. For instance, those who believe a statement is true with
certainties between 95 percent and 100 percent would round up to 100 percent surely true, so that choice is assigned
the value 0.975.
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because they have direct bearing on financial planning, stock market participation,
and investment behavior. Correct beliefs about stock market returns may also reflect
greater involvement in household investments. The full text of these questions are
provided in Appendix 2.7.
2.4.3 Cognitive ability, health, and risk tolerance measures
While the model emphasizes the effect of a spouse’s mortality on the division of
labor, a spouse’s declining cognition or health status are other factors that would
similarly necessitate learning about his tasks. Summary statistics for these factors
are reported in Table 2.3.
One of the most widely accepted theories of cognitive abilities is the Gf-Gc the-
ory (Cattell, 1941; Horn, 1965; Horn and Cattell, 1966, 1967). Primary abilities
are divided into two broad dimensions: fluid intelligence (Gf ) and crystallized in-
telligence (Gc). Fluid intelligence represents reasoning abilities that result from
biological influences on intellectual development, such as heredity or injuries to the
nervous system. Crystallized intelligence refers to the use of accumulated knowledge
and skill and represents the results of educational investments and experience rather
than underlying ability. The distinction between fluid and crystallized intelligence
is similar to the notion of ability versus human capital in labor economics. Other
cognitive abilities include episodic memory and processing speed.
Financial literacy can be interpreted both as a form of human capital as well as
a form of crystallized intelligence. While crystallized intelligence tends to increase
through the accumulation of knowledge, fluid intelligence peaks early in life and
declines over the remaining life cycle. Psychologists have verified that both fluid
intelligence and the episodic memory decline with age (McArdle et al., 2007; Ver-
haeghen and Salthouse, 1997; McArdle et al., 2002). Furthermore, episodic memory
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is typically among the first cognitive functions to deteriorate during aging (Backman
et al., 2001). Measures of fluid intelligence and episodic memory can thus be used
to control for the cognitive decline of respondents and to conduct robustness checks
on my results.
Fluid intelligence is measured using a normalized W-score of the Woodcock-
Johnson III Number Series test. Respondents are given a sequence of numbers with
a missing number, and they are asked the value of the missing number. The W-
scores used by psychologists are scaled using a large external norming sample, but
here I normalize the scores among all CogUSA respondents for easier interpretation.
Episodic memory (conceptualized as a form of fluid intelligence) is measured using
a Total Recall score, which is derived by testing both immediate and delayed recall
of a list of ten words. Again, I use scores that are normalized using all CogUSA
respondents. As can be seen in Table 2.3, in the CogEcon sample, men tend to have
higher Number Series scores, but lower Total Recall scores, than women.
Additional cognition measures can be used in place of financial knowledge as
falsification tests. I will use a variety of cognitive measures: working memory, pro-
cessing speed, verbal reasoning, and numeracy/mathematical skill. The Mental Sta-
tus battery includes the Serial 7s test, which is a measure of working memory, or
the ability to actively store and manipulate information in order to conduct com-
plex cognitive tasks, including learning or reasoning. The Mental Status score also
uses tests of backwards counting, date naming, object naming, and President/Vice
President naming. The Woodcock-Johnson III Visual Matching test measures pro-
cessing speed, and studies show that “measures of speed tend to share about 75%
of the age-related variance with various cognitive measures” (Salthouse, 2000). The
Woodcock-Johnson III Verbal Analogies test measures the respondent’s ability to
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reason using lexical knowledge; it is a verbal measure of fluid intelligence. Lastly,
numeracy or mathematical skill is measured with the Woodcock-Johnson III Calcu-
lation test. The Number Series and Calculation tests are the two scores that are
most highly correlated with financial literacy.
In addition to his cognitive decline, a husband’s poor physical health may also
contribute to a woman taking over his tasks. One overall measure of health is the
question, “Would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?”
This self-rated health measure is coded from 1 (for poor) and 5 (for excellent).
Women rate their health slightly higher than men (See Table 2.3), though this dif-
ference is not statistically significant.
Lastly, a risk tolerant woman may be more willing to delay investments in her
husband’s tasks than a risk averse woman. The Cognitive Economics survey asks
questions about hypothetical gambles similar to those asked in the Health and Re-
tirement Study to measure risk tolerance (Barsky et al., 1997). Respondents are
assigned one of six ordinal categories of risk tolerance based on which of the hypo-
thetical gambles are accepted or rejected.
2.5 Empirical results and discussion
2.5.1 The CFO and the household division of labor
The most direct question related to household division of labor asks “Which mem-
ber of the immediate family is most knowledgeable about your family’s assets, debts,
and retirement planning?” Respondents may specify “me,” “my spouse/partner,”
“both me and my spouse/partner,” or “someone else in the family” as the house-
hold’s “Chief Financial Officer.” About 16 percent of women in couples report being
most knowledgeable, and less than half report being at least equally knowledgeable
(see Table 2.2).
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A unique advantage of the CogEcon study is that it poses the same questions
to both members of a couple whenever possible. Table 2.4 cross-tabulates the two
members’ responses to the question about who is most financially knowledgeable
within the household. 152 couples, comprising 65 percent of these married cou-
ples, gave strongly consistent answers. This includes couples for which both specify
“both of us”, or one member specifies “me” and the partner/spouse specifies “my
spouse/partner.” Weakly consistent answers are answers that are not the same but
are non-contradictory. These include cases in which one member specifies “both of
us,” whereas the spouse/partner chooses either “me” or “my spouse/partner,” or if
one member of a couple skips the question. 71 couples, or 30 percent of married
couples, gave weakly consistent answers. Other combinations are contradictory and
are considered inconsistent; ten couples, or four percent of married couples, fall in
this category. Because of the small number of couples with inconsistent answers,
the analysis will ignore these discrepancies and will generally consider the woman’s
response as representative of the couple.
To verify that the question on financial knowledge provides information about the
division of labor, I investigate how financial knowledge relates to financial decision-
making using the question “Who (among members of your immediate family) makes
the decisions about how to save for retirement and other large expenses?” Responses
to the two questions are highly correlated. Among those in couples, over 60 percent
of respondents name the same person (or persons, in the case of the “both” answer
choice) as the most knowledgeable as well as the decision-maker. Over one third of
respondents state that both members of the couple make decisions while only one is
most knowledgeable, a small number state the reverse, and for 2 percent of couples
both are most knowledgeable but one makes the decisions. Only about 2 percent
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of respondents give inconsistent answers to the two questions — for instance, the
partner is most knowledgeable, but the respondent himself makes the major decisions.
Since these inconsistent responses are so few in number and because a majority of
respondents state that decisions are made by both members of the couple, the most
knowledgeable person is a meaningful measure without incorporating additional data
about who makes the major decisions.
Table 2.5 reports the characteristics of households with a female, male, or joint
CFO. Only 16 percent of couples have female CFOs. The CFO tends to be more
educated, have more financial literacy, and have more fluid intelligence (as measured
by the Number Series score) than his or her spouse; this is true for couples with
male CFOs as well as those with female CFOs. These patterns are consistent with
the idea that where one spouse has a comparative advantage with respect to fluid
intelligence or education, s/he becomes the CFO. In addition, the intra-couple age
gap is smaller in couples with female CFOs than those with male CFOs. Also, small
differences in the Number Series score become amplified in the differences in financial
literacy, which may be a product of specialization.
Similar patterns can be seen in Table 2.6, which reports the proportion of couples
for which the woman has higher levels of the characteristic than her husband. These
proportions are higher when women are CFOs; lower when men are CFOs; and in
between when both are jointly CFOs. The results verify that the patterns in Table
2.5 are not driven by a few outliers.
2.5.2 Descriptive non-parametric analysis: Financial literacy by age
The cross-section can be used as a synthetic cohort to see if patterns of financial
knowledge within couples change with age. My model predicts that women should
increase their financial knowledge as they approach widowhood. Furthermore, if
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their husbands’ cognition and/or health deteriorates earlier than their own, women
will have greater incentive to acquire more knowledge relative to their husbands. Be-
cause the survey is not currently longitudinal, there are no measurements of baseline
knowledge for women. To measure changes in financial knowledge in the synthetic
cohort, I instead use the husbands’ knowledge as a baseline.
Figure 2.4 shows the age profile of the financial sophistication score based on the
husband’s age. The age profile is estimated using a lowess plot (locally weighted
scatterplot smoothing), which non-parametrically estimates:
wife′s financial literacy − husband′s financial literacy = f(husband′s age).
(2.4)
Men’s financial sophistication follows a flat or upside-down U-shape, whereas women’s
financial sophistication score is upward sloping with respect to their husband’s age,
which can be seen in the graph on the left. A similar pattern emerges when stock
questions are excluded, as seen in Figure 2.5.
To see if this pattern holds when women are matched to their husbands, I plot the
wife-husband difference in financial sophistication on the right side graph of Figure
2.4. Within couples, the wife’s score rises relative to her husband’s score as he ages
and his life expectancy shortens; this is true also when excluding stock questions
in Figure 2.5. These patterns are not sensitive to bandwidth choice. Univariate
regressions of the wife-husband difference in financial scores on the husband’s life
expectancy show the same negative relationship. The slopes for the full financial score
estimate and the non-stock financial score estimate are statistically significant at the
ten percent and five percent level, respectively (see Table 2.7). This is consistent
with the notion that women invest in their human capital as their husbands age.
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Possible confounders
Is this active learning on the part of the women, in anticipation of their husbands’
decline in health and cognition? The age profiles in financial knowledge detailed
above are also consistent with two different explanations unrelated to my theoretical
model. First, the gains in women’s knowledge relative to men may not actually reflect
any actual gains; women’s knowledge may remain constant while their husbands’
cognition declines. Secondly, older women may have been in charge of finances
throughout their marriages, thereby violating the assumptions of the synthetic cohort
analysis employed here, and the results may merely reflect cohort effects.
Cognitive decline of husbands One might be concerned that these age profiles are
generated by older men paired with younger women, such that an increase in the
wife-husband financial knowledge gap is driven solely by a decline in the husband’s
ability, rather than a true increase in the woman’s ability. Figure 2.6 shows age
profiles of various other cognitive scores, plotted against the husband’s age (compa-
rable to the upper left panel of Figure 2.4). These graphs are generated by locally
weighted scatterplot (lowess) smoothing. Aside from the Total Recall score, none of
the other cognitive measures have a wife-husband gap that increases with the hus-
band’s age. The scores for husbands and wives track each other remarkably closely
by the husband’s age; if anything, for Verbal Analogies (a measure of reasoning using
lexical knowledge) and Visual Matching (a measure of processing speed), men seem
to gain on women at the oldest ages. Furthermore, the Number Series scores, which
have been shown to be strong predictors of financial literacy and wealth (McArdle
et al., 2009), have parallel profiles for both men and women when plotted against
the husband’s age. These patterns suggest that the age profile of financial literacy
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scores does not merely track underlying patterns of cognitive decline of husbands
and wives. Because the Total Recall score is the exception, all regression analyses
will include controls for the husbands’ and wives’ Recall Score.
Cohort effects Using the cross-section as a synthetic cohort assumes that the
experiences of individuals over the age distribution of the cross-section reflect the
experiences of individuals as they age through each successive cohort, as if I had
observed a single cohort longitudinally.12 An alternative hypothesis consistent with
my results is that older women have been household CFOs throughout the marriage,
while younger women are less likely to do so. This would cause the synthetic cohort
to produce spurious support for the model’s predictions.
However, social changes across cohorts suggest otherwise; historical marriage and
divorce patterns are likely to bias the data against my model’s predictions. Women
in younger cohorts are likely to have married at an older age, as seen in the CPS and
Census data in Figure 2.7.13 Although the median age of women married before 1949
(the 5th percentile in my data of the year of first marriage, marked on the figure
with a vertical line) was slightly higher, there was subsequently an upward trend
over time. Therefore, the younger women in my sample have had greater incentive
to gain financial knowledge prior to marriage. In addition, if the dispersion of power
within a couple is greater when the spousal age gap is larger, we may not expect the
younger spouses of the older men to have as much control over finances. Younger
couples are likely to be more “egalitarian” than older couples, and therefore older
women might be less likely (and older men more likely) to be household CFO.
12One common use of the synthetic cohort is the computation of life table life expectancies, which are expected to
be downward biased because younger cohorts will have the benefit of medical advances not available to those who
are already elderly.
13This figure was constructed using Table MS-2 posted online by the U.S. Census Bureau at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html.
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The prospect of divorce, which has changed considerably over time, may also lead
women to learn about finances earlier in life. Historical divorce rates in the United
States are shown in Figure 2.8.14 Although the rates were slightly higher in the mid
1940s than than in the 1950s, divorce rates climbed rapidly through the 1960s and
70s. Divorce rates remained high through the 80s and declined only more recently.
The sharp increase in divorce rates would create incentives for the younger women in
my sample to insure themselves by acquiring more knowledge earlier in adulthood.
Figure 2.9 confirms a similar pattern in my sample; the women who are married to
the oldest men are less likely to have ever been divorced.
These patterns, in addition to changing norms due to the rise of feminism, would
create greater incentives for younger women (relative to older women) to learn early
and/or become CFOs in the household. All of these cohort effects should produce
downward bias on any estimates of the effects of life expectancy on financial knowl-
edge.
2.5.3 Regression analysis using life table widowhood measures
Because CogEcon surveys both the husband and the wife in a couple whenever
possible, I can link members of a couple for analysis. I estimate the effect of expected
time to widowhood and expected length of widowhood (derivations in Appendix 2.8)
on women’s financial knowledge. Table 2.3 reports summary statistics of the financial
knowledge variables and measures of husband’s life expectancy and widowhood used
in the analysis. Women have on average -0.37 standard deviations less financial
literacy than their husbands, though this gap narrows to -0.31 when stock-related
questions are excluded. Women are most knowledgeable about finances in only 16
14Statistics prior to 1950 are drawn from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1954) and are based on population figures
including the armed forces overseas. Numbers from 1950 onward are from U.S. Census Bureau (2004); divorce rates
for 1998-2002 exclude California, Colorado, Indiana, and Louisiana from both the numerator as well as the population
denominator.
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percent of couples, but they are equally knowledgeable in 33 percent of couples.
In this sample, life tables indicate an expected time to widowhood (conditional on
the woman outliving the man) of about 14 years, with an expected duration of
widowhood (also conditional on the woman outliving the man) of 12.9 years.15
Table 2.8 uses the couple-level data to analyze the the difference between a woman
and her husband’s financial sophistication mean score and presents results for the
following equation:
d(financial sophistication) = γ1(expected time to widowhood)+
γ2(expected duration of widowhood) +Xβ +  (2.5)
where d(x) designates the wife-husband difference in x.
The first column of Table 2.8 estimates the equation with no covariates, while the
second column includes the usual education and health controls. Column (3) adds
the memory and fluid intelligence (Number Series) of both husband and wife, and the
woman’s risk tolerance. Including these cognition variables increases the magnitude
and precision of the estimated coefficient on the time to widowhood. A one-year
reduction in the expected time to widowhood is associated with a statistically signif-
icant 0.04 standard deviation increase in the wife-husband difference in normalized
financial sophistication, which is about 11 percent of the mean difference. This result
arises even when controlling for the Recall score, a cognitive measure that declines
markedly with age.
Several of the questions in the financial sophistication battery are related to the
stock market, and these concepts may not be relevant to members of households who
15These figures use life table aggregate statistics from individuals of all marital statuses, so it assumes that the
mortality of husbands and wives are uncorrelated, and that if there is a marriage treatment effect on life expectancy,
its magnitude does not differ between husbands and wives. If one does not condition on the woman outliving the
husband, life tables also indicate an average life expectancy of almost 20 years for the husbands, with wife-husband
difference in life expectancies of over four years. All analysis using these unconditional measures yield similar results.
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do not participate in the stock market. I construct a second financial literacy score
from the ten questions that are unrelated to the stock market and normalize them
over all respondents. Table 2.9 repeats the financial sophistication analysis with this
smaller set of non-stock related financial literacy questions. The coefficient on the
husband’s life expectancy increases substantially in magnitude; in the specification
with full controls in the third column, this coefficient increases 15 percent to -0.048
from -0.041 in Table 2.8. The coefficient on the expected length of widowhood is
unchanged and is still statistically insignificant.
The Number Series score is a strong predictor of financial knowledge, and since
this is a measure of fluid intelligence, having a higher Number Series score can be
interpreted as lowering the woman’s marginal cost of acquiring knowledge. A one
standard deviation increase in the wife’s Number Series score is associated with a
0.32 standard deviation increase in her financial literacy, relative to her husband.
Coefficients on the control variables are generally as expected: lower risk tolerance
for women is associated with more financial knowledge, and the lower the education
and health levels of the husbands, the greater the woman’s financial knowledge.
Likewise, the greater are a woman’s levels of health or education, the greater her
financial knowledge, and these effects are smaller in magnitude than those of her
husband’s levels.
Even after including for the Total Recall score, which declines strongly with age
and therefore helps control for the husband’s cognitive decline, I still find a statisti-
cally significant effect of time to widowhood on financial literacy. The magnitude of
the effect is large; if all women acquired financial literacy at the estimated 0.04 stan-
dard deviation per year, almost 80 percent of women in the sample would fully catch
up with their husband’s current level of financial literacy before the expected onset
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of widowhood. The coefficients on the expected duration of widowhood are positive
— the longer the length of widowhood, the more financial literacy the woman has
relative to her husband — but are not statistically significant. This is consistent with
the fact that the model predicts the effect of the marginal year closer widowhood
should be much larger than the marginal year during widowhood.
As a robustness check, I run false regressions of equation (2.5) by replacing the
difference in financial sophistication scores on the left hand side with differences in
cognition scores. Table 2.10 reports the results for the six cognition scores detailed
in Section 2.4.3. Because the left hand side variables are all wife-husband differences
in normalized scores, the coefficients are directly comparable to each other. The
columns are in order from most highly correlated to least correlated to financial
literacy. All but one of the falsification regressions have coefficients on the time to
widowhood that are smaller in magnitude than the same coefficient in the financial
literacy regression; two of them have positive estimated coefficients. The one measure
with a similar coefficient on time to widowhood, Total Recall, has a low correlation
with financial literacy; furthermore, the main regressions in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 control
for the recall score. This demonstrates that the estimated effect of time to widowhood
on financial literacy is not a spurious relationship solely attributable to the cognitive
decline of men.
2.5.4 Robustness: regression analysis using alternative probabilistic survival mea-
sures
The ideal explanatory variables would be the woman’s subjective expectation of
her husband’s life expectancy as well as her subjective expected length of widow-
hood. Life table life expectancies by age and sex mask much of the variation in
actual survival expectations across individuals. In the absence of questions elicit-
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ing expectations of the timing of one’s partner’s mortality, I will need to impose
various assumptions in order to derive a proxy for these expectations. In this sec-
tion, I construct objective and subjective probabilistic measures of the imminence
and duration of widowhood, and then I present the results using each of these mea-
sures. Converting probabilistic measures to measures in time units as used in the
main analysis would require strong assumptions about the shape of each individual’s
entire survival function, so I leave these survival measures in their probabilistic form.
The equations I estimate with these alternate survival measures are identical
to Equations 2.5 but replace the expected length of widowhood with the husband’s
probability of surviving at least another ten years, and the expected length of widow-
hood by the wife-husband difference in their respective ten-year survival probabilities.
These results generally confirm that the lower the husband’s survival probability (and
therefore the more imminent widowhood is), the greater the wife’s level of financial
knowledge.
Life table survival probabilities
The most straight-forward approach would be to assume that individuals have
expectations in accordance with published life tables as shown in Table 2.8. In the
previous analysis, I have used the expected time to widowhood and the expected
years of widowhood calculated from 2004 period life tables, by age and sex. An
alternative measure from the life table is the ten-year-ahead survival probability,
which is defined as
∏10
x=age(1 − q(x)), where q(x) is the life table hazard of dying
between age x and x+ 1.
Using life tables requires the assumption that a woman’s expectation of the timing
and length of widowhood are, in expectation, the same as those in these life tables.
One problem is that life tables are constructed as population-level averages, and par-
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ticular individuals’ life expectancies and mortality probabilities will diverge (either
positively or negatively) from the life tables as a result of individual characteristics
such as health status. Women will have some information, some observed in the
survey and some not, that may make their expectations deviate from life tables. In
addition, life table statistics are biased due to their use of synthetic cohorts.
Subjective survival probabilities
While life tables reflect the experience of entire populations, individual expecta-
tions are likely to deviate heterogeneously from these population measures. I use
subjective survival probability questions that are asked of each CogEcon respondent
in the second wave of CogUSA. These questions ask “What is the percent chance
that you will live to be X or more?” where X is an age that is between 11 and
15 years in the future (or more, in the case of spouses who are younger than 50).
Therefore, these responses represent the subjective Pr(alive at age X|current age).
Appendix 2.7.4 describes these questions in more detail.
A number of studies have analyzed the relationship between actual mortality and
the subjective survival probabilities elicited in surveys. Subjective survival proba-
bilities have been shown, on average, to be close to those in life tables, and they
covary with variables like health conditions, smoking behavior and socio-economic
status in the same way as actual mortality outcomes do (Hurd and McGarry, 1995).
The probabilities are consistent with individuals’ observed mortality patterns (Elder,
2010; Smith et al., 2001) and are updated by individuals in response to new informa-
tion, such as the onset of health conditions (Hurd and McGarry, 2002; Smith et al.,
2001). Perozek (2008) uses responses to survival expectations questions to construct
subjective life tables which are shown to predict the unusual direction of revisions
to subsequent Social Security Actuary life expectancies.
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Whether or not these responses predict mortality, one can argue that individ-
ual life-cycle behavior reflects subjective beliefs rather than actuarial probabilities.
Therefore, subjective probabilities can be used in my analysis, with additional as-
sumptions required to account for the different target ages faced by respondents.
This strategy assumes that a woman’s beliefs about her husband’s mortality are
identical to her husband’s own beliefs about his own mortality.16
Because the time horizon of the subjective survival questions varies between 11
and 15 years ahead, responses for different time horizons are not comparable at face
value. I interpolate a ten-year-ahead survival probability by assuming assuming that
one-year hazard rates are constant over the 11-15 year horizons of the subjective
survival questions. Constant hazards implies that Pr(alive in 10 years|age) =
(1− q(age))10 and Pr(alive at age X|age) = (1− q(age))X, where q(.) is the annual
mortality hazard and X the target age posed in the subjective survival questions.
Solving both equations for q(.), setting them equal to each other and rearranging
yields:
Pr(alive in 10 years|age) = Prsubj(alive at age X|age)
10
X−age (2.6)
I calculate this ten-year-ahead survival probability from the age 75 question for
those under 65, since the constant hazard assumption is more realistic for shorter
time horizons. I retain the original values of those who report 0 and 100 percent
probabilities. These probabilities have a 0.56 correlation with life table probabilities,
with a wife-husband difference that is smaller than the life tables (see Tables 2.11
and 2.12).
16Unfortunately for my analysis, to my knowledge no surveys that field these subjective survival expectations
questions query both members of a couple about their spouse’s survival prospects.
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Rounding and survey noise Here, I take the responses to the subjective survival
probability questions at face value. However, respondents may round their responses;
Manski and Molinari (2010) analyze expectations questions in the HRS and find that
respondents round to varying degrees. CogEcon asks a number of follow-up questions
in the expectations module that shed some light on the extent of rounding.
Those under 65 who report a survival probability to 75 that is a multiple of 10 or
25 (but not 50) are asked a followup: “When you said X percent just now, did you
mean this as an exact number or were you rounding or approximating?” Those who
reported they approximated were then asked, “What range of numbers did you have
in mind when you said 50 percent?” Of the 322 who reported a multiple of 10 or 25
(but not 50), 205 stated they had approximated. To better understand the direction
of rounding, one can compare the reported probability to the midpoint of the range
later reported. For 40.0 percent of those 322, the reported survival probability and
the midpoint of the range are the same; 29.3 percent report a probability that is less
than the midpoint, and the remaining 30.7 percent report a probability exceeding the
midpoint. The mean difference is 1.46 percentage points. This suggests symmetric
rounding. If noise is introduced through rounding or through general survey noise
like classical measurement error, these measures will produce attenuation bias in my
estimates.
Objective predicted survival probabilities (HRS)
Because CogEcon and the Health and Retirement Study share many socio-demographic,
cognitive and physical health measures, one can use the effect of these variables on
observed mortality in HRS to predict mortality for CogEcon respondents.
I estimate a probit model of survival using respondents of the 1998 wave of the
HRS and their survival outcomes using the 2008 Tracker File. The covariates in-
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clude gender, race, years of education, couple status, birth year, episodic memory,
mental status, depressive symptoms, an index of health measures, self-rated health,
smoking status, and alcohol consumption, all measured in 1998. I use the estimated
parameters to predict ten-year survival for CogEcon respondents. As can be seen
in Tables 2.11 and 2.12, these predicted survival probabilities are highly correlated
with life table probabilities, and have less variance and are of higher levels than the
subjective probabilities.
Standard error adjustment for two-step estimation Estimation with predicted sur-
vival probabilities uses a two-stage procedure in which mortalities are predicted in
the first stage using HRS data, and the main equation of interest is estimated in
the second stage. Since the husband’s predicted survival and the difference between
the wives’ and their husbands’ survival probabilities are predicted with error, the
variance-covariance matrix of the main estimating equation will require an adjust-
ment for the generated regressors. The adjustments made here are suggested by
Murphy and Topel (1985), and details about the adjustments can be found in Ap-
pendix 2.9. Due to the large sample size of the first-stage HRS estimates, the correct
standard errors are only slightly larger than the uncorrected ones.
Results with alternate probabilistic life measures
This section presents regression results using the alternate measures of survival.
Summary statistics for these probabilistic measures are reported in Tables 2.11 and
2.12. Figure 2.10 displays scatterplots of the survival probabilities generated using
each of the methods for CogEcon respondents in couples whose partners are also in
the survey.
In order to maintain comparability of units across the measures, I have chosen to
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use ten-year survival probabilities instead of life expectancies. Using ten-year proba-
bilities involves weaker assumptions (as outlined above) than life expectancies, which
require assumptions about the entire hazard function from the individual’s current
age onward. In both tables, the first column presents results using the ten-year
probabilities from U.S. life table; the second from subjective survival probabilities,
and the third from objective predicted probabilities from HRS probit estimation.
Since all of these measures are ten-year survival probabilities, the coefficients on the
husband’s survival probabilities are comparable across specifications, as are the coef-
ficients on the difference between a woman’s and her husband’s survival probabilities.
However, since the first and last columns are based on averages (by age and sex for
life tables, and for various personal characteristics in the case of the HRS estimates),
I expect these coefficients to be estimated with less precision. On the other hand,
the subjective survival measures are subject to survey noise, which should lead to
attenuation bias.
All of the regressions reported in Table 2.13 show that the effect of husbands’ sur-
vival probabilities on financial sophistication is negative, as predicted by the model,
though the estimates are not statistically significant. With subjective probabilities, a
ten percent decrease in husband’s survival probability is associated with an increase
in the woman’s financial sophistication score of 0.06 standard deviations over her
husband’s score. While the signs of the effect of husband’s survival probabilities are
consistent with the model’s predictions for both types of financial knowledge, the
estimated magnitudes appear to be small.
Regressions with non-stock financial literacy as the dependent variable are re-
ported in Table 2.14. Like the main results with expected time to widowhood, the
magnitude of the effects of the husband’s survival probabilities are much larger for
36
non-stock financial literacy than general financial sophistication; for the HRS pre-
dicted probabilities, the effect is doubled. This suggests that increases in financial
knowledge with the risk of widowhood are being made both in the realm of stocks
and even more so in more basic topics.
In all sets of regressions, the effect of the expected duration of widowhood (as
measured as the difference in the survival probabilities of husbands and wives) is
sensitive to the method used for deriving those probabilities. Given that the length
of widowhood is a secondary effect, is is not surprising that the effect of widowhood
is weaker than the effect of the timing of the onset of widowhood.
2.5.5 Regression analysis using other outcomes
I now turn to additional measures of financial knowledge: women’s self-rated
financial knowledge, historical knowledge of the stock market, and closely following
the stock market. Because these measures are absolute levels rather than relative to
their husbands, the use of the synthetic cohort for these outcomes is less compelling.
Nevertheless, results from analysis using each of these measures instead of financial
literacy provide additional supporting evidence that women increase knowledge as
their husband’s life expectancies decrease.
Self-rated knowledge The CogEcon survey includes two self-rated measures of fi-
nancial knowledge. Respondents are asked the degree to which they agree with the
following statements: “I am good at dealing with day-to-day financial matters, such
as checking accounts, credit cards, mortgages, installment payments, and budgeting,”
and “I understand the stock market reasonably well.” Respondents select from a six-
point Likert scale: strongly agree (six points), agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree,
disagree, and disagree strongly (one point). Summary statistics for this and subse-
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quent financial knowledge measures are reported in Table 2.15. On average, women
report much higher levels of financial skills than stock skills (5.0 versus 2.9). The
first two columns of Table 2.16 show ordered probit regressions of women’s self-rated
measures on their husband’s life expectancy, their expected length of widowhood, and
other control variables. Like the analysis of financial literacy, these regressions show
that reductions in the time to widowhood are associated with increases in self-rated
stock market knowledge and self-rated financial skills. The coefficients on husband’s
life expectancy are statistically significant in both regressions.
While the first two columns of Table 2.16 only use the wife’s self-report, columns
(3) and (4) use the wife-husband difference used in the financial battery analysis.
The main outcome used in this chapter, the wife-husband difference in financial
sophistication scores, is a relative measure of the woman in relation to her husband.
While the financial sophistication battery allows for an objective ratio, the husbands
and wives may have different cut-points on the latent variable underlying each self-
reported outcome. Therefore, the self-reports may not be appropriate for use as a
wife-husband relative measure. That said, these regressions still yield the expected
result of negative coefficients on time to widowhood.
Historical knowledge and following the stock market Another outcome measure is
knowledge about the historical returns of stocks relative to bonds. The following
question was posed in the post-crash (2009) wave of the CogEcon survey: “On
average over the last 100 years, how do you think the annual rate of return on stocks
has compared to the annual rate of return on bonds?” Respondents may indicate
whether stock returns have been higher than bond returns, bond returns have been
higher than stock returns, and both returns were the same. In the period between
38
1908 and 2006, the arithmetic average of annual total real stock market returns
was 8.5 percent, while the arithmetic average of annual long-term government bond
returns was 5.5 percent (Siegel, 2007). Answering this question correctly not only is
evidence of greater financial knowledge, but also has implications for stock market
participation, retirement planning, and other financial matters. About 57 percent
of women gave correct answers (see Table 2.15). Average marginal effects from a
probit estimation with an outcome of one if respondents report that stock returns
have been higher than bond returns are reported in the fifth column Table 2.16.
As predicted by my model, women with less time to widowhood are more likely to
answer correctly, and the average marginal effect is statistically significant at the five
percent level.
The CogEcon post-crash survey also asks respondents “How closely do you follow
the stock market?” with the answer choices “very closely,” “somewhat,” and “not at
all.” Following the stock market more closely may be a sign of greater involvement
in handling finances or increased learning about the economic and financial environ-
ment. An ordered probit of this question is reported in the sixth column of Table
2.16. As the time to widowhood shortens, women are more likely to follow the stock
market more closely (statistically significant at the one percent level). This effect is
consistent with women learning more about finances as they approach widowhood.
2.6 Conclusion
Empirical studies on financial literacy have generally shown that women have
less financial knowledge than men (Fonseca et al., 2010; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008;
Kotlikoff and Bernheim, 2001). One possible explanation for this gender gap is that
it reflects the household division of labor. Unequal life expectancies of household
39
members imply that a division of labor that emerges when the couple forms will
eventually change when the longer-living spouse takes over the responsibilities held by
the shorter-living spouse. Household financial management is a task that is frequently
the responsibility of the husband, who generally has a shorter life expectancy than
the wife. Because the benefits of financial knowledge for women are not realized
until she is a widow, the theoretical model predicts that a woman has an incentive
to delay the acquisition of financial knowledge until later in life. Conversely, because
knowledge cannot be acquired instantaneously, she also has an incentive to begin her
acquisition of financial knowledge well before widowhood so that she will be equipped
with the knowledge needed to manage her wealth when her husband dies.
Using matched data on wives and husbands, I show that women do indeed increase
their financial knowledge on a number of dimensions as their husbands age. Women
acquire financial literacy at a rate of 0.04 standard deviations per year; at this rate,
about 80 percent of the women in the sample would catch up with their husbands
in financial literacy before the expected onset of widowhood. In addition, women
have increased self-rated financial skills and follow the stock market more closely as
widowhood becomes more imminent. Because cohort effects related to age at first
marriage and divorce probabilities work against my finding a result, my estimates
are underestimates of the actual effects. Furthermore, I find statistically significant
effects of the time to widowhood in spite of the measurement error associated with
using population-average life table calculations.
However, I do not find a statistically significant effect of the expected length of
widowhood on women’s financial knowledge. This may not be surprising given that
the model predicts a much larger effect of time to widowhood than the length of
widowhood. Assuming a discount factor of 0.97 and no depreciation, the effect of
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time to widowhood is predicted to be on average 50 percent larger than the duration’s
effect, with the gap widening if human capital is assumed to depreciate. Furthermore,
while the model does not specify the functional form of the returns to financial
knowledge, the financial decisions faced by widows may be less complex than the
planning decisions made earlier in the life cycle. If this is the case, then the marginal
returns to financial knowledge may decline sharply after a certain threshold. Women
may aim to reach a level of financial knowledge at widowhood sufficient to manage
their decumulation, but not necessarily so much as to make complex investment
decisions.
The financial literacy outcome uses the husband’s literacy as a baseline in order
to identify effects from a synthetic cohort formed by a cross-section. My results
show that older women do indeed plan strategically for the future by investing in
financial knowledge as widowhood becomes more imminent. This supports the idea
that the poor economic outcomes associated with widowhood may reflect insufficient
preparation due to an unexpectedly early onset of widowhood. In addition, poor
outcomes may also reflect low levels of husband’s financial knowledge; in this case,
merely catching up with their husbands (as most women would if they continue to
acquire knowledge at the rates I have estimated) may not equip women with the
tools needed to manage their finances alone.
The model can be applied not only to financial literacy but also to any other
task specialized in by a spouse. In addition, the model can also be generalized to
other questions related to the length of time a person can depend on a spouse to
continue specializing. Korniotis and Kumar (2011) find that older investors exhibit
greater investment knowledge, but that these effects are offset by the adverse effects
of cognitive aging which further incentivizes early planning for women who may
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want to prepare not only for widowhood but also for the cognitive decline of their
husbands. Future work will specifically consider the effects of cognitive decline. Since
the model shows declining incentives to invest after widowhood, it sheds some light
on the stylized fact that widows have very low levels of financial knowledge. The
model can also be applied more generally to the expected duration of the union rather
than the expected timing of widowhood, so the same implications can be drawn for
women facing varying probabilities of divorce.
One extension not yet considered is the availability of an outside option for dealing
with the shorter-living spouse’s tasks. Instead of learning to manage her own wealth,
she can have a third person, whether an adult child or a financial planner, manage
her finances on her behalf. Indeed, the third-person option may be one reason why
women do not appear to react to a longer expected duration of widowhood.
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2.7 Appendix A: Data appendix
2.7.1 Response rates
1,222 participants who completed the CogUSA study17 were invited to complete
the Cognitive Economics Survey. The invitees included 371 uncoupled individuals,
304 couples in which both members were invited (608 individuals) and 243 couples
in which only one member was invited.
The reasons for which these 243 partners were not invited:
• 48 only partially completed the CogUSA study
• 138 refused to participate in the CogUSA study
• 24 did not provide an interview for CogUSA for unspecified reasons
• 4 were removed from the CogUSA sample for unknown reasons
• 4 were not interviewed by CogUSA due to language problems
• 25 were physically or mentally unable to conduct the CogUSA telephone inter-
view.
CogEcon had an overall response rate of 80.61 percent, yielding a sample size of
985 respondents. Response rates of mutually exhaustive sub groups:
• uncoupled individuals: 286/371 = 77.09%
• members of couples in which both members were invited: 512/608 = 84.21%
• individuals whose partners were not invited: 187/243 = 76.95%.
These response rates yielded the following CogEcon respondents:
17The 2008 wave of the CogUSA study was conducted in two stages, a telephone interview, then a face-to-face
interview. Of the 3224 contacted for the telephone interview, 1514 completed this interview, for a response rate
of 47 percent that was on target for a Random Digit Dialing sample methodology. 1230 (81 percent) of telephone
respondents completed a face-to-face interview. Respondents and non-respondents to the face-to-face interview were
not statistically significantly different at the 5 percent level in terms of cognition (Serial 7s and Mental Status), age,
sex, race, couple status, and self-rated health status. Respondents had, on average, 0.36 more years of education
(p < 0.2).
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• 286 uncoupled individuals
• 468 coupled individuals whose partners also completed CogEcon
• 44 coupled individuals who completed CogEcon but whose partners completed
CogUSA only
• 187 coupled individuals who completed CogEcon but whose partners did not
complete CogUSA.
Among the 304 couples with both members invited to CogEcon, there were 26
couples with no respondents, and 42 couples with one respondent (half of whom were
male, half were female). The remaining couples provided one complete survey for
each individual.
Among the 851 invitees in couples, men responded at a rate that was about
2 percentage points higher than women, though the difference is not statistically
significant.
All of the empirical results reported in this paper are estimated using unweighted
data, as couple-level weights have not been developed for this survey.
2.7.2 Derivation of the analysis sample
The Cognitive Economics survey is composed of 985 individuals in 751 households
(including 286 singletons). To construct my sample, I drop the 286 singletons as well
as those in same sex couples (3 couples in total). Doing so leaves 462 households,
which are composed of
• 233 couples about which we have full information (cognition data from CogUSA
and financial knowledge data from CogEcon),
• 21 couples for which we have full information about the wife and cognition data
only about the husband,
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• 21 couples for which we have full information about the husband and cognition
data about the wife, and
• 187 couples with only one respondent with no information about the partner.
When the wife-husband difference in financial sophistication is used as the dependent
variable, the maximum sample possible is the 224 couples from which both members
completed at least part of the financial literacy battery in CogEcon in addition to
CogUSA. The dependent variable here is constructed using CogEcon responses from
both members of the couple. Due to item non-response for some variables, actual
sample sizes will vary according to the specification used.
2.7.3 Survey questions used in the analysis
Financial literacy questions in CogEcon
The following tables list the question number and the text of both true and false
versions of each financial literacy question on the Cognitive Economics survey, with
the mean score on each question for women and men in the 224 couples in the
sample. All of these questions have been fielded on the RAND American Life Panel
(Delavande et al., 2008); sixteen of these questions were also fielded on the 2008 wave
of the Health and Retirement Study (Lusardi et al., 2009b), and twelve are currently
being fielded on the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study.
Questions related to stock
Question text Mean score
True Version False Version Women Men
18 Financially, investing in the
stock market is better than
buying lottery tickets.
Financially, investing in the
stock market is no better
than buying lottery tickets.
0.82 0.90
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19 When an investor spreads
money between 20 stocks,
rather than 2, the risk of los-
ing a lot of money decreases.
When an investor spreads
money between 20 stocks,
rather than 2, the risk of los-
ing a lot of money increases.
0.74 0.79
22 Mutual funds do not pay a
guaranteed rate of return.
Mutual funds pay a guaran-
teed rate of return.
0.65 0.76
24 It is easy to find mutual
funds that have annual fees
of less than one percent of
assets.
It is hard to find mutual
funds that have annual fees
of less than one percent of
assets.
0.54 0.58
25 Even if you are smart, it is
hard to pick individual com-
pany stocks that will have
better than average returns.
If you are smart, it is easy
to pick individual company
stocks that will have better
than average returns.
0.59 0.61
28 It is possible to invest in
the stock market in a way
that makes it hard for peo-
ple to take unfair advantage
of you.
There is no way to avoid
people taking advantage of
you if you try to invest in
the stock market.
0.69 0.71
31 An employee of a company
with publicly traded stock
should have little or none of
his or her retirement savings
in the company’s stock.
An employee of a company
with publicly traded stock
should have a lot of his
or her retirement savings in
the company’s stock.
0.55 0.53
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33 It is a good idea to own
stocks of foreign companies.
It is best to avoid owning
stocks of foreign companies.
0.61 0.68
34 Even older retired people
should hold some stocks.
Older retired people should
not hold any stocks.
0.76 0.80
35 You should invest in ei-
ther mutual funds or a large
number of different stocks
instead of just a few stocks.
You should invest most of
your money in a few good
stocks that you select rather
than in lots of stocks or in
mutual funds.
0.69 0.72
36 To make money in the stock
market, you should not buy
and sell stocks too often.
To make money in the stock
market, you have to buy
and sell stocks often.
0.68 0.68
39 It is better for young peo-
ple saving for retirement to
combine stocks with long-
term (inflation protected)
bonds than with short-term
(inflation protected) bonds.
It is better for young peo-
ple saving for retirement to
combine stocks with short-
term (inflation protected)
bonds than with long-term
(inflation protected) bonds.
0.59 0.58
40 If you invest for the long
run, the annual fees of mu-
tual funds are important.
If you invest for the long
run, the annual fees of mu-
tual funds are unimportant.
0.68 0.73
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41 Buying a stock mutual fund
usually provides a safer re-
turn than a single company
stock.
Buying a single company
stock usually provides a
safer return than a stock
mutual fund.
0.74 0.77
Questions not related to stock
Question text Mean score
True Version False Version Women Men
17 An investment advisor tells
a 30-year-old couple that
$1,000 in an investment
that pays a certain, con-
stant interest rate would
double in value to $2,000 af-
ter 20 years (by the time
they are 50). If so, that
investment would be worth
$4,000 after 40 years (by the
time they are 70).
An investment advisor tells
a 30-year-old couple that
$1,000 in an investment
that pays a certain, con-
stant interest rate would
double in value to $2,000 af-
ter 20 years (by the time
they are 50). If so, that
investment would not be
worth $4,000 for at least 45
years (until they are at least
75).
0.71 0.80
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20 If you start out with $1,000
and earn an average return
of 10% per year for 30 years,
after compounding, the ini-
tial $1,000 will have grown
to more than $6,000.
If you start out with $1,000
and earn an average re-
turn of 10% per year for
30 years, even after com-
pounding, the initial $1,000
will have grown to less than
$6,000.
0.58 0.71
21 The more you diversify
among stocks, the more of
your money you can invest
in stocks.
The more you diversify
among stocks, the less of
your money you should in-
vest in stocks.
0.59 0.61
23 Young people should hold
somewhat riskier financial
investments than older peo-
ple.
Older people should hold
somewhat riskier financial
investments than young
people.
0.78 0.80
26 Using money in a bank
savings account to pay off
credit card debt is usually a
good idea.
Using money in a bank
savings account to pay off
credit card debt is usually a
bad idea.
0.65 0.74
27 You could save money in in-
terest costs by choosing a
15-year rather than a 30-
year mortgage.
You could save money in in-
terest costs by choosing a
30-year rather than a 15-
year mortgage.
0.84 0.88
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29 If the interest rate falls,
bond prices will rise.
If the interest rate falls,
bond prices will fall.
0.55 0.60
30 Taxes affect how you should
invest your money.
Taxes do not affect how you
should invest your money.
0.68 0.75
32 For a family with a work-
ing husband and a wife stay-
ing home to take care of
their young children, life
insurance that will replace
three years of income is not
enough life insurance.
For a family with a working
husband and a wife staying
home to take care of their
young children, life insur-
ance that will replace three
years of income is more than
enough.
0.78 0.74
38 It is important to take a
look at your investments pe-
riodically to see if you need
to make changes.
Once you have made an ini-
tial decision about the in-
vestment mix for your port-
folio, you should avoid mak-
ing changes to your portfo-
lio until you are close to re-
tirement.
0.85 0.84
Other measures of financial knowledge in CogEcon
Questions asked on the Cognitive Economics 2008 Survey (answer choices in
parentheses):
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Self-rated financial knowledge Question 12: I am good at dealing with day-to-day
financial matters, such as checking accounts, credit cards, mortgages, installment
payments, and budgeting. (Strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree,
disagree, strongly disagree).
Self-rated stock knowledge Question 10: I understand the stock market reason-
ably well. (Strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, disagree, strongly
disagree).
Questions asked on the Cognitive Economics 2009 Survey (answer choices in
parentheses):
Historical knowledge Question 89: On average over the last 100 years, how do you
think the annual rate of return on stocks has compared to the annual rate of return
on bonds? (Stock returns have been higher than bond returns, bond returns have
been higher than stock returns, both returns were the same).
Following the stock market Question 82: How closely do you follow the stock
market? (Very closely, somewhat, not at all).
2.7.4 Subjective survival probability in CogEcon
These survival questions were asked as part of the Cognitive Economics / CogUSA
survey section on expectations. The questions are designed to elicit a respondent’s
belief about the likelihood that a future event will be realized.
At the beginning of this section, respondents are read the following:
Next we would like to ask your opinion about how likely you think various
events might be. When I ask a question I’d like for you to give me a
number from 0 to 100, where “0” means that you think there is absolutely
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no chance, and “100” means that you think the event is absolutely sure to
happen.
For example, no one can ever be sure about tomorrow’s weather, but if you
think that rain is very unlikely tomorrow, you might say that there is a 10
percent chance of rain. If you think there is a very good chance that it will
rain tomorrow, you might say that there is an 80 percent chance of rain.
The survey proceeds with questions eliciting the respondent’s probabilistic expec-
tations of future events. One set of questions asks about the respondent’s survival
probabilities. Respondents are asked “What is the percent chance that you will live
to be X or more?” where X is the target age, determined according to the following
table.
Age of respondent Target age Years to target age
<65 75 and 85 >10 and >20
65-69 80 11-15
70-74 85 11-15
75-79 90 11-15
80-84 95 11-15
85-89 100 11-15
≥90 none n/a
These questions elicit the following: Pr(alive at least 10-15 years from now | alive
today).
The survival probability measure in the model is the sequence of gt+1 over the
maximum length of life, where
gt+1 = Pr(husband dies right before t + 1) = Pr(husband lives exactly until t).
This measure can be transformed as follows:
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St = pr(husband is alive during time t) =
∞∑
t
gj+1. This is the “survivor function,”
or the probability that the duration equals or exceeds t
ht+1 =
St−St+1
St
= gt+1
St
. This is the hazard function, or the probability of dying during
t+ 1 conditional on being alive during t
dt+1 = 1−ht+1 = St+1St . This is the probability of surviving at least to t+1 conditional
on surviving to t.
Subjective survival questions in the survey speak to dt+1. Those who are younger
than 65 years are asked, “What is the percent chance that you will live to be 75 or
more?” (P028), in which case t is defined as the current age and t + 1 is defined as
age 75.
2.8 Appendix B: Equations for life table widowhood measures
Suppose that the current age of the wife is x and the age of the husband’s age is
y during the time of the survey.
Let lfd be the woman’s life table probability of surviving from birth to age d and
lmd the husband’s life table probability of surviving from birth to age d. Let q
m
d be
the life table probability that the husband dies at age d (this is the life table one-year
mortality rate at age d).
The probability that the woman becomes a widow t years from the survey is the
joint probability that woman is alive in t years, the man is alive in t years, and that
the man dies at age (y + t), conditional on the woman and her husband both being
alive at ages x and y, respectively. This probability can be expressed as:
f(x, y, t) =
l
f
x+t
l
f
x
lmy+t
lmy
qmy+t. (2.7)
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The probability that a woman will outlive her husband is therefore the sum of
f(x, y, t) over all possible years of the onset of widowhood:
Pr(woman outlives her husband) =
∞∑
t=0
f(x, y, t). (2.8)
The expected time to widowhood and the expected duration of widowhood, con-
ditional on a woman outliving her husband, are:
E[Time to widowhood|woman outlives husband] =
∞∑
t=0
(t)f(x, y, t)
∞∑
t=0
f(x, y, t)
(2.9)
E[Length of widowhood|woman outlives husband] =
∞∑
t=0
(efx+t)f(x, y, t)
∞∑
t=0
f(x, y, t)
(2.10)
where efx+t is the woman’s remaining life expectancy at age x+ t.
2.9 Appendix C: Standard error adjustment for two-stage analysis
Because the regressions using the HRS predicted ten-year survival probabilities
employ two-step estimation, the covariance matrix of the second step equation must
be corrected. I use the two-step maximum likelihood estimation described in Murphy
and Topel (1985).
This section employs the Greene’s notation (Greene, 2002, p.510):
Theorem 17.8: Asymptotic Distribution of the Two-Step MLE [Murphy
and Topel (1985)]. If the standard regularity conditions are met for both
log-likelihood functions, then the second-step maximum likelihood estima-
tor of θ2 is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed with asymp-
totic covariance matrix
V ∗2 =
1
n
(V2 + V2[CV1C
′ − RV1C ′ − CV1R′]V2)
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where
V1 = Asy.V ar[
√
n(θˆ1 − θ1)] based on lnL1
V2 = Asy.V ar[
√
n(θˆ2 − θ2)]; based on lnL2
C = E
[
1
n
∂lnL2
∂θˆ2
· ∂lnL2
∂θˆT1
]
R = E
[
1
n
∂lnL2
∂θ2
· ∂lnL1
∂θT1
]
.
Vˆ1 and Vˆ2 are the uncorrected first and second stage variance matrices. The
matrices required for correction are estimated as:
Cˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∂lnfi2
∂θˆ2
· ∂lnfi2
∂θˆT1
and Rˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∂lnfi2
∂θˆ2
· ∂lnfi1
∂θˆT1
. (2.11)
As usual, n is the number of observations. The total number of second stage
regressors is m + k where k is the number of non-predicted second-step regressors,
and m is the number of regressors generated by the first step. There are T first-stage
regressors.
Since the parameters estimated in the two steps are based on different samples
(HRS in the first step and CogEcon in the second), Rˆ is exactly zero (Murphy and
Topel, 1985, p.377).
Now, consider each derivative in the two matrices. In the first-step probit log
likelihood contribution of each person:
lnfi1 = F (θ1, x1i) = yilnΦ(x
T
i θ1) + (1− yi)ln(1− lnΦ(xTi θ1)) (2.12)
∂lnfi1
∂θˆ1
=
∂lnfi1
∂xiθˆ
· ∂xiθˆ
∂θˆ1
= statascore ∗ xi. (2.13)
Note that the score reported by STATA is the first derivative of the log likelihood
for the probit with respect to xβ. The other derivatives are different for the linear
regression second step and probit second step.
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Linear regression second stage For analysis of general financial knowledge within
the household, I regress wife-husband difference in financial sophistication on hus-
band’s predicted survival, the wife-husband difference in predicted survival, and con-
trol variables. Therefore, the estimating equation is:
Difference in finsoph = x2θ2 + γ1Φ(x1husbandθ1) + γ2(Φ(x1selfθ1)− Φ(x1husbθ1))
where
∂lnfi2
∂θˆ2
: N × (m+ k) vector (one column for each 2nd stage regressor)
lnfi2 = ln1 − ln(
√
2piσ2)− 1
2
·
(
y −XT θ2
σ
)2
∂lnfi2
∂θˆ2
=
(yi − xTi θ2)
σ2
· xTi (2.14)
∂lnfi2
∂θˆT
1
: N × T vector (one column for each parameter predicting generated regres-
sor). Let θ2 related to generated regressors be [γ1, γ2], where γ1 denotes the husband’s
survival and γ2 denotes the difference in own and husband’s survival.
lnfi2 = ln1− ln(
√
2piσ2)−
{
yi − xTi θ2 − (γ1 − γ2)Φ(x1husbθ)− γ2Φ(x1selfθ)
}2
2σ2
∂lnfi2
∂θˆ1
= −2residual
2σ2
· [−(γ1 − γ2)φ(x1husbθ)x1husb − γ2φ(x1selfθ)x1self ] (2.15)
Lastly, I use STATA’s degree of freedom adjusted variance matrix for the second
step Vˆ2.
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2.10 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Timeline of analysis
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The initial division of labor breaks down at time D.
Figure 2.2: Present value of an additional unit of human capital at time t
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The payoffs to financial human capital are realized for the woman when she is a widow, for T −D
years. While her husband is still alive, the value of a marginal increase in financial human capital
is discounted by the number of years a woman must wait until the stream begins (D − t years).
At time zero, the present value of the benefits are low due to the D-year delay until widowhood.
The value increases as a woman approaches widowhood, at which point it declines because of the
decreasing number of years the knowledge can be used.
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Figure 2.3: A financial literacy question on CogEcon 
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Figure 2.4: Financial literacy and husband’s age
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Wife−husband difference in financial literacy
OLS regression of the right panel is reported in Table 2.7.
Figure 2.5: Financial literacy (no stock questions) and husband’s age
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Wife−husband difference in financial literacy−no stock q’s
OLS regression of the right panel is reported in Table 2.7.
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Figure 2.6: Cognitive measures and husband’s age
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All scores are standardized. Unlike financial literacy, women’s cognition scores do not systematically
gain on their husband’s scores. The cognition variables are detailed in Section 2.4.3.
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Figure 2.7: U.S. historical age at first marriage
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Figure 2.8: U.S. historical divorce rates
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Vertical lines indicate the 5th and 95th percentile of year of first marriage among partnered respon-
dents in the CogEcon sample. Younger women face greater incentives than older women to acquire
financial literacy early in life.
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Figure 2.9: Probabilities of ever being divorced for women in the CogEcon sample, by husband’s
age
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CogEcon: Pr(Women ever divorced) by husband’s age
Older women in the sample are less likely than younger women to have ever been divorced.
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Figure 2.10: Individual and life table 10-year survival probabilities
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Solid and dashed plots represent life table survival probabilities. Scatterplots are generated using
CogEcon respondents with partners.
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Table 2.1: Ratio of the marginal effect of time to widowhood and length of widowhood on the value
of human capital
Variable Mean SD Min Max
ratio with δ = 0.00 1.52 0.15 1.21 2.23
ratio with δ = 0.03 2.03 0.25 1.53 3.28
ratio with δ = 0.05 2.38 0.33 1.663 4.00
If the depreciation of financial literacy is zero, the magnitude of the effect of time to widowhood
on would be on average 1.52 times the magnitude of the effect of the duration. If human capital
depreciates, the effect of time to widowhood is even greater relative to the effect of the duration.
Table 2.2: Demographic characteristics of the analysis sample
Women Men
Variable Mean N Mean N Diff.
Age 60.53 224 62.86 224 -2.326 ∗∗∗
(9.44) (10.04)
Life expectancy (years) 24.00 224 19.25 224 4.758 ∗∗∗
(7.47) (6.91)
Years of education 14.42 224 14.65 224 -0.228 ∗
(1.99) (2.16)
Who is most knowledgeable about finances?
Me 0.161 223 0.491 216 -0.321 ∗∗∗
(0.367) (0.501)
Me OR Both of us 0.489 223 0.866 216 -0.372 ∗∗∗
(0.501) (0.342)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Table 2.3: Summary of regression variables
Variable Mean SD N
Outcomes
Wife-husband diff. in normalized financial literacy -0.37 1.10 224
Wife-husband diff. in fin. literacy (no stock questions) -0.31 1.25 224
Key explanatory variables
Expected time to widowhood (years) 14.39 5.74 224
Expected length of widowhood (years) 12.92 2.87 224
Other regressors
Woman’s risk tolerance (6 point scale) 2.36 1.39 214
Husband’s self-rated health (5 point scale) 3.63 1.00 224
Woman’s self-rated health (5 point scale) 3.73 0.96 224
Husband’s years of education 14.65 2.16 224
Woman’s years of education 14.42 1.99 224
Woman’s Recall score (normalized) 0.40 0.85 224
Husband’s Recall score (normalized) -0.06 0.94 223
Woman’s Number Series score (normalized) 0.17 0.84 224
Husband’s Number Series score (normalized) 0.34 0.88 224
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Table 2.4: Consistency of responses to “Who is most financially knowledgeable” within couples
Wife’s response
Husband’s Me Partner Both Someone No Total
response else Response
Me 4 84 19 0 3 110
Partner 20 4 6 0 0 30
Both 15 20 47 1 0 83
Someone else 0 1 0 1 0 2
No response 0 5 3 0 0 8
Total 39 114 75 2 3 233
Only 10 couples (4%) report inconsistent answers about who is the household CFO, defined as the
person who is most financially knowledgeable within the household.
Table 2.5: Comparative advantage and the division of labor: characteristics of couples by gender
of CFOs
Wife-husband Differences in
Normalized Normalized
CFO Age Educ. Number Financial N
Series Literacy
Wife -1.33 0.69 0.13 0.30 36
Husband -2.60 -.62 -0.44 -0.71 112
Both -2.40 -.12 0.05 -0.16 73
Someone else -4 2.5 0.91 0 .21 2
No Response 1 -3 0.65 -2.10 1
Total -2.33 -0.23 -0.17 -0.37 224
The Household CFO is defined as the person who is most financially knowledgeable within the
household. The CFO tends to be more educated, have more financial literacy, and have more fluid
intelligence (as measured by the Number Series score) than his or her spouse; this is true for couples
with male CFOs as well as those with female CFOs.
Table 2.6: Comparative advantage and the division of labor: proportion of couples in which the
woman has higher levels of characteristics than her husband, by gender of CFOs
Age Education Number Financial N
CFO Series Literacy
Wife 0.250 0.417 0.472 0.583 36
Husband 0.134 0.214 0.304 0.259 112
Both 0.192 0.274 0.452 0.521 73
Someone Else 0.000 0.500 1.000 0.500 2
No Response 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1
Total 0.174 0.268 0.388 0.397 224
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Table 2.7: Wife-husband difference in financial literacy and husband’s age
All questions No stock questions
Husband’s age 0.013 0.017
(0.007)∗ (0.008)∗∗
Const. -1.212 -1.379
(0.466)∗∗∗ (0.526)∗∗∗
N 224 224
R2 .015 .019
F 3.37 4.237
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
These regressions are OLS versions of the graphs on the right panels of 2.4 and 2.5. As the husband
ages, the woman gains financial literacy relative to her husband.
Table 2.8: Financial literacy regressions (all questions)
(1) (2) (3)
Expected time to widowhood -0.035 -0.037 -0.041
(0.02)∗ (0.02)∗ (0.02)∗∗
Expected duration of widowhood 0.037 0.042 0.043
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Woman’s health 0.047 0.063
(0.078) (0.078)
Husband’s health -0.082 -0.092
(0.075) (0.076)
Woman’s education 0.056 0.035
(0.041) (0.045)
Husband’s education -0.11 -0.105
(0.038)∗∗∗ (0.043)∗∗
Woman’s risk tolerance 0.0008
(0.054)
Woman’s Recall -0.028
(0.091)
Husband’s Recall -0.042
(0.09)
Woman’s Number Series 0.321
(0.109)∗∗∗
Husband’s Number Series -0.197
(0.099)∗∗
Const. -0.349 0.533 0.754
(0.377) (0.739) (0.894)
N 224 224 213
R2 0.016 0.061 0.13
F 1.844 2.338 2.729
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
OLS regression with dependent variable: wife-husband difference in normalized financial sophisti-
cation score
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Table 2.9: Financial literacy regressions (no stock questions)
(1) (2) (3)
Expected time to widowhood -0.042 -0.044 -0.048
(0.022)∗ (0.022)∗∗ (0.023)∗∗
Expected duration of widowhood 0.04 0.043 0.041
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Woman’s health 0.032 0.044
(0.088) (0.088)
Husband’s health -0.018 -0.037
(0.084) (0.086)
Woman’s education 0.08 0.039
(0.046)∗ (0.051)
Husband’s education -0.143 -0.124
(0.043)∗∗∗ (0.048)∗∗
Woman’s risk tolerance -0.041
(0.062)
Woman’s Recall 0.034
(0.104)
Husband’s Recall -0.061
(0.102)
Woman’s Number Series 0.387
(0.124)∗∗∗
Husband’s Number Series -0.248
(0.112)∗∗
Const. -0.231 0.643 1.134
(0.426) (0.832) (1.018)
N 224 224 213
R2 0.019 0.069 0.144
F 2.161 2.668 3.065
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
OLS regression with dependent variable: wife-husband difference in normalized non-stock financial
literacy score This table reproduces the regressions in Table 2.8, replacing the dependent variable
with a financial literacy score that excludes all stock questions. The coefficients are qualitatively
the same, but the effect of the time to widowhood is larger in magnitude here.
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Table 2.10: Falsification tests: regressions using cognition outcomes
Fin Number Calcu- Verbal Mental Total Visual
Soph Series lations Analogies Status Recall Matching
Time to -0.038 0.001 0.014 -0.016 -0.002 -0.038 -0.009
widowhood (0.02)
∗ (0.018) (0.02) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021)∗ (0.02)
Duration of 0.038 -0.012 0.016 0.014 0.044 0.003 0.05
widowhood (0.04) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.04)
Woman’s risk 0.019 0.055 0.013 -0.041 0.094 0.069 0.026
tolerance (0.054) (0.048) (0.053) (0.05) (0.052)
∗ (0.057) (0.054)
Woman’s .051 0.039 0.189 -0.032 0.118 0.097 0.101
health (0.078) (0.069) (0.077)
∗∗ (0.072) (0.074) (0.082) (0.077)
Husband’s -0.07 0.06 -0.035 0.063 -0.038 0.027 -0.006
health (0.077) (0.068) (0.076) (0.071) (0.073) (0.08) (0.076)
Woman’s 0.08 0.169 0.13 0.145 0.069 0.06 0.002
education (0.042)
∗ (0.037)∗∗∗ (0.041)∗∗∗ (0.039)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗ (0.044) (0.041)
Husband’s -0.128 -0.137 -0.155 -0.071 -0.022 -0.124 -0.058
education (0.039)
∗∗∗ (0.035)∗∗∗ (0.038)∗∗∗ (0.036)∗∗ (0.037) (0.041)∗∗∗ (0.038)
Const. 0.387 -0.957 -0.926 -1.208 -1.858 1.307 0.303
(0.757) (0.672) (0.733) (0.696)∗ (0.717)∗∗∗ (0.788)∗ (0.745)
N 214 214 213 214 213 213 214
R2 0.075 0.121 0.121 0.069 0.063 0.08 0.031
F 2.384 4.042 4.024 2.196 1.968 2.534 0.929
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
OLS regression with dependent variables: wife - husband difference in normalized cognition.
These falsification tests reproduce the regression in column (1) of Table 2.8, replacing the dependent
variable with the wife-husband difference in cognition scores and omitting the cognition scores
(Number Series and Recall) on the right hand side. The cognition variables are detailed in Section
2.4.3. Because the cognition scores are normalized, the coefficients are directly comparable with
those estimated using the wife-husband difference in financial literacy in column (1).
Table 2.11: Summary of 10-year survival probabilities
Measure Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Life table Husband 0.72 0.21 0.10 0.95 238
Wife - husband 0.11 0.10 -0.07 0.65 238
Subjective - Husband 0.71 0.24 0 1 224
constant hazard Wife - husband 0.05 0.27 -0.83 0.77 214
HRS predicted Husband 0.87 0.16 0.21 0.99 216
probabilities Wife - husband 0.08 0.13 -0.20 0.62 215
Table 2.12: Cross-correlation table of alternate 10-year survival measures
Variables Life Subjective HRS
Table survival predicted
Life table 1.000
Subjective survival 0.562 1.000
HRS predicted 0.827 0.573 1.000
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Table 2.13: Robustness check: Financial literacy regressions using 10-year survival measures
Life table Constant HRS
10-year hazard predicted
survival life table (adjusted se)
Husband’s Pr(surv) -0.664 -0.634 -0.328
(0.594) (0.454) (1.017)
Diff Pr(surv) 0.332 -0.38 2.005
(1.151) (0.382) (1.187)∗
Woman’s health -0.063 -0.075 -0.015
(0.078) (0.084) (0.081)
Husband’s health 0.089 0.094 -0.031
(0.076) (0.085) (0.083)
Woman’s education 0.037 0.036 0.052
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
Husband’s education -0.106 -0.107 -0.114
(0.042)∗∗ (0.044)∗∗ (0.042)∗∗∗
Woman’s risk tolerance -0.005 -0.012 -0.015
(0.054) (0.058) (0.053)
Woman’s Recall -0.022 -0.016 -0.05
(0.091) (0.097) (0.091)
Husband’s Recall -0.032 -0.062 0.007
(0.09) (0.093) (0.092)
Woman’s Number Series 0.33 0.34 0.329
(0.11)∗∗∗ (0.114)∗∗∗ (0.109)∗∗∗
Husband’s Number Series -0.192 -0.186 -0.152
(0.099)∗ (0.105)∗ (0.097)
Const. 1.011 1.07 0.805
(0.994) (0.893) (1.332)
N 213 196 211
R2 0.13 0.136 0.166
F 2.733 2.64 3.607
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Dependent variable: wife-husband difference in normalized financial literacy scores, all questions.
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Table 2.14: Robustness check: Financial literacy regressions (no stock questions) using 10-year
survival measures
Life table Constant HRS
10 year hazard predicted
survival Life table
Husband’s Pr(surv) -1.083 -0.767 -1.012
(0.678) (0.521) (1.176)
Diff Pr(surv) -.385 -.522 1.208
(1.313) (0.439) (1.371)
Woman’s health .041 .054 .015
(0.089) (0.097) (0.094)
Husband’s health -.036 -.023 .073
(0.086) (0.098) (0.096)
Woman’s education .041 .039 .054
(0.051) (0.053) (0.052)
Husband’s education -.125 -.12 -.13
(0.048)∗∗∗ (0.051)∗∗ (0.048)∗∗∗
Woman’s risk tolerance -.048 -.062 -.056
(0.061) (0.066) (0.061)
Woman’s Recall .042 .036 .022
(0.104) (0.112) (0.105)
Husband’s Recall -.052 -.116 -.011
(0.103) (0.107) (0.106)
Woman’s Number Series .397 .409 .394
(0.125)∗∗∗ (0.131)∗∗∗ (0.126)∗∗∗
Husband’s Number Series -.24 -.252 -.21
(0.113)∗∗ (0.121)∗∗ (0.112)∗
Const. 1.809 1.433 1.387
(1.116) (0.944) (1.392)
N 213 196 211
R2 .142 0.152 .16
F 3.019 2.997 3.458
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Dependent variable: wife-husband difference in normalized financial literacy scores, excluding stock
questions.
69
Table 2.15: Summary of other financial knowledge outcomes
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Woman’s self-rated
financial skills 5.03 0.99 1 6 238
Woman’s self-rated
stock market understanding 2.95 1.36 1 6 232
Wife-husband difference in
self-rated financial skills 0.01 1.48 -4 5 217
Wife-husband difference in
self-rated stock market understanding -0.77 1.63 -5 5 210
Woman’s correct response to “Stocks
historically outperform bonds?” 0.57 0.50 0 1 187
Woman’s “How closely do you
follow the stock market?” 0.66 0.63 0 2 212
Full text of these questions are found in Appendix 2.7.3. Self-rated financial skills and stock market
understanding: coded as 6 for “strongly agree” and 1 for “strongly disagree.” Historical stock/bond
returns: coded as 1 if respondents correctly reported that stock returns have exceeded bond returns.
Follow the stock market: coded as 2 for “very closely,” 1 for “somewhat” and 0 for “not at all.”
Table 2.16: Regressions of other financial knowledge outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Woman’s Woman’s Difference Difference Stocks Follow
Financial Stock Financial Stock returns stock
skills market skills market (AME) market
Expected time -0.021 -0.021 -0.028 -0.009 -0.012 -0.041
to widowhood (0.012)
∗ (0.012)∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.012) (0.005)∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗
Expected length -0.043 0.028 -0.031 0.03 -0.004 -0.028
of widowhood (0.022)
∗∗ (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.011) (0.025)
Woman’s health 0.142 0.172 0.019 0.113 0.026 0.161
(0.077)∗ (0.075)∗∗ (0.076) (0.076) (0.037) (0.091)∗
Husband’s health -0.13 -0.052 -0.129 -0.052 -0.035 -0.062
(0.077)∗ (0.073) (0.075)∗ (0.074) (0.035) (0.087)
Woman’s education -0.066 0.023 -0.024 0.024 -0.032 0.016
(0.043) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045) (0.021) (0.047)
Husband’s education 0.018 -0.02 -0.051 -0.093 0.055 -0.101
(0.042) (0.04) (0.042) (0.042)∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.049)∗∗
Woman’s risk 0.069 0.009 0.011 -0.031 0.007 0.019
tolerance (0.053) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.025) (0.062)
Woman’s Recall 0.177 -0.039 0.0002 0.118 0.063 0.036
(0.092)∗ (0.089) (0.09) (0.091) (0.045) (0.106)
Husband’s Recall -0.061 0.013 -0.098 -0.161 0.069 0.343
(0.09) (0.088) (0.089) (0.091)∗ (0.044) (0.108)∗∗∗
Woman’s 0.186 0.087 0.455 0.217 0.123 0.171
Number Series (0.11)
∗ (0.106) (0.11)∗∗∗ (0.108)∗∗ (0.053)∗∗ (0.13)
Husband’s 0.029 0.097 -0.124 -0.072 -0.05 0.235
Number Series (0.094) (0.091) (0.096) (0.096) (0.044) (0.109)
∗∗
N 238 232 217 210 187 212
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
Dependent variables: woman’s self-rated financial skills and stock market skills; wife-husband differ-
ences in self-ratings, woman’s knowledge that stocks have historically outperformed bonds, woman’s
closely following the stock market.
CHAPTER III
The Implications of Alzheimer’s Disease Risk for Household
Financial Decision-Making
3.1 Introduction
Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias cause progressive declines in cognition
that lead to a complete loss of functional capacities. This may pose enormous fi-
nancial risk to all members of a household. First, Alzheimer’s is associated with
high costs of care, including the costs of identifying and paying for nursing home
services and home care; second, cognitive impairment of a financial decision-maker
can lead to financial mismanagement. The financial risks highlight the potential
benefits of preparing for the loss of functional capacities and raise the question: how
do households respond to early signs of cognitive impairment and official diagnoses
of Alzheimer’s or dementia? In this chapter we focus on the impacts of self-reported
difficulties with money and memory disease diagnoses on the household division of
labor for financial decision-making tasks.
A series of articles about Alzheimer’s disease in the New York Times describe
the difficulties some older individuals have handling money, for example, forgetting
to pay bills, participating in fraudulent schemes, and signing contracts they don’t
understand. These difficulties often later give way to a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s, as
well as serious financial problems. Indeed, medical research has shown that such
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problems are an early sign of dementias like Alzheimer’s.
The emergence of difficulties handling money can be extremely problematic if
one does not have assistance with this task. Married individuals could potentially
rely on their cognitively intact spouses to assume responsibility of finances. Using
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal, nationally representative
study of older Americans, we employ survival analysis and other regression methods
to examine if and when financial responsibility is transferred from one spouse to
another as a result of cognitive decline. We find that as the cognition of the primary
financial decision-maker declines, the management of finances is eventually turned
over to the unimpaired spouse. However, the switch often does not occur until well
after the impaired spouse reports difficulties handling money. This suggests that a
cognitively impaired individual often continues to make financial decisions even after
he is aware of his difficulties handling money.
To understand the variation in the timing of this switch, we analyze an economic
model of the value of information about future cognitive impairment. There is sur-
prisingly little consensus among medical professionals—let alone patients and loved
ones—about the value of early detection of Alzheimer’s. On one hand, given the irre-
versibility of Alzheimer’s, a diagnosis may introduce unnecessary emotional trauma.
On the other hand, a diagnosis allows couples to alter their plans and prepare for the
future, which can be financially beneficial. Our model highlights both the emotional
cost of new information and the financial benefits of using that information to re-
optimize for the future. Based on the model, we hypothesize that, holding emotional
costs constant, one source of variation in the net benefit from re-optimization is the
level of individual oversight needed to manage a household’s existing financial assets.
In their model about forms of human capital that are useful for the management
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of wealth, Delavande et al. (2008) show that the benefits of financial competence are
proportional to the amount of wealth one manages. Households who rely on fixed
income sources, such as pensions and Social Security, need only a modest amount of
day-to-day oversight of finances relative to those who actively manage wealth, such
as savings in 401(k) accounts. Protecting household finances against mismanagement
by a cognitively impaired husband may involve establishing trusts, assigning power-
of-attorney, or otherwise transferring financial responsibility to the wife.
In fact, couples who actively manage their retirement accounts transfer respon-
sibility more quickly after the emergence of money difficulties and at higher levels
of cognition. A diagnosis increases the hazard of switching the financial respondent
by a factor of 2.2 for couples who control their retirement accounts relative to those
who passively receive retirement income. These results hold even after controlling
for wife’s cognition, education, wealth, and stock ownership. This is consistent with
an economic model of the value of information: households with the most to gain
financially from preparation are most responsive to information about cognitive de-
cline.
3.2 Background
In this section, we will provide some background on the issues at hand. We will
begin with a description of Alzheimer’s disease and its impact on the division of labor.
In particular, we focus on the management of finances and the financial vulnerability
of older persons. Lastly, we discuss the value of a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s, a form
of information about cognitive decline.
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3.2.1 Aging, dementia, and Alzheimer’s Disease
Dementia is defined as the loss of cognitive and mental functions severe enough
to impair a person’s daily functioning. These losses reflect declines from a previous
baseline, and they must include the impairment of memory and at least one other
cognitive function.1 One of the earliest signs of dementia is forgetfulness, which is
often accompanied by functional difficulties in areas like language, social skills and
reasoning skills. Estimates show that nearly 15 percent of Americans over the age
of 70, or 3.4 million individuals, suffer from some form of dementia (Plassman et al.,
2007).
Dementing disorders are distinct from normal aging in that dementia is charac-
terized by diminished functional capacity. A person experiencing typical aging will
be largely independent in his daily activities, in spite of possible complaints about
memory loss. A person aging with dementia becomes dependent on others for ac-
tivities necessary for daily living and will begin behaving in socially inappropriate
ways. Under typical aging, a person may complain about memory loss but can gen-
erally recount in detail these bouts forgetfulness, whereas a demented person would
generally be unable to recall these incidents (American Medical Association, n.d.).
Dementia represents a set of symptoms, characterized by reduced functional ca-
pacity, that can be caused by a number of diseases or conditions. Alzheimer’s disease
is the most common form of dementia and accounts for an estimated 60 to 90 percent
of all dementia cases (Brookmeyer et al., 2011; Alzheimer’s Association, 2011). The
prevalence of Alzheimer’s has been estimated at 13 percent of those over 65 and 43
1These functions are, as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition,
cited in Holsinger et al. (2007): agnosia, failure to recognize or identify objects despite intact sensory function;
aphasia, deterioration of language function (impairment); apraxia, impaired ability to execute motor activities de-
spite intact motor abilities, sensory function, and comprehension of the required task; delirium, a disturbance of
consciousness that is accompanied by a change in cognition that cannot be better accounted for by a preexisting or
evolving dementia; executive functioning, the ability to think abstractly and to plan, initiate, sequence, monitor, and
stop complex behavior.
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percent of those over 85 (Alzheimer’s Association, 2011). The defining abnormalities
of Alzheimer’s disease are amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles in the brain,
though these features cannot be definitively identified until the brain is examined in
an autopsy.
Individuals with dementias like Alzheimer’s suffer progressive declines in cognition
that worsen continuously over a period of years. Other common forms of progressive
dementia include include vascular dementia, dementia with Lewey bodies, Parkin-
son’s disease, or some combination thereof. Some dementias are brought about by
a single event, such as cardiac arrest or brain injury; these dementias are static but
are also generally irreversible.
For all causes of dementia, doctors assess a patient’s cognition using neuropsy-
chological tests, including tests for memory, problem-solving skills, and thinking and
reasoning skills. One of the more widely used (and commonly studied) tests for
screening and assessing the severity of dementia is the Mini-Mental State Examina-
tion (MMSE), which covers a number of cognitive functions in about ten minutes
(Holsinger et al., 2007).
While all forms of dementia are associated with memory impairment, the defining
feature is the loss of functional capacity (Marson, 2001). Health professionals rely
on a standardized list of activities, known as the Activities of Daily Living (ADLs),
to determine the functional status of patients. Basic ADLs include walking, bathing,
toileting and other requirements of personal care and hygiene. Instrumental ADLs
(IADLs) refer to more complicated tasks, like those involved in managing a house-
hold and its finances. Pe´re`s et al. (2008) find that individuals who are eventually
diagnosed with dementia perform more poorly on IADLs than those who do not
develop dementia.
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At this time, Alzheimer’s and most other forms of dementia have no cure.2 Cur-
rent treatments include drugs that can help manage the cognitive symptoms of
Alzheimer’s for a limited period of time.3 While research on the prevention, treat-
ment, and early detection of Alzheimer’s is underway, reactions to the value of early
detection are quite varied.
3.2.2 Human capital and cognitive decline: the case of financial management
Many couples have a division of labor that results in each member specializing
in particular tasks. For instance, one member (often the wife) may be primarily
responsible for health care for the family, while the other (frequently the husband)
may be the household “Chief Financial Officer” (CFO) responsible for household
finances. Individuals will typically invest in the human capital relevant to their
specialty early on in order to reap the benefits of their knowledge over the course of
their adult lives.
A division of labor may be efficient, but only if the union is intact and if both
members continue to hold the mental and physical abilities required by their respon-
sibilities. Chapter II discussed the role of widowhood in the division of labor, but
what happens if one member of the couple begins to lose skills due to a dementing
disease such as Alzheimer’s? The death of a spouse necessarily disrupts the division
of labor, but cognitive decline can have consequences that are even more severe.4
Wise financial management and decision-making become even more important given
the high costs of care associated with Alzheimer’s, including the complexity of iden-
2Dementias with certain causes, like infection, nutritional deficiencies, or drug interactions, may be reversible. A
meta-analysis of dementia studies showed that less than ten percent of cases were potentially reversible; in articles
that provided follow-up information, only 0.6 percent of cases reversed at least partially (Clarfield, 2003).
3http://www.alz.org/alzheimers disease standard prescriptions.asp
4The analysis of Chapter II focused on women, who tend not to be CFOs but are more likely than men to become
widows. While more women than men have dementia (Alzheimer’s Association, 2011), this gap is attributable to
gender differentials in mortality. Indeed, mild cognitive impairment (MCI) is more prevalent among men than women
(Petersen et al., 2010). The same issues regarding dementia and financial decision-making arise regardless of the
gender of the financial CFO.
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tifying and paying for nursing home services and home care.
Furthermore, while the onset of widowhood is instantaneous and impossible to
ignore, the cognitive decline associated with dementias like Alzheimer’s occurs pro-
gressively and disrupts division of labor in a more subtle way. Individuals might be
physically able to continue the division of labor, but cognitive impairment makes
it harder to do certain tasks well, especially if the tasks require thinking and rea-
soning. Declines in ability lead to declines in productivity of human capital and
consequently the loss of comparative advantage in tasks that require high cognitive
function. Therefore, one way to mitigate the impact of Alzheimer’s on a patient’s
family is to restructure the division of labor such that a person who is cognitively
intact is responsible for cognition-intensive tasks.
Financial management is one such task that can be very complex and requires
high cognitive function. As discussed in Chapter II, this task has become more
complicated as regular streams of retirement income from defined benefit pensions
have been replaced by retirement plans that need to be actively managed both before
and after retirement. Korniotis and Kumar (2011) find evidence that older investors
“exhibit worse stock selection ability and poor diversification skill,” which the authors
attribute to aging-related cognitive declines. Reduced cognitive function predicts
both low asset accumulation as well as less participation in the financial markets
(Benjamin et al., 2006). Other studies have found similar patterns with respect to
numeracy and the accumulation of wealth (Banks and Oldfield, 2007; Banks et al.,
2010; Smith et al., 2010).
Declines in financial capacity, the productivity of financial human capital, have
been detected in Alzheimer’s patients. Studies have shown that those with mild cases
of Alzheimer’s have significantly impaired financial abilities, particularly with respect
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to complex tasks (Marson et al., 2000), even though their basic calculation skills may
still be intact (Martin et al., 2003). The impairment in financial abilities is even more
severe among those with moderate Alzheimer’s (Marson et al., 2000). Studies have
also found particularly rapid declines in financial skills among Alzheimer’s subjects,
particularly in their susceptibility to simple fraud (Martin et al., 2008).
While it may be unsurprising that researchers have identified reduced financial
abilities among individuals who already have Alzheimer’s, the worsening of financial
abilities can be found prior to the onset of dementia and Alzheimer’s. Triebel et
al. (2009) detect declining financial skills in patients with mild cognitive impairment
(MCI) in the year before developing Alzheimer’s. While not all individuals with
mild cognitive impairment convert to Alzheimer’s, cross-sectional studies have shown
that individuals with MCI also have impaired financial abilities (Griffith et al., 2003;
Okonkwo et al., 2008).
Ideally, individuals would be aware of their own declining cognitive capacity early
in the process and change their own behavior accordingly in order to mitigate the
effects of such declines on their households. Alarmingly, however, individuals with
mild cognitive impairment (Okonkwo et al., 2008) and dementia (Van Wielingen et
al., 2004) are not fully aware of their deteriorating financial skills. This suggests
that self-reported measures of cognitive functioning may actually overestimate the
financial skills of the cognitively impaired. Furthermore, their proxy informants or
caregivers also systematically misjudge the financial abilities of patients (Okonkwo et
al., 2008), as well as their general cognitive and other functional abilities (Loewen-
stein et al., 2001). This lack of awareness on the parts of both the impaired and
their caregivers will lead to increased financial vulnerability if the impaired individ-
ual continues to make financial decisions.
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3.2.3 The financial vulnerability of older Americans
Regardless of cognitive status, older Americans are more financially vulnerable
than the general population. Not only have most of the elderly left the labor market,
but they face greater medical costs in their declining health, and they are frequently
targets of financial abuse and exploitation. At the same time, the financial tasks
facing the elderly can be quite complex. These tasks include budgeting and decumu-
lation, leaving enough money for essentials, managing credit and debt, dealing with
bills (including medical bills), managing retirement wealth, planning for medical or
nursing home care, bequests, and so on. Even seemingly minor oversights can lead
to large problems: the New York Times describes a former lawyer who forgot to pay
his bills, and then later stopped paying creditors altogether. By the time his wife
noticed something was wrong, most of their money had vanished (Kolata, 2010b).
Financial abuse and exploitation is endemic among older Americans. Financial
exploitation is defined as the “unjust, improper, and/or illegal use of [an older per-
son’s] resources, property, and/or assets” (National Research Council et al., 2003).
Examples of financial abuse include cashing an older person’s checks without per-
mission; forging an older person’s signature or coercing him into signing a contract,
will or other document; stealing or misusing an older person’s financial resources;
and so forth (Teaster et al., 2006, p. 9).
In 2004, financial exploitation was one of the most common forms of elder abuse
investigated and substantiated by Adult Protective Services (Teaster et al., 2006).
Financial exploitation cases outnumbered cases of physical abuse as well as emotional
and psychological abuse. A survey of older Americans and their adult children found
that half of the older respondents exhibited at least one of the “warning signs of
current financial victimization.” These warning signs include being asked for money,
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to play lotteries, or participate in other schemes; not feeling comfortable making
major financial decisions alone; or not understanding financial decisions being made
on their behalf (Infogroup/ORC, 2010, p. 38).5
However, the consequences of incompetent financial decision-making or financial
abuse will vary across households. The extent of a household’s vulnerability to
either risk depends on the volatility and exposure of their assets and any future
potential income. If a household’s retirement income comes primarily from wealth
that is individually managed, then the household will be exposed to the risk of poor
investment decisions. In such a case, it would be possible to quickly and easily
squander wealth that was meant to last months or even years. For example, an older
doctor somehow became the director of several clinics; one used his name to engage
in fraudulent billing, and another took out mortgages without his knowledge. By
the time his son noticed, the doctor’s savings had been completely emptied out by a
scammer, and all that was left was his Social Security income (Kolata, 2010b).
Others may have fewer assets under their direct control. Those who depend pri-
marily on regular streams of income that are not actively managed may be less likely
to incur severe losses as a result of incompetent decision-making. Active decisions
are generally not required to receive monthly streams of income like defined ben-
efit pensions or Social Security income. Furthermore, individuals whose income is
limited to such streams do not have direct access to future income that could be
spent unwisely or exploited in scams. The problems these individuals face are likely
to be limited to cash flow issues—leaving enough money each month for necessities,
refraining from buying items they would not otherwise buy if they were cognitively
intact, knowing how to access the money, or remembering to pay the bills.
5This survey also found that 40 percent of adults with parents over 65 are worried that their parents “will become
less able to handle personal finances over time”; 36 percent of the parents over 65 have the same worry about
themselves (Infogroup/ORC, 2010, p. 23)
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3.2.4 The value of information: costs and benefits
In an article about advances in the early diagnosis of Alzheimer’s, the author asks:
“Does it help to know you are likely to get a disease if there is nothing you can do?”
(Kolata, 2010a)
Readers who thought that early detection held little value emphasized the idea
that there is nothing one can do with such information.6 Early detection is seen as
merely delivering “devastating knowledge” (Winer, 2010), given the inevitability of
decline with Alzheimer’s. The question above hinges on the idea that one may not
be able do anything with this information—with no cure, a diagnosis provides only
emotional costs and no benefits. The role of psychological costs, including anxiety
and fear, have been emphasized in research about HIV testing (see Thornton, 2008)
and behavioral research on decision-making, including health decisions (for example
Caplin and Leahy, 2001; Koszegi, 2003; Frank, 2004), both of which have parallels
to the case of Alzheimer’s diagnoses.
Others, in spite of the incurability and irreversability of Alzheimer’s, see value
in this information, precisely because they would take action as a result of early
detection. One reader states: “I most definitely do want to know if [Alzheimer’s]
is in store for me so that I can begin to plan the rest of my life while I am still
‘in charge.’ Most important, I would invest my savings in a supportive, long-term
living arrangement, one that I would choose, on my own terms. And I would decide
myself what to do with all my ‘stuff’ - my books, collections, clothing and furniture.”
(Bloom, 2010)7
6Some examples: “Even assuming that the new diagnostic test for Alzheimer’s is 100 percent accurate, what good
does that knowledge do? There is no drug that cures the disease, only ones that mitigate the symptoms at an early
stage. My wife died four years ago from Alzheimer’s at age 69. She and her family suffered with the disease for seven
years after the initial diagnosis. Had we known earlier, everyone would have suffered even longer.” (Eisen, 2010) A
doctor’s perspective, in an Op-Ed: “The doctor’s most basic tenet is that of primum non nocere—first, do no harm.
Until we have a more definite idea about what causes Alzheimer’s, early-detection tests may do patients more harm
than good.” (Pimplikar, 2010)
7A geriatric psychiatrist agrees: “Scientists’ understanding of Alzheimer’s disease may not be clear enough to
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A positive diagnosis would allow an individual who knows that s/he will suffer
cognitive decline to prepare for that impairment. In this respect, preparation is as
much about protecting the rest of their household from the externalities of future poor
decision-making as it is about preparing themselves individually for such impairment.
This reflects the logic of the two-selves model (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). In this
model, a single agent is represented as two players: a “planner,” whose utility is
derived as the present value of future gains, and a “doer,” who receives the utility
from prior planning in a present period. In the context of dementia, preparation is
needed to protect the planning-self—who will no longer exist after dementia exacts a
sufficient toll—from a future “doer” who has no ability to plan or to act altruistically
toward other members of the household. For instance, a cognitively intact person
may believe that if he developed Alzheimer’s he would not have the awareness to
derive utility from high-quality nursing care. In spite of this, he may still want to
plan for such nursing care in order to increase the utility of his spouse or loved ones,
who may suffer disutility if he suffered bedsores due to insufficient care, for example.
Armed with foreknowledge about one’s cognitive decline, the “planner” can begin
preparation for a state of cognitive impairment. One retirement planning magazine
suggests gathering a group of experts: a financial advisor to plan for incapacity and
paying for costs of care, an attorney to establish trusts and use other legal vehicles to
protect financial assets and medical planning, and a geriatric-care manager to help
with finding caregivers (Garland, 2010). While the suggestion may not be feasible
for all households dealing with dementia, it highlights that one can take actions in a
develop tools for diagnosis and treatment. But Sanjay W. Pimplikar falls into the trap into which many of us
physicians find ourselves: thinking that without a medical treatment, ‘many individuals would simply prefer to
be spared the emotional trauma of a diagnosis.’ This runs contrary to the spoken wishes of many people with
memory loss. They are grateful to hear that their disorienting and frightening experiences have a name. And if
the Alzheimer’s disease is diagnosed early (providers can do this today with a skillful history and clinical exam),
they can actively plan for their future. The real emotional trauma comes when patients and families are confronted
with incomprehensible personality changes, memory lapses and difficulty functioning that are unrecognized by their
medical providers.”(Czapiewski, 2010)
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number of areas: financial, legal, and medical or day-to-day care, among others. In
this chapter, we will focus on the first of these areas.
Households may want to alter their financial plans well before cognition and func-
tional capacities are lost. Expenditures on goods and leisure activities might be
re-allocated to earlier ages when a person still has normal cognition and functioning.
Alternatively, such expenditures may be delayed or cancelled outright in favor of
saving for expensive care in old age. Dementias like Alzheimer’s are progressive and
expensive to manage, so the most direct financial implication of foreknowledge is to
ensure access to care. Additionally, if a spouse is present, one may want to ensure
that the spouse’s financial needs are taken care of during the period of cognitive
impairment. Furthermore, a spouse is also commonly the caretaker of a dementia
patient, so this spouse may be in a position to monitor behavior and actions, such
as how the patient handles money, as cognition declines. A financially competent, or
involved, spouse may notice the danger signs and know when it is optimal to assume
responsibility of finances.
Sharing financial responsibilities with a cognitively intact spouse or loved one (and
eventually delegating responsibilities completely to that person) can be a key form
of preparation. Problems understanding or remembering to pay bills are frequently
cited in anecdotal accounts and academic studies of dementia and Alzheimer’s (Ko-
lata, 2010b; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Okonkwo et al., 2006; Martin et al., 2008;
Okonkwo et al., 2008; Griffith et al., 2003), so for some, altering financial planning
may also be as basic as ensuring that bills are paid correctly and on time.
Households who manage their own investments tend to have more assets to pro-
tect, which makes turning over financial responsibilities even more important. One
New York Times reader comments: “By the time [my father’s] dementia became
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manifest, I was forced to learn the entire universe of money-management without
benefit of his experience and expertise ... Please, if you have assets to protect, make
sure your family understands the details before it’s too late.”8 These households
will also be more vulnerable to financial abuse, since they have assets that can be
exploited.
Knowing preparation is necessary requires some awareness of one’s current or
future cognitive status. Because of the gradual nature of cognitive decline, mild
impairment may not be easily detected. While cognitive impairment is more easily
concealed than physical impairment, loved ones, particularly spouses or children, are
likely to notice and can persuade an individual to see a doctor. Financial advisors,
lawyers, doctors, and others who work with the elderly may also be in a position to
notice cognitive decline. However, due to privacy obligations, lawyers and doctors
may not inform family members or loved ones. Even those without privacy obliga-
tions will not find it easy to deal with these situations. Recent articles in the Journal
of the American Medical Association aim to help clarify the role of physicians who
might be in a position to notice financial decision-making problems in their patients
(Sabatino, 2011; Widera et al., 2011).
In summary, the value of information—in this case information with a large neg-
ative emotional cost—is determined largely by what individuals can do with such
information. There is no cure that can be applied after this information is revealed,
so the utility value of information is derived from changes in one’s own behavior and
planning. In this chapter, we focus on adjustments to financial decision-making that
might reduce the financial costs of Alzheimer’s.
8Susan, Chester County PA, October 31st, 2010, 10:24 am, Comments to Kolata (2010b)
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3.3 Theoretical framework
Early detection of Alzheimer’s, before the onset of symptoms, is a source of infor-
mation about the trajectory of one’s cognition and functional capacity. To formalize
the variation in beliefs about the value of this information, consider a model first
proposed by Boozer and Philipson (2000) to analyze the demand for HIV tests. An
individual is one of two types, each with its own utility function. In our context,
one type undergoes normal aging (UN); the other type develops Alzheimer’s disease
(UA). Let y be a vector of behaviors over time that is a function of p, the subjective
belief of one’s own probability of developing Alzheimer’s.
Therefore, the expected utility gained from a particular type of behavior is
V (y, p) = pUA(y) + (1− p)UN (y) + I(pEA + (1− p)EN ) (3.1)
where I is one if the individual takes a medical test that reveals his type.
The prior belief is denoted by p0. If an individual is tested for Alzheimer’s,
pA is the posterior belief after a positive test, and pN is the posterior belief after a
negative test. If the test perfectly predicts whether or not one will eventually develop
Alzheimer’s, pA equals one and pN equals zero. Otherwise, pA and pN reflect updated
beliefs based on new information from the doctor. For simplicity, we assume that
the test is administered while a person still has normal cognition.
The emotional impact of receiving a diagnosis (positive or negative) is E, with
the emotional impact of remaining in ignorance normalized to zero. The “emotional
trauma of a diagnosis” (Pimplikar, 2010) of Alzheimer’s is EA < 0. The benefit of
knowing you will retain your cognition is denoted by EN > 0.
Behavior y is chosen optimally given a person’s underlying beliefs. If one tests
positive for Alzheimer’s, a person re-optimizes his behavior based on his posterior
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beliefs, formed with the new information about his type, yA. If a person learns he
will not develop diagnosis and will undergo normal aging, his new optimal behavior
bundle is yN . A person who does not take the test will act in accordance with his
prior subjective beliefs and continues his behavior y0.
Utility is then
V (y, p) =


V (yA, pA) = U
A(yA) + EA if one receives a positive test
V (yN , pN) = U
N (yN) + EN if one tests normal
V (y0, p0) = p0U
A(y0) + (1− p0)UN (y0) if one does not take the test.
The value of information is “equal to the expected utility with the information
(under the assumption of optimal reaction) minus the expected utility without”
(Birchler and Bu¨tler, 2007). If c denotes the pecuniary cost in units of utility of
acquiring a diagnosis, the value of information is positive if
p0V (yA, pA) + (1− p0)V (yN , pN)− c > V (y0, p0) (3.2)
where the left-hand side is the net utility gained from the information, and the
right-hand side is the utility gained if a person behaved in accordance with his prior.
Plugging in for V and rearranging shows that one would take the test if:
p0
Benefit from preparation︷ ︸︸ ︷[
UA(yA)− UA(y0)
]
+(1− p0)
Benefit of freedom from fear︷ ︸︸ ︷[
UN (yN)− UN (y0)
]
>
Emotional and pecuniary cost of test︷ ︸︸ ︷
− [p0EA + (1− p0)EN ] + c.
(3.3)
The two expressions on the left hand side represent the increased utility derived
from behavior that is changed with new information, or behavior that is information
elastic (Boozer and Philipson, 2000). If re-optimization after a new Alzheimer’s diag-
nosis does not generate changes in behavior (and therefore utility), then information
about Alzheimer’s has little value. More specifically, information is only valuable if
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the utility gain from the information exceeds the emotional (and pecuniary) cost of
the information.
We can think of y as a stream of behaviors from now until death. In our con-
text, behaviors might include the intertemporal allocation of consumption, saving,
portfolio allocation and the management of finances, and leisure activities. Other
behaviors may involve other preparation for old age by turning over the management
of finances to a loved one, designating a power of attorney, writing medical direc-
tives, undertaking estate planning, and so forth. There is currently little conclusive
evidence about behavior that specifically lowers the risk of Alzheimer’s disease, so
we assume that the objective probability of developing Alzheimer’s is exogenous.
An individual may choose to preemptively prepare for the prospect of Alzheimer’s
even without a definitive diagnosis. If a person has a very high prior belief about
getting Alzheimer’s (p0 close to one), he may have mechanisms in place for someone
else to take over finances, choose to invest in safer assets, or save sufficiently for
long-term nursing care. In this case, a positive diagnosis does not effect substantial
changes in behavior, and therefore behavior is information inelastic; y0 is already
quite close to yA. Indeed, Boozer and Philipson (2000) show that the greatest gains
from test results are reaped by those who would be surprised by those results. Figure
3.1 plots the costs and benefits of information by p. If emotional costs of a positive
diagnosis are low, then most individuals would derive benefit from a diagnosis. Only
those with p0 very close to 0 or 1 would not expect to gain utility from a diagnosis.
This is because their behavior y0 is already very close to yN or yA, respectively, and
therefore the benefits of preparation or freedom from fear are very low. If emotional
(or pecuniary) costs are high, very few individuals would find it worthwhile to have
information; only those with values of p0 close to 0.5 would seek a diagnosis.
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If we interpret p as the probability of developing Alzheimer’s within a specific
time horizon, say five years, the model also generates predictions of how the value
of information depends on the timing in which it is revealed. Consider, for example,
beliefs p that represent the probability of developing Alzheimer’s within five years.
A person at age 20 has a close to zero probability of developing Alzheimer’s in such
a short time frame; furthermore, the potential benefits of changing behavior, such
as turning over finances to a loved one, will not be reaped until old age. Therefore,
such information holds little value for such a young person who is far, in terms of
age and cognition, from developing Alzheimer’s.
As a person progresses into old age, the risk of Alzheimer’s increases dramati-
cally. Researchers have found that starting at age 65, the probability of developing
Alzheimer’s doubles every five years (Khachaturian, 2000), and almost 50 percent
of those 85 and older have Alzheimer’s. One’s p increases accordingly as one ages,
and as can be seen in Figure 3.1, the value of information also increases to a point.
When one is very old and Alzheimer’s is very likely, information no longer carries
much value because the posterior p generally will not be much different than the
prior belief at such an advanced age or low cognition. Consequently, information like
a diagnosis generates few changes in behavior if it is revealed when a person is very
young and has a very low p, or when a person is very old and has suffered much
cognitive decline already, and has a very high p.
We have implicitly assumed so far that the subjective prior is formed rationally
and is at least partially based on current medical knowledge. In reality, one may have
a poor understanding of the risk factors of Alzheimer’s and may have irrationally
low or high prior beliefs, when the objective probability of developing Alzheimer’s
may be very different. Medical professionals therefore are in a position to update the
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beliefs of patients, perhaps by through an educational role that increases a patient’s
awareness of actual risk factors. These patients with unrealistically high or low priors
would gain greatly from such information, even if the information is not in the form
of an accurate test.
Re-optimizing and choosing a new y bundle after a positive diagnosis of Alzheimer’s
yields benefits from preparation, formalized in the first term of Equation (3.3). Given
a person is the type who will eventually develop Alzheimer’s, this term describes the
utility that would be gained if a person changed his behavior from y0, based on his
prior subjective belief, to yA, the optimal bundle chosen under the new information
from a diagnosis. The greater the differences between yA and y0, and therefore the
utility derived from each bundle, the greater the value of information.
One key dimension of re-optimization and changing y is through financial prepa-
ration. Individuals can become especially financially vulnerable in old age, and the
potential losses of wealth are even more severe if one is trying to make financial
decisions under cognitive impairment. Therefore, those who would retain control of
their finances under y0 would be subject to a substantial reduction in their budget
when they suffer cognitive decline. These individuals will necessarily see a reduction
in their subsequent consumption and lower levels of utility UA(y0). If such a person
were to instead learn that he would eventually develop Alzheimer’s, his behavior
would change—for him, yA chosen after a diagnosis is very different than y0 chosen
optimally in the absence of a diagnosis. The more his behavior changes, the greater
the benefits from preparation.
Behavior may be more information elastic if a person’s finances are particularly
vulnerable to losses due to poor decision-making. This theoretical framework there-
fore predicts that households with more to lose—for example, those with investments
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that must be individually managed—will respond more actively to signs of cognitive
decline and memory disease diagnoses than those with less to lose under cognitively
impaired decision-making. These individuals would choose yA that is very different
than their default y0, particularly if their prior belief on p0 was very low.
Conceptually UA and UN are the same with respect to consumption and other
behaviors engaged during periods of normal cognition. However, the utility gained
from behavior changes after the onset of Alzheimer’s, perhaps by the separation of the
“doer” from the “planner.” While preferences under normal cognition are assumed
to be well-behaved, a person with such severe Alzheimer’s that he has no awareness
of his surroundings may have little to no marginal utility of consumption. A forward-
looking person may therefore re-allocate his consumption earlier to periods of low
cognition and place less emphasis on high-quality nursing care.
Even if a person’s own marginal utility of consumption is low under Alzheimer’s,
though, a spouse or loved one may derive great disutility from seeing him experience
poor nursing care. If a person cares about the spouse’s utility, he may want to
reduce current consumption and increase precautionary saving in order to afford more
expensive nursing home care. In this case, his forward-looking altruistic marginal
utility of consumption would drive re-allocating consumption later in the life-cycle.
We can think of the utility function here as representative of however couples make
decisions and abstract away from any cooperative or non-cooperative decision-making
processes. Consequently, individuals with and without spouses may have different
preferences before and after the onset of Alzheimer’s, with differing optimal paths of
consumption.
Re-optimizing with a new behavior path after a test reveals a person to be of
normal type yields benefits of freedom from fear, the second term of Equation (3.3).
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Certainty that a person will not develop Alzheimer’s may enable a person to reduce
precautionary savings intended to pay for long term nursing care, and he would
no longer need contingency plans based on cognitive decline. He might re-allocate
consumption with the knowledge he will retain his ability to think and reason.
The right hand side of Equation (3.3) represents the utility cost of paying for the
test, and the expected emotional impact of the diagnosis. This emotional impact
may be the emotional relief associated with a normal diagnosis, or the trauma from
a diagnosis of dementia. In sum, individual variation in the value of an Alzheimer’s
diagnosis can be traced to the degree to which behavior is information elastic, dif-
ferences in prior beliefs, and the expected emotional cost of the test.
3.4 Empirical approach and data
In this chapter, we focus on the decision to change the household’s financial
decision-maker within the household and therefore restrict our analysis to couples.
As discussed in Section 3.3, the value of information and its associated changes in
behavior depends in part on its timing. Behavior changed too early—when a person
is young, has normal cognition, and has low subjective and objective prior proba-
bilities of developing Alzheimer’s—is of little value. Likewise, attempts to change
behavior at a very advanced age or when cognition is already impaired may be too
late to result in any increases in utility relative to the counterfactual. We analyze
the impact of new information—a diagnosis of a memory-related disease—on the
timing of this change. Because our empirical analysis focuses on older Americans,
the possibility of learning or changing behavior too early has probably passed, but
we can observe how behavior changes at various points of aging or cognitive decline.
We begin with descriptive analysis of two-way relationships between the choice
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of financial decision-maker, cognition, functional capacity, and memory disease di-
agnoses. We then proceed with regression models—probit and survival models—to
analyze how the choice of financial respondent relates to cognitive decline over time,
the emergence of problems handling money, and most importantly the diagnosis of
a memory-related disease. Because these are analyses of couples, we consider char-
acteristics of both members of each couple. The theoretical model predicts that the
financial respondent switch should occur more quickly for households whose wealth
is individually managed. Because the speed of cognitive decline varies across indi-
viduals, we also use cognition as analysis time in survival analysis to examine how
low cognition falls before a failure occurrence.
The empirical analysis uses several waves of the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS),9 a nationally representative longitudinal survey of Americans over the age
of 50 and their spouses. Since its first wave in 1992, follow-up surveys have been
conducted approximately every two years. New cohorts are added every six years
to maintain the steady state design. The survey content includes individual- and
household-level information about family demographics, health status, cognition,
functional limitations, assets, debts, and others. In the 2008 wave, the HRS inter-
viewed over 18,000 individuals.
The HRS is supplemented by the Aging, Demographics, and Memory Study
(ADAMS), a national population-based study of dementia (Langa et al., 2005). A
sample of 856 HRS respondents over the age of 70 participated in an extensive in-
home cognitive assessment and received a diagnosis of normal, ‘cognitive impairment,
not demented’ (CIND), or dementia. Follow-up assessments were conducted for those
diagnosed with CIND, or whose diagnoses were unclear at baseline. Each ADAMS
9The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging (grant number NIA
U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan. Some variables were provided by the RAND HRS
Data file (RAND HRS Data, 2010). See http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu for more information.
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respondent also participated in the HRS, so the diagnoses can be linked to HRS
cognition data to verify the validity of HRS measures.
3.4.1 Measures used in the empirical analysis
Cognitive decline A 27-point cognitive scale is administered to self-respondents
who are 51 and older. The scale includes a ten-word immediate and delayed recall
test (0-20 points) that measures episodic memory, a serial 7s test that measures
working memory (0-5 points), and a backwards counting test that measures mental
processing speed (0-2 points). These tasks were derived from the Mini-Mental State
Examination commonly used by physicians and other well-validated scales, and they
display “satisfactory psychometric properties” (Herzog and Wallace, 1997; Herzog
and Rodgers, 1999).
Scores from waves from 2006 and earlier include imputations for missing data
(Fisher et al., 2009), while those from 2008 are raw scores and do not include im-
putations. Crimmins et al. (2011) determined cut points of the 27-point cognitive
scale that would generate the same population prevalence of dementia and ‘cogni-
tive impairment, not demented’ (CIND) among the HRS sample as that found in
the Aging, Demographics, and Memory Study (ADAMS). Scores between 12 and
27 points are considered normal, 7-11 points CIND, and 0-6 points correspond to
dementia. Those who have proxy respondents are coded with scores of zero,in the
dementia range. Proxy interviews are generally triggered by low scores on a more
basic cognition test.
Information: memory disease diagnoses Beginning in 1998, the HRS has asked each
respondent, “Has a doctor ever told you that you have a memory-related disease?”
This question is re-asked at each interview and is our primary variable of information
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about cognitive decline.
Awareness of financial capacity: Money IADL The HRS asks respondents about
their ability to perform both ADLs and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living
(IADLs). One such IADL question asks the respondent, “Because of a health or
memory problem, do you have any difficulty with managing your money—such as
paying your bills and keeping track of expenses?” If a respondent answers “yes,”
“don’t do,” or “can’t do,” he is coded as having difficulties handling money. This
money IADL variable can thus be used as an indicator for having problems han-
dling money. This variable can be used both as an intermediate outcome—financial
capacity—as well as an indicator of self-awareness, or a source of information.
Financial respondents A measure of financial responsibility in the household in
the HRS is the “financial respondent,” who answers all survey questions related to
household finances and wealth. This person is selected when the couple enters the
study, in accordance with the question about the person most knowledgeable about
household finances. The wording of the question varies slightly across waves:
• Which of you is most knowledgeable about your family’s assets, debts and re-
tirement planning? (husband, wife, or partner) (1992)
• I will be asking some questions about your financial situation and health care
costs. Which of you would know more about this, you or your (husband/wife/partner)?
(1993)
• I would like to interview both you and your [husband/wife/partner]. I will
be asking some questions about family assets, debts and retirement planning.
Which of you is the most knowledgeable about this, you or your [husband/wife/partner]?
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(1998)
During the introductory section of each wave’s interview, the interviewer determines
whether or not the financial respondent assignment needs to be changed. A new
financial respondent can be seen as a strong signal that the previous financial re-
spondent is no longer the most knowledgeable about household finances. While
this measure was designed for survey management purposes, rather than as a direct
measure of financial decision-making, the financial respondent measure is the best
measure available in the data. As seen in Chapter II, the financial respondent in a
couple tends to have higher financial literacy than the spouse, and in most cases is
the husband. The financial respondent also tends to either singly or jointly make the
major financial decisions for the household.
The choice of financial respondent is our measure of behavior y; in our empirical
analysis, we look for changes in the financial respondent within couples in response
to cognitive decline.
Household wealth We use two variables related to household wealth. First, we use
the natural log of total wealth (net value of total wealth, not including secondary
home), with households with negative wealth coded as zero. Second, we use the
tercile of share of wealth held in stock; those who do not own any stocks are coded
as zero. Both of these variables are based on wealth calculations drawn from RAND
HRS Data (2010). We also construct an indicator for owning retirement accounts
with investments that are personally managed.
Variation in the benefits of preparation: individually managed wealth Impaired
financial decision-making exposes households to more severe consequences if they
hold wealth that requires personal management. The HRS asks of those who report
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participating in defined contribution pension or retirement plans: “Are you able to
choose how the money in your account is invested?” We create an indicator that
takes the value of one for the first wave at which the couple reports holding at least
one account that allows the holder to choose how the money is invested, and each
wave thereafter. In doing so, our measure is not contaminated by moving assets out
of individually controlled accounts as a form of preparation.
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics
All analysis in this chapter is conducted at the household level from the perspective
of the member who was the financial respondent when the couple entered the HRS.
The analysis sample is restricted to waves in which the cognition score was collected,
waves 1998 through 2008. Table 3.1 reports summary statistics from the first year
a couple appears in the analysis sample. Most financial respondents at baseline are
male. Likewise, they are older than their spouses and are more educated than their
spouses. Approximately 1/3 of couples have retirement accounts for which they can
choose their investments. About 63 percent of households do not hold any wealth in
stock.
The bottom of Table 3.1 summarizes the cognition of baseline financial respon-
dents and their spouses, measured during the first year the couple appears in the
analysis sample. Most respondents have cognition scores in the normal range. About
11 percent of initial financial respondents and 13 percent of spouses have scores in
the CIND range, and 4 percent and 8 percent in the dementia range, respectively.
In about 90 percent of couples, the baseline financial respondent has a cognition
score in the same or better range than his spouse (see Table 3.2). Few respondents
(less than 2 percent) report having been diagnosed with a memory disease. About
5 percent of initial financial respondents and 10 percent of spouses report having
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problems handling money.
It should be noted that our sample is subject to left censoring. Due to the design of
the HRS, members of different cohorts entered the study at different ages. Therefore,
some couples are young during the first wave of analysis, while others are older. If
some couples switched financial decision-makers prior to the onset of the survey, or
if they passed on responsibility to an adult child, our analysis will not capture these
events.
3.5 Descriptive analysis
3.5.1 Validation of cognition measures
27-point cognition scores and actual diagnoses of dementia or CIND
The use of the 27-point cognition scores and the cutoffs for CIND and dementia
can be validated using the ADAMS. ADAMS respondents were administered the
same cognitive tests as all other HRS respondents in addition to additional assess-
ments, resulting in a determination of whether the respondent is normal, CIND, or
demented. Figure 3.2 displays a box plot of cognition scores for ADAMS respon-
dents who were found to be normal, CIND, or demented as of the most recent wave
available of the ADAMS. The scores reported were the most recent scores from the
core HRS interview available at the time of the ADAMS diagnosis. Therefore, the
scores may be slightly higher than what the respondents would have achieved if mea-
surement of the 27-point tests occurred at the same time as the ADAMS assessment,
given that cognition tends to decline with age. As seen in Figure 3.2, over 80 percent
of ADAMS respondents with a normal outcome have cognition scores in the normal
range (greater than 12, or above the topmost red horizontal line). The interquartile
range of CIND respondents is mostly in the CIND cognition score range, though
the median is at 11 points, the upper cutoff of the range. Those with a dementia
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diagnosis have scores that span both the CIND and the dementia score ranges, and
again the median at the dementia/CIND threshold. The cognition scores and the
cutoffs proposed by Crimmins et al. (2011) are largely consistent with the diagnostic
conclusions from ADAMS, which validates the use of these 27-point scores alone for
all respondents.
Comparison of objective and subjective (self-reported) measures
During each interview, All respondents underwent a cognitive assessment using the
objective 27-point scale, and were also asked whether they have received a memory
disease diagnosis. In Figure 3.3, we pool all respondents (regardless of coupleness sta-
tus) and all waves to compare the objective cognition measure and the self-reported
memory disease diagnosis. The incidence of self-reported memory disease diagnoses
increases as the cognition score declines. However, only 15 percent of respondents
with dementia-range cognition scores report a memory disease diagnosis (see Table
3.3). One possible explanation is that some of the remaining 85 percent do indeed
have such a disease, but never received a diagnosis from a doctor. Alternatively,
these may be false negatives in the sense that the respondents were once diagnosed
but either are unaware of the diagnosis or have forgotten. To our knowledge, no
studies have examined the reasons for the low rates of self-reported memory dis-
ease diagnoses, but studies about rates of undiagnosed dementia find results ranging
between 35 percent and more than 90 percent (Olafsdottir et al., 2000).
3.5.2 Cognition and financial skills / responsibility
Cognition and financial capacity: problems handling money
Financial capacity can be ascertained from an IADL question asked by the HRS:
“Because of a health or memory problem, do you have any difficulty with managing
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your money—such as paying your bills and keeping track of expenses?” Figure 3.4
graphs the proportions of all respondents that answer yes, don’t do, can’t do, and no,
split by the cognition score. As the cognition score declines, the proportion reporting
“no difficulty” declines as well. While very few of those with cognition scores in the
normal range report having difficulties handling money, more than one third of those
in the dementia range report difficulties (see Figure 3.5).
Cognition and financial responsibility: the financial respondent
Figure 3.6 displays a bar graph of the proportion of respondents who are the finan-
cial respondent in their households, by their cognition score. Because all uncoupled
individuals are necessarily financial respondents, the analysis only includes those in
couples. All waves are included. The lower the cognition score, the less likely an in-
dividual is to be a financial respondent, but 37 percent of coupled respondents serve
as financial respondents. Figure 3.7 groups the cognition scores into the normal,
CIND, and dementia ranges; the pairwise differences in proportions of respondents
who are financial respondents are statistically significant across the three groups.
Changes in wealth and changes in cognition
Do declines in cognition generate reductions in wealth? In Figure 3.8, we present
a lowess curve of wave to wave changes in total wealth (in thousands of dollars)
plotted against changes in cognition on the 27-point scale. Large declines in cog-
nition are associated with large declines wealth, which is consistent with anecdotal
evidence presented above. This graph should only be taken as suggestive evidence,
however, for a number of reasons. First, declines in wealth may reflect transfers to
children in order to qualify for Medicaid and avoid private financing of nursing home
care. Secondly, large swings in cognition can only occur for those who started with
99
relatively high cognition. For example, a person who is borderline CIND-normal can
decline by a maximum of 11 points on the scale, which according to this graph is
associated with zero change in wealth. Lastly, if wealth is calculated using responses
from a cognitively impaired financial respondent, those values may not reliably re-
flect wave-to-wave changes. Indeed, Venti (2010) finds that longitudinal estimates of
IRA values in the HRS are made difficult by inaccuracies in respondent reports.
3.5.3 Lowess estimates over the 27-point cognition score
Financial capacity and financial responsibility
Do baseline financial respondents turn over responsibility for finances at the same
level of cognition that they report having difficulties managing money? Figure 3.9
displays two graphs; both include a lowess curve of being the financial respondent
as well as a lowess of the absence of money difficulties plotted on the 27-point cog-
nition scale. Both of these graphs only include individuals in couples who were the
financial respondent at the baseline. The first graph includes those who do not have
retirement investments that are individually chosen, while the second graph includes
respondents who do. In both cases, although the proportion of respondents without
money problems begins to decline at the lower end of the normal cognition range
and drops sharply in the CIND and dementia ranges, the proportion of individuals
who are financial respondents remains quite stable until the CIND-dementia thresh-
old. For those in the dementia range a larger proportion of individuals are financial
respondents than report no difficulties handling money. This suggests that some of
these financial respondents may make financial decisions in spite of reporting diffi-
culties handling money. However, the gap between the two lines is much narrower for
those who can choose how their retirement wealth is invested, so fewer households
are exposed to the risk of bad financial decisions. This also provides some suggestive
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evidence that the decision to switch the financial respondent is different for the two
groups.
These graphs imply that for many individuals, reporting difficulties managing
money precedes switching the financial respondent. Table 3.4 cross-tabulates couple-
wave observations and shows that for 87 percent of observations in which initial
financial respondents report having trouble handling money, they are still the finan-
cial respondent. Table 3.5 tabulates the order of the two events: reporting problems
handling money on the part of the initial financial respondent, and switching the
financial respondent. Note that one or more of these events occur for 1575 couples;
neither event occurs for the remaining couples. Among the couples that have experi-
enced at least one event, nearly three quarters of them reported difficulties handling
money first. For most of these, the financial respondent switch has not yet occurred.
An additional 5 percent had both events occurring in the same wave. About 20
percent switched the financial respondent before the baseline financial respondent
reported difficulties managing money.
A possible reason for this discrepancy—that a person remains the financial re-
spondent in spite of having problems handling money—is that the spouse may be
even worse off. In this case, the baseline financial respondent may retain his com-
parative advantage even in light of his difficulties handling money. The regression
analysis will address this issue.
Memory disease diagnoses and financial responsibility
Receiving a diagnosis of a memory-related disease is a strong indication from a
medical professional that one’s cognition is declining. Being able to recall and report
this diagnosis to an interviewer demonstrates self-awareness of cognitive decline.
How do rates of being financial respondents and of memory disease diagnoses change
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as cognition declines? We know that memory disease diagnoses rise and financial
respondents fall in the dementia range of cognition scores, but do these changes
track each other?
Figure 3.10 displays lowess estimates of being the financial respondent and not
having a memory disease diagnosis, plotted against the cognition score. The up-
per graph includes respondents who have retirement accounts that are individually
managed, and the lower graph includes those who do not have such accounts. In
both cases, when respondents are in the normal cognition range, the two lines are
parallel. Regardless of the nature of retirement accounts, some individuals with a
memory disease diagnosis serve as financial respondents, and this proportion is fairly
constant throughout the range.
The pictures diverge for those in the dementia range. Among those without indi-
vidually managed retirement accounts, the proportion of individuals who are financial
respondents is much higher than the proportion of respondents without a memory
disease diagnosis, and the gap increases the lower the cognition score. However, the
opposite is the case for respondents with retirement investments that are individ-
ually chosen. Among those in the dementia range, a much smaller proportion of
individuals are financial respondents than have not had memory disease diagnoses.
This provides suggestive evidence that how the financial respondent decision relates
to a memory disease diagnosis depends on the nature of financial decisions being
made—namely, whether or not retirement wealth needs to be individually managed.
Kaplan-Meier estimation Kaplan-Meier survival estimates (Figure 3.11) show that
those with accounts that are individually managed have a greater hazard of switching
the financial respondent than those who do not; a log-rank test rejects the null that
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these hazard functions are equal (log rank test: χ2(1) = 26.83; Pr > χ2 = 0.0000).
However, having individually managed retirement accounts does not increase the
hazard of reporting problems handling money (log rank test: χ2(1) = 1.57; Pr >
χ2 = 0.2109). Individuals tend to report difficulties with money at the same levels
of cognition, regardless of the nature of their retirement wealth.
In summary, cognition scores negatively correlate with having a memory-related
disease diagnosis and having problems handling money in the expected manner. In
particular, the lower the cognition score, the higher the likelihood of reporting a
diagnosis and problems handling money. The emergence of financial incapacity with
low cognition is consistent with medical research on Alzheimer’s. Couples do switch
financial respondents when the original respondent’s cognition declines, but many
log-cognition respondents remain the financial respondent for their households. In
general, among those with cognition in the CIND or dementia range, the propor-
tion who are financial respondents exceeds the proportion who retain their financial
capacity. Therefore, some low-cognition individuals are financial respondents even
while they report having problems handling money. However, the gap between rates
of problems handling money and being the financial respondent is much smaller for
those who have individually controlled retirement accounts. At dementia ranges of
cognition, rates of being the financial respondent exceed of having no memory dis-
ease diagnosis if retirement wealth is not individually controlled. This implies that
some demented individuals are serving as the financial respondent in spite of suf-
fering from a memory-related disease. The reverse is true for couples who do have
individually controlled investments. The next section uses regression techniques to
further understand these patterns.
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3.6 Regression analysis
Here, we analyze how the financial outcomes, financial capacity (measured by
respondent self-reports of difficulties handling money) and financial responsibility
(measured by identifying the financial respondent in the couple) are affected by
cognition and memory disease diagnosis. As before, the unit of analysis is a couple,
and each observation will contain attributes of both the first financial respondent
and his or her spouse. The reference point of the observation is the person who
was designated the most financially knowledgeable when the couple first entered
the survey. Where we refer to “own education” or “own cognition,” we mean the
characteristics of the financial respondent at baseline; we refer to the other member
of the couple as “the spouse.” Because there can only be one financial respondent
in the couple, each couple only has one observation per wave.
Couples exit the sample when one spouse dies, or the couple otherwise dissolves—
this is a source of censoring, which can be addressed using survival analysis. Another
source of right-censoring comes from couples who are still intact, with no reports of
money difficulties or switching of the financial respondent, during the most recent
2008 wave of the HRS.
The regression analysis employs the following variables (see Section 3.4.1 for more
details):
• Individual-level demographic characteristics of both members of the couple: gen-
der, age, and education,
• Individual-level cognition: indicators for having a cognition score in the CIND
or dementia range, self-reported diagnoses of memory-related diseases, and self-
reported difficulties handling money of both members of the couple, and
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• Household financial characteristics: tercile of household assets held in stock
(zero if the household owns no stock), natural log of total wealth.
3.6.1 Bivariate probit regression
The fact that the two financial responsibility outcomes—difficulties handling money,
and no longer being the financial respondent—should be correlated suggests the use
of bivariate probit analysis. The descriptive analysis above shows that people develop
difficulties handling money before they turn over being the financial respondent to
the spouse. If the financial respondent switch occurs at the same time as the origi-
nal respondent reports difficulty handling money, then the coefficients should be the
same for both equations. If a particular coefficient is larger in the equation estimat-
ing difficulties handling money, then the decision to switch financial respondents is
less responsive.
Table 3.6 presents results of a bivariate probit regression of two financial out-
comes: difficulties handling money for the initial financial respondent in column
(1), and switching the financial respondent in column (2). The reference point is
the member of the couple who was the financial respondent at baseline. Having a
memory disease diagnosis is strongly associated with difficulties with money, but the
effect of a diagnosis on switching the financial respondent much smaller in magnitude
and not statistically distinguishable from zero. However, the interaction effect of the
memory disease diagnosis and an indicator of retirement wealth that can be indi-
vidually managed is positive and statistically significant for the financial respondent
switch. This interaction effect has a negative, statistically insignificant effect on the
probability of having problems managing money.
This means that while a memory disease diagnosis is associated with switching
the financial respondent (though the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero), the
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effect is even larger for households in which investments in retirement wealth can
be individually controlled. It is precisely those couples that are more potentially
more exposed to poor financial decisions that are more responsive to memory disease
diagnoses in terms of switching the financial respondent.
The probability of switching the financial respondent is less responsive to the
respondent being CIND than is the probability of reporting having problems handling
money. Column (3) reports χ2 tests for the difference in each coefficient across the
two equations. For both the CIND and dementia indicators, the coefficients for the
money problem outcome are larger in magnitude than those of the switching financial
respondent outcome, and for CIND the difference is statistically significant. This
provides additional evidence that some individuals who have difficulties handling
money have not yet been replaced as the financial decision-maker.
3.6.2 Survival analysis
Survival analysis using age as analysis time
While a bivariate probit model explicitly assumes the two financial outcomes are
correlated, the model does not address right censoring caused by the dissolution of
couples due to divorce or widowhood. Furthermore, couples who have not switched
their financial respondents may still do so in the future, creating another source of
right censoring. Survival models treating the two outcomes as “failures” account for
such censoring and explicitly model durations so we can compare how time to report-
ing problems handling money relates to the time to changing financial respondents.
Although the bivariate probit model shows that the two equations are correlated,
standard survival models assume the two are independent. Here, durations are mea-
sured in calendar time, using the baseline financial respondent’s age at each wave of
observation.
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Table 3.7 reports results from Cox proportional hazards models; column (1) treats
reporting difficulties handling money as the failure, and column (2) treats switching
the financial respondent as the failure. The main effect of a memory disease diagnosis
is much larger for reporting difficulties managing money than for the financial respon-
dent switch, increasing the hazard by a factor of 3.3 and 1.5, respectively. However,
the interaction of a memory disease diagnosis with choosing one’s own retirement in-
vestments has a large, statistically significant positive impact on switching, doubling
the hazard, and virtually no impact on having problems managing money. This is
consistent with the idea that those with more to lose—those with individually man-
aged retirement accounts—do indeed respond to a memory disease diagnosis above
and beyond those who do not choose their own investments.
Having a cognition score in the CIND range more than doubles the hazard of
problems handling money relative to being in the normal cognition range. However,
a CIND score only increases the hazard of switching the financial respondent by less
than a factor of 1.5. This suggests that the hazard of switching of the financial
respondent is less responsive to declines in cognition to CIND than the hazard of
difficulties handling money, as shown in the descriptive analysis. Given that the
evidence in medical research shows that financial capabilities suffer when cognitive
declines are still mild, the lack of responsiveness to being in the CIND range can pose
problems to the household. That said, dementia increases the hazard of difficulties
handling money to 435 percent, and the hazard of switching the financial respondent
responds similarly (483 percent), so when declines are severe, families do adjust
accordingly.
Having a spouse in the CIND or dementia range reduces the hazard function of
money difficulties, to 72 percent and 77 percent of the hazard associated with having
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normal cognition spouse. Again, the switching of financial respondents is much more
responsive to being in the spouse being in the dementia range than in CIND. If
the baseline financial respondent is female, the hazard of having problems handling
money only increases by a factor of 1.2, while the hazard of switching the financial
respondent to the spouse triples. Therefore, the characteristics of both members of
the couple are important.
Unlike the bivariate probit regression, this analysis assumes the two “failures”—
money difficulties and the financial respondent switch—are independent. Column (3)
of Table 3.7 reports the results of a Cox proportional hazards model that restricts the
analysis to those who have reported difficulties handling money, and treats the finan-
cial respondent switch as the failure. Note that this sample size is quite small (1739
couple-wave observations) so estimates are not precise, but qualitatively the results
are the same: the interaction of choosing investments and memory disease diagnosis
has a large positive effect on the hazard of switching the financial respondent.
Survival analysis using cognition scores as analysis time
While the previous analysis measures durations in terms of calendar time, we can
also treat the 27-point cognition score itself as the “time scale.” This would allow
us to how much cognition deteriorates before the occurrence of the two failures-
developing problems handling money, and switching the financial respondent. Using
cognition scores as analysis time in a survival framework is a transformation similar
to operational time (Lee and Whitmore, 2006).
To use these scores as analysis “time,” cognition scores should decline monoton-
ically with age. Table 3.8 tabulates the wave-to-wave changes in cognitive status
among HRS respondents. About 83 percent of wave-to-wave changes in cognition
remain within the same cognitive status: for example back-to-back scores in the
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normal range. Most of these within-status changes are small, and on average they
are declines in scores. Approximately 10 percent are transitions into worse cognitive
states, from normal to CIND or dementia, and CIND to dementia. These changes
have an average of a 6.5 point decline the cognition scores. Only 6 percent of wave-
to-wave changes are improvements from one cognition category to another. Of these,
the vast majority are CIND to normal transitions.
Cognition scores are negatively monotonic for the most part (particularly after a
respondent has moved out of the normal range), so they can be treated as analysis
time. Some individuals receive the same cognition score in multiple waves; we can
either drop the duplicate waves or perturb scores in order to deal with the fact that
survival analysis cannot deal with multiple observations at the same point in “time.”
If an individual receives the same cognition score in two waves, we subtract 0.01
from the more recent score. If an individual receives the same cognition score in
three waves, we add 0.01 to the first measurement and subtract 0.01 from the most
recent measurement. The two methods have similar results, so we report the analysis
using the full sample with perturbed scores.
Table 3.9 reports the results of the estimation of Cox proportional hazards mod-
els, one for each failure—problems managing money, and the financial respondent
switch. While the main effect of a memory disease diagnosis increases the hazard of
having problems managing money by a precisely-measured factor of 1.87, it does not
increase the hazard of switching the financial respondent. However, the interaction
of a diagnosis and controlling investments has no effect on the hazard of difficulties
handling money but increases the hazard of switching the financial respondent to
157 percent of the baseline hazard, with a p-value of 0.09.
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Competing risks and Cox proportional hazards models In using cognition scores as
analysis time, there is another source of censoring (in addition to the lack of failure
during the most recent measurement): reaching the lowest cognition score. Cognition
scores are on a 27-point scale and cannot take values outside this range, so in this
framework when a person has reached a score of zero, or has been replaced with
a proxy respondent in the survey, cognition scores are then censored. Therefore a
more appropriate model would be a competing risks survival model. Here, we report
the results of a competing risks regression where the failure object of interest is
the switching of financial respondents within a couple or the emergence of problems
handling money, and the competing risk is the attainment of the lowest cognition
score.
While the estimates in Table 3.9 does not account for the competing risk of reach-
ing a zero cognition score, Table 3.10 reports results from the analogous competing
risks models. The results of the Cox proportional hazards model and the competing
risks model are quite similar, but accounting for the competing risk strengthens the
estimates of the effects of a memory disease diagnosis and its interaction with control-
ling investments. Surprisingly, the main effect of having a memory disease diagnosis,
while doubling the hazard of difficulties handling money, decreases the hazard of
switching the financial respondent, though it is not statistically significant. How-
ever, its interaction effect with controlling one’s investments is large and statistically
significant; if one has accounts that are individually invested, being diagnosed with a
memory disease more than doubles the hazard of switching the financial respondent
(hazard ratio of 2.1), even though this interaction term has no effect on problems
handling money. This result is consistent with the idea that those with much to
gain from preparing for cognitive decline—those with assets that are at risk of being
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mismanaged by the original financial respondent—prepare by switching the financial
respondent more quickly.
Given that problems handling money tend to precede the financial respondent
switch, we also estimate models of this switch with problems handling money as an
explanatory variable. Results from the estimation of a Cox proportional hazards
model and a competing risks model are reported in Table 3.11. Even controlling for
these problems managing money, the two models again confirm the large, significant
effect of a memory disease diagnosis on switching the financial respondent for those
who control investments in their retirement accounts. In fact, for the competing risks
regression in column (2), the hazard ratio of the interaction effect is a statistically
significant 2.2.
Reporting having trouble handling money has a strong (and statistically signif-
icant, for the Cox model) effect on the hazard. If the initial financial respondent
reports no problems, the hazard is reduced; if the spouse reports no problem, the
hazard is increased. In all specifications, other spousal characteristics also matter
in the expected way; in some cases they matter more than the initial financial re-
spondent’s characteristics. The older, more educated, and more cognitively intact a
spouse is, the greater the hazard of switching financial respondents. The effect of the
spouse’s age is not statistically significant in the competing risk regression, which is
not surprising given that the regression already controls for spouse’s cognition. Own
age and education do not have a statistically significant effect on the hazard.
Holding a greater share of wealth in stock and log wealth have very little effect on
the hazard of switching the financial respondent. While this is inconsistent with the
intuition of the theoretical model that wealthier individuals have more to lose from
poor financial decision-making, it confirms the most important factor is whether or
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not assets are individually controlled. Therefore, the indicator for holding retirement
wealth that is individually controlled is not merely a proxy for portfolio allocation
or wealth.
3.7 Conclusion
How one prepares for cognitive decline depends on how much one has to lose by
failing to prepare. For example, poor financial decisions may have a smaller impact
for someone who is living on predictable streams of income than for those with retire-
ment wealth that needs to be individually managed. Therefore, we expect variation
in responses to diagnoses of memory-related diseases like Alzheimer’s disease. In this
chapter, we analyze how the person in the couple serving as the financial respondent
changes as cognition declines to impaired and demented levels.
We find that households tend to wait until cognition has fallen quite low to make
the switch. In particular, this switch often occurs well after the original financial
respondent has reported having difficulties handling money.
To analyze how this financial respondent switching behavior varies according to
the nature of their retirement wealth, we use a number of econometric methods. The
same story arises in all of the regression analyses—bivariate probit models, survival
analysis using calendar age, and survival analysis using cognition as analysis time.
There is variation in how quickly financial respondents switch in response to cogni-
tive decline, memory disease diagnoses, and even the emergence of problems handling
money. After controlling for wealth, those with individually managed retirement ac-
counts switch financial respondents more responsively to memory disease diagnoses.
They also switch at higher levels of cognition—in other words, before suffering too
much decline—and sooner after reporting problems handling money.
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This is consistent with an economic model of the value of information about
future states. If information about future cognition enables re-optimization and
preparation by have someone else manage retirement wealth, then the information
is useful. If one does not have the ability to prepare, for instance, if one holds no
individually managed retirement wealth that can be handed over to a spouse, then
the information is not helpful. This is not just an effect of higher wealth, which
has a small, positive but imprecisely estimated effect on the financial respondent
switch in all specifications. Spousal characteristics are also important and influence
the decision to switch financial respondents in the expected direction. The decision
depends not only on how poor one’s cognition is, but how poor is the cognition of
the spouse to whom one might potentially turning over the finances. This provides
evidence that the most important factor is one of comparative advantage relative to
one’s spouse.
Another option we cannot observe in our data is passing on responsibility of fi-
nances to an adult child. Having adult children nearby may enhance monitoring;
these children may more easily notice poor decision-making. On the other hand,
frequent contact with children may make it more difficult to notice changes in cogni-
tion in the parent. If children only see their parents during major holidays, the time
distance between visits makes cognitive decline more noticeable. Indeed, including
child proximity measures in the regressions does not influence the effect explanatory
variables of interest, cognition and memory disease diagnoses; furthermore, the sign
of their coefficients is extremely sensitive to the specification and is never statistically
significant, and there were dropped from our analysis. Future research will enable us
to examine in greater detail the nature of the division of labor within older couples
as well as the role of their adult children.
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3.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Value of information as a function of subjective risk of Alzheimer’s
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Graph adapted from Figure 1 of Boozer and Philipson (2000).
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Figure 3.2: Cognition score of ADAMS respondents, by eventual outcome
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Figure 3.3: Self reported memory disease diagnoses, by cognition score
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Figure includes all respondents.
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Figure 3.4: Self-reported difficulties handling money, by cognition score
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Figure includes all respondents.
Figure 3.5: Self-reported difficulties handling money, by cognition score range
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Figure includes all respondents.
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Figure 3.6: Proportion of individuals who are financial respondents, by cognition score
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Figure includes all respondents in couples.
Figure 3.7: Proportion of individuals who are financial respondents, by cognition score range
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Figure includes all respondents in couples.
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Figure 3.8: Lowess estimates of change in wealth (in thousands of dollars) and change in cognition
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Figure 3.9: Financial respondents and the absence of difficulties handling money by cognition score,
separated by nature of retirement wealth
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Figure includes all respondents in couples who were financial respondents during the baseline wave.
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Figure 3.10: Financial respondents and memory diagnoses over cognition scores, separated by na-
ture of retirement wealth
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Figure includes all respondents in couples who were financial respondents during the baseline wave.
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Figure 3.11: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of problems handling money and being the financial
respondent, separated by nature of retirement wealth
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Figure includes all respondents in couples who were financial respondents during the baseline wave.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of financial respondents during the first wave analysis
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Female 0.362 0.481 7103
Own age 63.817 9.6 7103
Spouse’s age 63.18 10.201 7103
Years of school 12.793 3.146 7103
Spouse’s years of school 12.245 3.133 7103
Tercile of stock share if stock> 0, otherwise 0 0.744 1.084 7103
Log total household assets 11.999 1.594 7103
Choose investments for retirement accounts 0.318 0.466 7103
Own cognition in normal range 0.845 0.362 7103
Own cognition in CIND range 0.108 0.31 7103
Own cognition in Dementia range 0.048 0.213 7103
Own problems handling money 0.045 0.207 7103
Own memory disease diagnosis 0.015 0.12 7103
Spouse’s cognition in normal range 0.791 0.406 7103
Spouse’s cognition in CIND range 0.131 0.337 7103
Spouse’s cognition in Dementia range 0.078 0.268 7103
Spouse’s problems handling money 0.092 0.289 7103
Spouse’s memory disease diagnosis 0.018 0.135 7103
Table 3.2: Cognition of baseline financial respondent and spouse
Own cognition
Spouse’s cognition Normal CIND Dementia Total
Normal 4,941 666 392 5,999
CIND 466 188 112 766
Dementia 215 75 48 338
Total 5,622 929 552 7,103
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Table 3.3: Proportion of respondents with memory disease diagnoses, by cognition score range
Cognition Proportion with Std. Dev. Freq.
score Memory disease diagnosis
Normal .007 .082 57332
CIND .0301 .171 8856
Dementia .156 .363 4029
Total .018 .134 70217
Table reports results for all respondents, person-wave observations.
Table 3.4: Financial respondents and difficulties handling money
Problems 1 if financial respondent
Handling money Mean Std. Dev. Freq.
No .968 .176 23701
Yes .864 .343 1371
Total .962 .190 25072
Table reports results for observations in the analysis sample only; person-wave observations.
Table 3.5: Onset of money problems and switching the financial respondent
Events Years between events
Problems handling Switch financial Freq % Mean SD
money respondent
1st event n/a 1089 0.69 3.21 3.56
1st event 2nd event 76 0.05 4.72 3.17
Events happened same wave 73 0.05 0.00 0.00
2nd event 1st event 48 0.03 -4.44 2.62
n/a 1st event 289 0.18 3.12 3.55
TOTAL 1575 100.00 2.89 3.74
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Table 3.6: Bivariate probit regressions with outcomes “Difficulties handling money” and “no longer
financial respondent”
(1) (2) (3)
Difficulties Not Financial χ2 test
Handling money Respondent (P-value)
Female -0.02 0.43*** 27.8
(0.05) (0.07) (0.00)
Age 0.02*** 0.00 5.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Spouse’s Age -0.01 0.02*** 13.53
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Own education -0.01 -0.01 0.20
(0.01) (0.01) (0.66)
Spouse’s education -0.02* 0.03 7.48
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Own cognition: CIND 0.49*** 0.23*** 11.1
(0.05) (0.07) (0.00)
Own cognition: dementia 1.00*** 0.99*** 0.02
(0.07) (0.09) (0.90)
Spouse’s cognition: CIND -0.24*** -0.28*** 0.35
(0.06) (0.07) (0.55)
Spouse’s cognition: dementia -0.18* -0.65*** 14.7
(0.09) (0.10) (0.00)
Control investments 0.01 0.09 1.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.31)
Memory disease diagnosis 1.22*** 0.13 54.8
(0.09) (0.13) (0.00)
Control X Diagnosis -0.01 0.49* 3.87
(0.19) (0.22) (0.05)
Spouse diagnosis 0.04 -0.13 0.99
(0.12) (0.14) (0.32)
Spouse’s problems handling money -0.12 -0.26*** 2.02
(0.07) (0.08) (0.16)
Stock share tercile 0.00 -0.03 1.54
(0.02) (0.02) (0.21)
Log total assets -0.09*** -0.00 10.46
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
Const. -1.39*** -4.01*** 36.98
(0.28) (0.34) (0.00)
ρ 0.27***
(0.04)
N 25072
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%
Coefficients reported. Estimation uses HRS household level weights (unweighted results are very
similar). For regression results, robust standard errors in parentheses (couple-level clusters). For
χ2 tests, p-values in parentheses.
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Table 3.7: Cox proportional hazards models with age as analysis time
(1) (2) (3)
Regression type Cox PH Cox PH Cox PH
Analysis time Age Age Age
Failure Money IADL Not fin R Not fin R
conditional on
money IADL
b/se b/se b/se
Female 1.014 2.748*** 2.065***
(0.07) (0.21) (0.38)
Spouse’s Age 0.981*** 1.011 0.991
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Own education 0.975* 0.991 0.987
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Spouse’s education 0.983 1.074*** 1.055
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Own cognition: CIND 2.306*** 1.429*** 1.071
(0.17) (0.15) (0.23)
Own cognition: dementia 4.352*** 4.832*** 2.654***
(0.35) (0.47) (0.52)
Spouse’s cognition: CIND 0.692*** 0.577*** 0.684
(0.06) (0.06) (0.15)
Spouse’s cognition: dementia 0.750** 0.342*** 0.321**
(0.08) (0.06) (0.12)
Control investments 1.190** 1.163* 0.960
(0.08) (0.09) (0.17)
Memory disease diagnosis 3.294*** 1.469* 1.211
(0.32) (0.24) (0.32)
Control X Diagnosis 1.160 1.950** 2.001
(0.20) (0.50) (0.78)
Spouse diagnosis 1.062 0.866 0.818
(0.19) (0.25) (0.46)
Spouse’s problems handling money 0.852 0.619*** 0.936
(0.08) (0.08) (0.28)
Stock share tercile 1.002 0.932* 0.820*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
Log total assets 0.886*** 0.993 1.139*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
N 25072 25072 1739
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%
Hazard ratios reported.
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Table 3.8: Changes in cognition scores over time
Change in cognitive status Change in cognition score Freq. Percent
Mean SD
Normal to Normal -0.22 3.20 45,738 76.4
Normal to CIND -5.09 2.77 4,111 6.87
Normal to Dementia -13.52 4.58 925 1.55
CIND to Normal 4.71 2.64 3,032 5.06
CIND to CIND -0.13 1.78 2,836 4.74
CIND to Dementia -5.78 2.91 1,029 1.72
Dementia to Normal 8.90 2.77 142 0.24
Dementia to CIND 3.69 1.82 474 0.79
Dementia to Dementia -0.65 1.86 1,580 2.64
Total -0.56 3.97 59,867 100.00
All respondents included.
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Table 3.9: Cox proportional hazards models using cognition as analysis time, two failures estimated
separately
(1) (2)
Regression type Cox PH Cox PH
Analysis time Cognition score Cognition score
Failure Money IADL Not fin R
Female 0.982 2.668***
(0.07) (0.21)
Age 1.013* 0.991
(0.01) (0.01)
Spouse’s Age 1.003 1.032***
(0.01) (0.01)
Own education 0.991 1.000
(0.01) (0.01)
Spouse’s education 0.971** 1.075***
(0.01) (0.02)
Spouse’s cognition: CIND 0.735*** 0.550***
(0.06) (0.06)
Spouse’s cognition: dementia 0.698** 0.343***
(0.08) (0.06)
Control investments 1.256*** 1.292***
(0.08) (0.10)
Memory disease diagnosis 1.870*** 0.928
(0.17) (0.15)
Control X Diagnosis 0.976 1.568
(0.17) (0.41)
Spouse diagnosis 1.000 0.808
(0.18) (0.24)
Spouse’s problems handling money 0.937 0.678**
(0.09) (0.10)
Stock share tercile 1.066* 0.984
(0.03) (0.03)
Log total assets 0.922*** 1.051
(0.02) (0.03)
N 24334 24334
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%
Hazard ratios reported.
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Table 3.10: Competing risks regressions using cognition as analysis time, two failures estimated
separately
(1) (2)
Regression type Competing risks Competing risks
Analysis time Cognition score Cognition score
Failure Money IADL Not fin R
Female 0.842* 2.206***
(0.07) (0.28)
Age 1.006 1.004
(0.01) (0.01)
Spouse’s Age 1.011 1.010
(0.01) (0.01)
Own education 1.015 1.014
(0.01) (0.02)
Spouse’s education 0.951*** 1.053*
(0.01) (0.03)
Spouse’s cognition: CIND 0.722*** 0.566**
(0.07) (0.10)
Spouse’s cognition: dementia 0.593*** 0.347***
(0.08) (0.11)
Control investments 1.104 1.042
(0.10) (0.14)
Memory disease diagnosis 1.837*** 0.932
(0.19) (0.20)
Control X Diagnosis 0.960 2.121*
(0.19) (0.72)
Spouse diagnosis 0.971 0.590
(0.22) (0.37)
Spouse’s problems handling money 0.964 0.525*
(0.12) (0.14)
Stock share tercile 1.082* 1.002
(0.04) (0.06)
Log total assets 0.912*** 1.003
(0.02) (0.05)
N 23037 23783
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%
Hazard ratios reported.
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Table 3.11: Survival analysis using cognition as analysis time: problems managing money as an
explanatory variable
(1) (2)
Regression type Cox PH Competing risks
Analysis time Cognition score Cognition score
Failure Not fin R Not fin R
Female 2.660*** 2.202***
(0.21) (0.28)
Age 0.988 1.002
(0.01) (0.01)
Spouse’s Age 1.032*** 1.010
(0.01) (0.01)
Own education 1.000 1.014
(0.01) (0.02)
Spouse’s education 1.078*** 1.054*
(0.02) (0.03)
Spouse’s cognition: CIND 0.554*** 0.566**
(0.06) (0.10)
Spouse’s cognition: dementia 0.349*** 0.352***
(0.07) (0.11)
Control investments 1.275** 1.031
(0.10) (0.14)
Memory disease diagnosis 0.745 0.814
(0.12) (0.20)
Control X Diagnosis 1.658 2.205*
(0.44) (0.76)
Spouse diagnosis 0.794 0.587
(0.24) (0.37)
Own problems handling money 1.503*** 1.276
(0.15) (0.22)
Spouse’s problems handling money 0.688** 0.528*
(0.10) (0.14)
Stock share tercile 0.980 0.999
(0.03) (0.06)
Log total assets 1.059* 1.008
(0.03) (0.05)
N 24334 23783
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%
Hazard ratios reported.
CHAPTER IV
Internet Access and Cognitive Ability:
An Analysis of the Selectivity of Internet Interviews in the
Cognitive Economics Survey
4.1 Introduction
Differences in findings drawn from data collected by internet and mail surveys
represent a mixture of mode effects generated by different responses to the same
question in the two modes and selective differences in coverage of the population
that respond to the two modes. In this chapter, we use detailed information on
the cognitive abilities of respondents in the Cognitive Economics Survey (CogEcon)
to study the implications of selection on cognitive ability for studies of an older
population who participates in internet surveys. From earlier studies of internet
interviewing of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) sample, we know that in-
ternet access is strongly related to age and education in the older population (Couper
et al., 2007). If valid inferences about population characteristics and behavior are
to be drawn from web surveys, it is important to understand this selectivity, make
appropriate statistical adjustments or, if that is not feasible, consider supplemental
data collection to overcome selectivity biases associated with internet interviewing.1
These issues are of particular importance for studying economic decision-making by
1See Schonlau et al. (2009), for a discussion of these issues in the context of HRS.
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older populations because decisions made by older people about finances, retirement
and health are significantly influenced by their cognitive abilities which, in turn, are
correlated with age and education.
The Cognitive Economics Survey (CogEcon) is an innovative new survey admin-
istered by mail and internet to a national sample of 1222 persons, age 51 and older
and their spouses regardless of age, who are participants in the Cognition and Aging
in the USA study (CogUSA)2. A major goal of the CogUSA study is to provide scien-
tific guidance to the HRS in order to improve its measures of higher order cognitive
abilities which are theorized to play an important role in determining the quality of
economic and health decisions by older Americans. As discussed in Chapter II, one of
the most widely accepted theories of cognitive abilities is the Gf-Gc theory (Cattell,
1941; Horn, 1965; Horn and Cattell, 1966, 1967). Primary abilities are divided into
two broad dimensions: fluid intelligence (Gf ), broadly defined to include reasoning
abilities, and crystallized intelligence (Gc), accumulated knowledge and skill. The
distinction between fluid and crystallized intelligence is similar to the notion of abil-
ity versus human capital in labor economics. CogUSA measures many components of
fluid and crystallized intelligence during an extremely detailed, three-hour cognitive
assessment of sample members.
The CogEcon survey, supported by a separate NIA program project led by Robert
Willis, was designed by a team of economists to help understand the cognitive bases of
economic decision-making.3 The CogEcon questionnaire, which has a median length
of 53 minutes on the internet version, includes a battery of twenty-five questions on
2The CogUSA Study is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging, grant number R37 AG007137, “Assessing
and Improving Cognitive Measurements in the HRS,” led by John J. McArdle, PI, a quantitative psychologist at the
University of Southern California, who is a co-investigator in the Health and Retirement Study.
3The Cognitive Economics Survey is supported by NIA program project P01 AG026571, “Behavior on Surveys and
in the Economy Using HRS,” Robert J. Willis, PI. In addition to Willis, the design team includes Daniel Benjamin,
Miles Kimball, Claudia Sahm, Matthew Shapiro, and Tyler Shumway. Gwen Fisher, Brooke Helppie McFall, and
Joanne W. Hsu oversaw the internet and mail data collection and also provided valuable help on the survey design.
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financial sophistication, detailed measures of income, wealth and portfolio allocation
plus measures of risk tolerance, self-assessed financial knowledge, use of records and
other sources of information and several questions on decision-making. By linking
psychological and economic measures, the combined survey provides crucial evidence
about which of the new cognitive measures in CogUSA would be most productive to
add to the HRS.
4.2 Survey design
4.2.1 The CogUSA Study
The CogUSA Study consists of three survey components, as depicted in Figure 4.1.
The study begins with a 40 minute telephone interview that replicates the sections
of the HRS4 questionnaire on demography, health and cognition. These wave 1
interviews were conducted between June and December 2007. For each respondent
this telephone survey was followed as quickly as possible—ideally, within a week—by
wave 2, a three hour face-to-face assessment of the cognitive abilities of respondents
on a large number of different tasks measuring components of fluid and crystallized
intelligence. Finally, the wave 3 telephone interview wave took place at a randomized
interval of one to twenty-four months following the personal interview. In addition to
re-testing several components of ability using a telephone administration, this second
telephone interview administered the same subjective probability questions fielded
by HRS during its 2008 wave.
One of the goals of the CogUSA is to develop efficient methods of assessing well-
recognized components of intelligence and personality that can be administered by
surveys using either face-to-face or telephone administration.5 For example, McAr-
dle, Rodgers, Fisher, Horn, and Woodcock developed an adaptive Number Series
4See Section 3.4 for more details about the HRS.
5See Section 4.6 for a full description of these measures.
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test that was piloted in HRS experimental modules in 2004 and 2006.6 The adaptive
Number Series test covers the same range of ability covered by 47 items in the stan-
dard Woodcock-Johnson (WJ-III) test in about four minutes and no more than six
questions. This adaptive test is repeated in the CogUSA telephone interview, while
the full WJ-III number series test is conducted in the in-person wave.7
Among the many cognition measures in our survey, we focus our attention to
standardized scores of three tests: Number Series, Retrieval Fluency and Vocabu-
lary, all drawn from the in-person interview (wave 2). In preliminary research with
the CogEcon data, the Number Series test, which is a measure of quantitative rea-
soning, has been shown to be more significantly related to measures of economic
knowledge and economic status than other cognitive measures. Vocabulary, a test
from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), measures a form of crystallized
intelligence that includes expressive vocabulary, verbal knowledge, and fund of in-
formation. Lastly, Retrieval Fluency is a measure of long-term retrieval from stored
knowledge, also from the WJ-III. In this test, respondents are asked to name as many
items as possible in a specific category during a short period of time. These three
were chosen to cover disparate forms of cognition.
4.2.2 The Cognitive Economics Survey
Members of the CogUSA sample whose cognitive ability was assessed in wave
2 face-to-face interviews were invited to participate in the CogEcon mail/internet
survey in 2008. In addition, CogEcon fielded a 2009 Post-Crash survey to follow up
with respondents after the economic crisis, and plans are underway for new waves
6The number series test asks a person to fill in the missing number in a sequence. An easy example is 1, 2, 3,
; a little harder one is 2, 4, , 256. (Note that the actual items are copyrighted and cannot be reproduced). An
adaptive test can dramatically reduce the number of items needed to assess a person’s ability by asking questions
that are of most relevance to a person’s ability.
7The 47-item test is “somewhat adaptive,” so that few respondents answer all 47 items.
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of data to be collected in the fall of 2011 and in 2013. The CogEcon Study content
includes many aspects of economic decision-making, including income, assets, and
another form of crystallized intelligence, financial sophistication/literacy (see Section
2.4.2 for more details).
The CogEcon sample frame consists of the 1222 individuals, including age-ineligible
spouses, who completed the first two waves of CogUSA. The invitees range in age
from 38 to 96 years, with a mean age of 64.0 years. Of the invitees, 816—just over
two-thirds of respondents8—reported using the internet regularly.
To avoid conflict with wave 2 of the CogUSA survey, the CogEcon survey was
divided into two releases; 921 were assigned to the first release (fielded in February
and March of 2008), and 301 were assigned to the second (fielded in July 2008; see
Figures 4.1 and 4.2). All individuals in the first release who indicated that they
had used the internet “regularly”9 during the baseline wave 1 telephone interview of
the CogUSA were sent a letter inviting them to participate in an internet interview;
those without access were sent a letter with a mail version of the survey enclosed.
In the first CogEcon sample release, 624 respondents were invited to completed
the internet version of the survey and 297 to complete the mail version. In the second
sample release, we invited all 301 persons to complete a mail survey regardless of
internet access—no internet survey was administered in this second release. Of these,
189 had reported at baseline that they used the internet regularly. Since individuals
were randomly assigned to sample releases, assigning these individuals to a mail
survey forms the basis for a randomized mode experiment, analyzed in detail in Hsu
8This is substantially higher than the internet usage rate found in the HRS. This is possibly due to the sampling
frame used for the CogUSA, based on random-digit dialing. Furthermore, since CogUSA was described as a study
on cognition and aging in the recruitment letter from the Survey Research Center, those with lower cognition may
have declined to participate in higher numbers than those in the HRS sample. Since internet access is related to
ability, such an effect would lead to fewer respondents without internet access in the CogUSA sample.
9Question number W303 from HRS was used. It reads: “Do you regularly use the WorldWide Web, or the Internet,
for sending and receiving e-mail or for any other purpose, such as making purchases, searching for information, or
making travel reservations?”
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and McFall (2011).
Our analysis in this chapter takes two primary forms, shown in Figure 4.3. First,
we characterize differences, if any, between those reporting internet access and those
without access on the basis of attributes measured in CogUSA. This is represented as
the dotted rectangle in the first row of the figure (maximum sample size: 1222). Be-
cause CogUSA was implemented in the same mode at each wave for all respondents—
telephone for wave 1 and in-person for wave 2—this analysis will not be subject to
mode effects. Second, we restrict the analysis to the CogEcon sub-sample. Since
Release 1 of CogEcon was mixed-mode, some differences may be due to mode effects
rather than selectivity. Comparing internet users and non-users in the mail-only Re-
lease 2 provides an opportunity to isolate selection issues. This comparison is shown
in the second row of Figure 4.3.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Internet Coverage and Determinants of Access
While respondents with internet access outnumber those without at a rate of
nearly two to one, the probability of internet access differs dramatically by the age
and education of CogUSA respondents. This can be seen in the probit regression
results in the first column of Table 4.1 and is very similar to the pattern of internet
access seen in HRS data. The second column adds the respondent’s standardized
Number Series score (a measure of fluid intelligence), Vocabulary score (a measure of
crystallized intelligence), and Retrieval Fluency (a measure of long-term retrieval),
all obtained in the CogUSA in-person survey. Both Number Series and Vocabulary
have a strong positive relationship to internet access. A one standard deviation
increase in the Number Series score is associated with an 8 percentage point increase
in the probability of internet access. Likewise, a one standard deviation increase in
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Vocabulary increases internet access by 0.06. This implies that respondents with
internet access tend to be of considerably higher ability than those without, even
after controlling for age and education. Retrieval Fluency is also positively related
to internet access, but the coefficient is not precisely estimated. The third column
adds coupleness status, coded as one if the respondent is married or partnered and
zero otherwise. The slight increase in the likelihood for internet access for those in
couples is unsurprising given economies of scale and the ease of sharing computers
and internet access within a household.
A scatter plot of predicted probabilities from the regression in column (2) is pre-
sented in Figure 4.4 along with non-parametric lowess estimates of the unconditional
probability of access by age. The lowess plot shows that on average, 60-year-old re-
spondents in CogUSA have an 80% predicted probability of internet access, while for
the oldest members this probability is 20% or below. The scatter of points around
the lowess plot indicates considerable variation in the probability of being in the
internet sample that is associated with differences in education and cognition.
Ability differentials between the internet and mail eligible samples are shown more
directly in Figure 4.5, which presents kernel density estimates of the distribution of
the standardized cognition scores in the two samples. The mean Number Series
scores in the internet and mail samples are, respectively, 0.29 and -0.60, with stan-
dard deviations of 0.85 and 1.003. Thus, overall there is about a 0.89 difference in
means (nearly one standard deviation) in the Number Series scores between the two
subsamples. Internet users have Vocabulary scores that exceed those of non-users
by 0.76 on average, and their distributions are particularly different from each other.
Internet users also have higher Retrieval Fluency scores, though the dispersion of
Retrieval Fluency is much smaller than Number Series and Vocabulary.
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We can also consider variables from the CogEcon study; doing so, however, re-
stricts the sample to at most 985 observations. Furthermore, these variables may be
subject to mode effects. Running the three specifications in Table 4.1 on the smaller
CogEcon sample yields point estimates that are very similar to those found in the
CogUSA sample (CogEcon results reported in Table 4.2), so we can be confident
that the CogEcon sample is representative of the larger CogUSA sample.
In Table 4.3, we consider economic determinants of internet access, and therefore
restrict the analyses to those who completed the CogEcon study. Column (1) reports
results with only demographic explanatory variables. Column (2) also includes the
three cognition scores as well as the standardized financial sophistication score, a
measure of crystallized intelligence obtained in the CogEcon study. Including finan-
cial sophistication somewhat weakens the effect of the Number Series score relative to
column (2) in Table 4.2. The positive and statistically significant effects of Number
Series, Retreival Fluency, and financial sophistication score all remain. This provides
additional evidence that those who participate in the internet sample are of higher
ability than their counterparts in the mail sample.
Lastly, we investigate the relationship of internet access to income and wealth.
We use the natural log of earnings (with those not working coded as zero) and the
natural log of total wealth (with negative and zero values of wealth coded as zero).
Column (3) of Table 4.3 reports regressions including demographics, log income, and
log wealth, excluding cognition, while the last column includes all covariates.
Greater earnings and wealth both increase the probability of having internet ac-
cess. The effect of earnings suggests that occupational exposure to computing tech-
nology may have a role in internet access for older Americans. This may also reflect
some of the effects of being retired and having less of a need for computers or internet
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access for work.10
However, including cognition and financial literacy weakens the effects of earnings
and wealth. Comparing columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.3, the marginal effect of log
wealth is reduced by about 40 percent, from 0.013 to 0.008, with the inclusion of
the two scores. Furthermore, the inclusion of cognition and financial sophistication
reduces the effect of education from 0.038 to 0.012, or almost 70 percent.
The effect of cognition is not quite as sensitive to the inclusion of economic vari-
ables (see columns (2) and (4)). This suggests that even after controlling for standard
demographic and economic variables, there is still selection into internet access on
the basis of cognitive ability. A one-standard deviation increase in the Number Series
score increases the probability of internet access by 0.05, and the same increase in
Vocabulary is associated with a 0.08 increase in internet access. In the full specifica-
tion in the last column, demographic and cognition (Number Series and Vocabulary)
variables are statistically significantly related to internet access; economic variables
are positive but not statistically significant here.
These results used pooled data from respondents without internet access, who
necessarily responded by mail, and those with internet access, who were randomly
invited to respond by mail or internet. Of the variables in Table 4.3, earnings,
wealth and financial literacy were collected in CogEcon using the two modes; the
demographic variables were collected in CogUSA using the same mode for all re-
spondents. To verify that our results are not driven by mode effects, we repeat the
analysis of Table 4.3 using only CogEcon Release 2: 146 with internet access, and 83
without. All of these individuals completed mail surveys, so group differences are not
due to mode. The results of these regressions, reported in Table 4.4, are largely con-
10We unfortunately do not have information on whether respondents access the internet from home, work, or
elsewhere.
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sistent with the results from the complete sample. The main exception is that in the
full sample, the effect of log wealth exceeded that of log earnings, and the opposite
is true here in the mail-only Release 2 subsample. Because in both specifications the
marginal effect of earnings is not statistically different from that of wealth (p-values
of 0.6130 and 0.4719 in the full sample and the Release 2 subsample, respectively),
this discrepancy is not problematic.
4.3.2 Response rates in CogEcon
Response rates to the CogEcon survey differed quite dramatically by mode. Cog-
Econ achieved an overall response rate of 86.72% for internet invitees and 71.62%
for mail invitees in Release 1.11 Of those who were initially assigned to the internet
mode, 83.4 percent submitted a completed questionnaire either by internet or mail
while 74.7 percent of those initially assigned to the mail mode returned a question-
naire. A probit model of response rates to Release 1 shows that being an internet
user who was invited to take the internet survey is associated with a 0.12 increase
in the probability of response (the first column of Table 4.5).12 We also see that
the Number Series score also has a positive, statistically significant impact on the
probability of response.
To see if this difference is more a function of unmeasured ability or personality
differences between mail and internet invitees than a true mode effect, we analyze
Release 2 data, in which respondents with and without internet access were all invited
to complete a mail survey. As can be seen in the second column of Table 4.5, having
11Of the 624 who were invited to do the internet survey in CogEcon Release 1, 492 (79.2 percent) submitted
complete interviews. There were also 25 “partial” interviews by people who failed to hit the “submit” button at the
end of the interview; some of these are largely complete, while others have very few questions answered. In addition,
251 mail interviews were submitted, including 30 respondents with internet access who eventually requested paper
questionnaires. In sum, 921 CogUSA respondents were invited to participate in Release 1 of the CogEcon Survey
and 743, or 80.6 percent, returned completed questionnaires.
12These probit regressions exclude 30 internet invitees who eventually responded using a mail questionnaire included
in a reminder letter.
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internet access is not associated with increased likelihood of response. Likewise, we
no longer see an impact of Number Series on response.13 Therefore, the results of the
Release 1 response rate analysis are likely due to mode effects (see Hsu and McFall,
2011).
Personality We also investigated difference in personality by internet access. The
Big Five personality traits—extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroti-
cism, and openness—do not vary systematically between web users and non-users
(see Section 4.6 for more details on personality traits). Likewise, Need for Cogni-
tion also does not vary. None of these personality traits are statistically significant
in univariate regressions of internet access, nor are they significant when added to
the full specifications of determinants of access with demographics, cognition, and
wealth. In addition, the Big Five traits and Need for Cognition also do not predict
response to the 2008 CogEcon study. These results are not reported here for brevity.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 How does selectivity of the internet sample affect inferences from data?
One of the major goals of the CogEcon/CogUSA collaboration is to provide ev-
idence on the relationship between cognitive ability and economic decision-making.
The cognitive measures obtained in CogUSA may be interpreted within the theory
of “fluid and crystallized intelligence” (Cattell, 1941, 1987). Crystallized knowledge
(Gc) is thought to represent acculturated knowledge, and fluid reasoning (Gf ) is
thought to represent reasoning and thinking in novel situations.14 Connections be-
tween Gf/Gc theory and human capital theory have been developed by Willis and
13Similar results hold when analyzing all mail surveys in both releases.
14The current form of GfGc theory (Horn, 1988, Horn, 2003) contains 8 broad cognitive functions: 1. Fluid
Reasoning (Gf). 2. Acculturation Knowledge (Gc). 3. Short-term memory (Gsm) 4. Processing Speed (Gs) 5.
Long-term Retrieval (Glr), 6. Visual Processing (Gv), 7. Auditory Processing (Ga). 8. Quantitative Knowledge
(Gq). For purposes of our model, we consider only the first two functions.
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McArdle (n.d., forthcoming) and have been used to study the accumulation of finan-
cial knowledge and financial decision-making by Delavande et al. (2008).
In this section, we examine the age trajectories of the Number Series score, a
well-established component of fluid intelligence collected in the CogUSA, and two
measures of different types of crystallized intelligence: Vocabulary, a well-established
measure from CogUSA, and a newly developed measure of financial sophistication
from the CogEcon survey. From an economic point of view, the financial sophisti-
cation score measures a form of human capital which, from a psychological point of
view, is largely a component of crystallized intelligence.15 Our interest in this chapter
is simply to illustrate the degree to which the selectivity of an internet sample might
produce misleading inferences utilizing data from the full CogUSA sample and both
the internet and mail components of the CogEcon survey.
Over the lifespan, fluid reasoning ability increases rapidly during childhood and
adolescence, reaching a peak between ages 15-20, and then begins a linear decline
that continues among cognitively normal adults without dementia until death. In
contrast, crystallized abilities tend to continue increasing at least through middle
age and then remain relatively unchanged through the rest of life. In other words,
patterns of age-related decline are evident for fluid intelligence, but not crystallized
intelligence. These theoretically predicted patterns are illustrated in Figure 4.6. Us-
ing the full CogUSA sample, non-parametric lowess estimates of the age trajectories
of the Number Series, Vocabulary, and financial sophistication scores are presented
in Figure 4.7.
As predicted byGc/Gf theory, the Number Series score decreases linearly through-
out the 50+ age range of the sample while the financial sophistication measure only
15Psychometric analysis of the financial sophistication measures is currently underway by several researchers in
the Willis P01 project (NIA program project P01 AG026571).
141
begins declining at late ages. From a substantive point of view, it is important to
note that these cross-sectional age trajectories represent an unknown mix of age and
cohort effects.16 Given the methodological focus of this chapter on selectivity issues,
this distinction is not critical. For our purposes, the key message of Figure 4.7 is
that the trajectories we see in the full sample are broadly consistent with theoretical
expectations.
The fact that internet access is strongly correlated with age, education, Number
Series score, and Vocabulary score implies that participation in an internet survey
will be selective on fluid and crystallized intelligence, and both quantitative and
verbal skills. The pattern of selection by age is illustrated in the first panel of Figure
4.8, in which non-parametric lowess curves of the standardized Number Series score
versus age are plotted separately for respondents with internet access, respondents
without internet access, and the full sample; the second and third panels display the
same for Vocabulary and financial sophistication scores. While the rate of decline
is similar for mail and internet eligible respondents, the slope of the full sample
age profile is much steeper, reflecting differential selection at older ages. Since the
full sample age profile is a weighted average of the age profiles for the mail eligible
group and the internet eligible group, these slopes are consistent with the declining
predicted probability of having internet access with age as shown in Figure 4.4.
At younger ages, the full sample is dominated by internet eligible respondents;
those who are mail eligible are of lowest ability. Likewise, at older ages, our full
sample is composed primarily of mail respondents, and those captured in the internet
16There is good reason to think that cohort effects are important for these measures. The “Flynn Effect” refers
to a well-documented increase across cohorts of scores on tests of fluid intelligence. (See Flynn (2007) and Schaie
(2005) for an extensive discussion of these findings.) Examination of gender differences in the financial literacy scores
shows a decline in scores for females at older ages which is almost surely a cohort effect reflecting a traditional
household division of labor. Chapter II addresses possible cohort effects by looking at intra-couple differences in
financial sophistication.
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eligible are of very high ability. Therefore, not only does the internet eligible sample
select on the basis of age, it also selects on the basis of ability at both ends of the age
distribution. An internet-only sample would miss an increasing number of persons,
particularly those with lower ability, at older ages. Because of selection, it is clear
that an internet-only sample would lead to an overestimate of level of intelligence
and an underestimate of the rate of cognitive decline with aging.
Analysis of survey data must take selectivity into account. In the case of the
CogEcon survey, we recognized that selection would be an issue when we began
thinking of administering an internet survey and, therefore, decided to supplement
it with a mail survey in order to cover the entire CogUSA sample. However, this is
not an option with many internet surveys.
4.4.2 Propensity score weighting
In the above analysis, we have established that internet users differ fundamentally
from internet non-users, and that a internet-only sample would be subject to selec-
tion on cognition in addition to standard demographic variables. Propensity score
weighting is one method of correcting for the selection bias arising from variation in
internet access. In this section, we create weights based on our probit regressions
of internet access and compare weighted means from a internet-only subsample to
means from the a full sample of internet users and non-users. For simplicity, we
treat the full CogUSA sample as representative random sample of the population
of interest in order to abstract away from non-response issues within the CogUSA
study and attempt to weight the internet sub-sample to resemble the full sample.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) developed the use of propensity scores to adjust
for non-random assignment of treatments in observational studies (see also Little
and Rubin, 2002). The valid use of propensity scores requires strong ignorability.
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Following the notation in Schonlau et al. (2009), strong ignorability requires that
for an outcome of interest Y , and X covariates used to estimate the propensity for
internet access I,
P (I = 1|X, Y ) = P (I = 1|X) for almost all X and Y. (4.1)
In our context, this requires that the outcome of interest Y and internet use I are
independent, conditional on a set of covariates X .
If the strong ignorability condition is met, inverse probability weights can be used
to construct consistent estimates of parameters of the distribution of Y (Schonlau et
al., 2009). We use predicted probabilities estimated from the two probit regressions
from Table 4.1; the weights are the inverse of these predicted probabilities, normalized
so the weights have a mean of one. We construct one set of weights using only
standard demographic information as explanatory variables: age, sex, education,
and coupleness status. The second set of weights also includes cognition variables,
which unlike the demographic variables are not standard data collected by surveys.
Figure 4.4 displays a scatterplot of these propensity scores.
This comparison of the two sets of weights is similar to work on whether attitudinal
or lifestyle questions are useful additions to propensity score estimates for weighting
data. Harris Interactive, a company that specializes in web surveys, uses a set of
attitudinal variables called “webographic” variables. Schonlau et al. (2004) find
that propensity scores using “webographic” variables improve some of the bias that
emerges from a web-only sample. Indeed, weighting using propensity scores from
demographic variables alone produce large discrepancies in “webographic” measures
for web-using and non-using samples (Schonlau et al., 2007). Here, we continue our
focus on the role of cognition.
To analyze the weighted and unweighted descriptive statistics of web-users and the
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full sample, we consider the prevalence of 14 health conditions: diabetes, high blood
pressure, cancer, lung disease, heart conditions, stroke, arthritis, past and present
smoking status, and others. Each variable is coded as one if the respondent reported
the condition, and zero otherwise; these were asked on CogUSA and therefore are not
subject to mode effects. We also considered a number economic variables: currently
working for pay (collected by telephone for all respondents in the third wave of Cog-
USA), an indicator for owning one’s own home, and values of retirement wealth and
total wealth. Internet users and internet non-users have statistically significant dif-
ferences in means for 11 of the 14 health conditions and all of the economic variables.
The two groups do not have statistically significant differences in means for having
fallen in the last two years, ever smoked, psychological or emotional problems, and
incontinence.
Table 4.6 reports means of each variable, with the the mean of the CogUSA
“population” in column (1) and means from the internet-using subsample with and
without weights in columns (2) through (4). For nearly all outcomes with statisti-
cally significant differences between internet users and non-users, applying weights
(whether the weights in column (3) or column (4)) reduces the difference means of
the internet sample with the full sample. The only exception is lung disease: the
weights without cognition increase the difference, but the weights with cognition do
bring the weighted internet-only mean closer to the full sample mean.
For 11 of the 14 health variables, using weights computed with cognition scores
reduced the gap between internet-only and full sample means more than weights
computed using only demographic characteristics. In particular, weights without
cognition exacerbated differences in means for three of the four outcomes for which
web-only means were similar to the full sample mean (fallen in the last two years, ever
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smoked, and incontinence), while weights with cognition preserved the similarities
between web users and the full sample. However, for three of the four economic
variables, the weights without cognition closed the gap more than the weights with
cognition. In our case, it appears that propensity score weights based on our analysis
do help correct for selectivity in some, but not all, outcomes.
4.5 Conclusion
In general, data collected through internet and mail surveys can yield differences in
data that are a combination of differential responses to the same question in the two
formats and selection effects due to differing coverage of the population responding
to each mode. By using data obtained in the face-to-face interview of CogUSA in
conjunction with data from the mixed-mode CogEcon survey, we have been able to
analyze the selectivity of internet interviews without being subject to mode effects.
After controlling for age, sex, and education, we find that the Number Series
and Vocabulary scores have a strong positive relationship to internet access. The
effect of the Number Series score is only reduced with the inclusion of the financial
sophistication score, a measure of crystallized intelligence.
Our results suggest that those with internet access will tend to be of higher ability,
both in terms of fluid and crystallized intelligence, than those without internet access.
In addition, the degree of selectivity increases as respondents’ ages increase. First,
the older the person, the less the likely he or she is to be included in our internet
sample. Since fluid intelligence declines with age, that means an internet sample
loses more and more people—particularly those with low fluid intelligence and those
who have acquired little financial knowledge—as the age of respondents increases.
Consequently, not only would an internet-only sample overestimate the abilities and
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knowledge of participants, it would underestimate the rates of decline with age in
fluid and crystallized intelligence relative to data with full population coverage.
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4.6 Appendix: Summary of WJ-III Number Series and personality mea-
sures
CogUSA Data Collection in General Respondents completed a 35-40 minute tele-
phone interview, followed by a three-hour face-to interview scheduled within 1-14
days after the initial telephone interview. The telephone interview comprised a se-
ries of questions to gather demographic characteristics, internet use, health status,
and basic cognitive measures. The face-to-face interview was a much more in-depth
assessment of cognitive functioning, as well as personality and a few other mea-
sures. The cross-battery set of cognitive measures included a series of tests from the
Woodcock-Johnson III (WJ-III) tests of cognitive abilities and achievement.
Number Series The Number Series test in the WJ-III battery is a measure of fluid
intelligence that measures quantitative reasoning (Woodcock and Mather, 2001).
This ability involves reasoning with concepts that depend upon mathematical rela-
tionships. The task required the respondent to look at a series of numbers with a
number missing from the series. The respondent needed to determine the numerical
pattern, and then provide the missing number in the series. Answers were scored
correct or incorrect for each item, and a standardized score (called a W-score) was
computed based on WJ-III standard scoring (Woodcock and Mather, 2001).
Retrieval Fluency The Retrieval Fluency test in the WJ-III battery measures
an aspect of long-term retrieval, specifically retrieval from stored knowledge. The
Respondent is asked to name as many examples as possible from a particular category
within a fixed period of time.
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Vocabulary The Vocabulary test from theWechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS)
is a measure of crystallized intelligence that measures expressive vocabulary, verbal
knowledge, and fund of information. The test also addresses other cognitive abilities,
including learning ability, and concept and language development.
Big Five Personality Inventory Personality refers to relatively stable characteris-
tics of thought, affect, and behavior. In this study, we conceptualized personality
in terms of the Big Five model of personality, which describes five broad personal
traits: conscientiousness (being goal-directed, organized, and detail-oriented), agree-
ableness (having a tendency to get along easily with others), extroversion (enjoys
social engagement and interacting with others), openness to experience (willing to
try new things), and neuroticism (having a tendency to worry a lot). These five char-
acteristics were measured via self report with the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI;
John et al. (2008)). Participants indicated the extent to which he/she agreed with
a series of statements that describe him/herself using a 5-point Likert-type response
scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
Need for Cognition Need for cognition is an individual difference variable defined
by (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982, p. 116) as “the tendency for an individual to engage in
and enjoy thinking.” Studies by Cacioppo and colleagues (e.g., Cacioppo and Petty
(1982); Cacioppo et al. (1996)) have posited that individuals high or low in need for
cognition make sense of their world and approach problem solving differently. For
example, individuals high in need for cognition think about things, seek, acquire,
and reflect on information, whereas those low in need for cognition prefer to obtain
information from other sources, including other people, by making social compar-
isons, or using cognitive heuristics, rather than figuring things out for themselves.
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We measured need for cognition in this study using the 18-item short form measure
validated by Cacioppo et al. (1984). Participants responded to each item using a 5-
point Likert-type response scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
Variables for analysis were constructed in two ways. First, we constructed a single,
composite summary measure of all 18 items. Secondly, we constructed three sepa-
rate dimensions of the need for cognition scale based on Tanaka et al. (1988). The
three dimensions were (1) cognitive confidence (the extent to which one is confident
about engaging in cognitive activities), (2) cognitive persistence (the extent to which
one enjoys engaging in cognitive tasks), and (3) cognitive complexity (a tendency to
prefer complex problems more than simple ones).
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4.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Timing of the Cognitive Economics Study
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Figure 4.2: CogUSA and CogEcon flow chart
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Figure 4.3: Web users and non-users on CogUSA and CogEcon
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Each wave of CogUSA was implemented in the same mode for all respondents (waves 1 and 3 over
the telephone; wave 2 in person). CogEcon fielded its 2008 survey by mail to some respondents and
web for other users. Note that the 544 web users in release 1 include 30 respondents who submitted
a mail questionnaire. These 30 either requested a mode switch or did not respond until we sent a
final reminder with a paper survey.
Figure 4.4: Predicted probabilities of internet access
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Figure 4.5: Densities of cognition scores, by internet access
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Figure 4.6: Life cycle pattern of fluid and crystallized intelligence
Figure 1. A theoretical description of life span curves of intellectual abilities. From Intelligence: Its structure,
growth and action (p. 206) by R. B. Cattell, 1987, Amsterdam: North-Holland. Copyright 1987 by Elsevier
Science Publishers. Reprinted with permission.
Figure from McArdle et al. (2002).
Figure 4.7: Age profile of standardized scores
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Figure 4.8: Age profiles of standardized scores, by internet access
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Figure 4.9: Age profiles of standardized scores, by education
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
St
an
da
rd
ize
d 
sc
or
es
50 60 70 80 90 100
Age
Full sample HS or less
Some college College grad or more
CogEcon sample
Age profile of Number Series scores by education
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
St
an
da
rd
ize
d 
sc
or
es
50 60 70 80 90 100
Age
Full sample HS or less
Some college College grad or more
CogEcon sample
Age profile of Vocabular scores by education
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
St
an
da
rd
ize
d 
sc
or
es
50 60 70 80 90 100
Age
Full sample HS or less
Some college College grad or more
CogEcon sample
Age profile of financial literacy scores by education
156
Table 4.1: Probit model of determinants of internet access - CogUSA and CogEcon
(1) (2)
Age -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.06* 0.06*
(0.02) (0.02)
Education 0.05*** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Coupled 0.08** 0.05
(0.03) (0.03)
Number Series (standardized) 0.08***
(0.02)
Retrieval Fluency (standardized) 0.02
(0.01)
Vocabulary (standardized) 0.06***
(0.01)
N 1207.00 1207.00
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%
Dependent variable is 1 if the respondent uses the internet regularly, 0 otherwise. Average marginal
effects reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses (couple-level clusters).
Table 4.2: Probit model of determinants of internet access - CogEcon only (full sample)
(1) (2)
Age -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.05 0.05*
(0.03) (0.02)
Education 0.05*** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Coupled 0.08** 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03)
Number Series (standardized) 0.07***
(0.02)
Retrieval Fluency (standardized) 0.01
(0.01)
Vocabulary (standardized) 0.08***
(0.01)
N 969.00 969.00
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%
Dependent variable is 1 if the respondent uses the internet regularly, 0 otherwise. Average marginal
effects reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses (couple-level clusters).
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Table 4.3: Probit model of determinants of internet access, with income and wealth - CogEcon full
sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.048 0.058* 0.059* 0.063*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Education 0.046*** 0.014* 0.038*** 0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Coupled 0.089** 0.063* 0.070* 0.055
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Number Series (standardized) 0.058** 0.050**
(0.019) (0.019)
Retrieval Fluency (standardized) 0.017 0.015
(0.014) (0.014)
Vocabulary (standardized) 0.081*** 0.079***
(0.015) (0.015)
Financial literacy (standardized) 0.023 0.017
(0.014) (0.014)
Log(Earnings) 0.009** 0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
Log(Net wealth) 0.013** 0.008
(0.004) (0.004)
N 943.000 943.000 943.000 943.000
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%
Dependent variable is 1 if the respondent uses the internet regularly, 0 otherwise. Average marginal
effects reported. Robust standard errors in parenthesis (couple-level clusters).
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Table 4.4: Probit model of determinants of internet access, with income and wealth - CogEcon
Release 2 only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.010** -0.008*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female 0.043 0.041 0.050 0.042
(0.058) (0.054) (0.057) (0.053)
Education 0.053*** 0.014 0.043** 0.011
(0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Coupled 0.115 0.083 0.115 0.090
(0.066) (0.062) (0.068) (0.064)
Number Series (standardized) 0.116** 0.107**
(0.037) (0.038)
Retrieval Fluency (standardized) 0.019 0.023
(0.033) (0.033)
Vocabulary (standardized) 0.071* 0.068*
(0.030) (0.030)
Financial literacy (standardized) 0.010 0.012
(0.032) (0.031)
Log(Earnings) 0.014* 0.009
(0.006) (0.006)
Log(Net wealth) 0.006 0.000
(0.010) (0.010)
N 217.000 217.000 217.000 217.000
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%
Dependent variable is 1 if the respondent uses the internet regularly, 0 otherwise. Average marginal
effects reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses (couple-level clusters).
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Table 4.5: Probit model of determinants of survey response
(1) (2)
Release 1 Release 2
Internet access 0.122*** 0.047
(0.032) (0.060)
Age 0.003* 0.004
(0.001) (0.003)
Female -0.015 0.006
(0.026) (0.047)
Education 0.002 0.010
(0.007) (0.013)
Number Series (standardized) 0.035* 0.020
(0.018) (0.033)
Retrieval Fluency (standardized) 0.015 0.028
(0.015) (0.033)
Vocabulary (standardized) -0.013 -0.053
(0.016) (0.032)
Coupled 0.046 -0.033
(0.029) (0.061)
N 874.000 295.000
∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%
Average marginal effects reported. 30 web-eligible respondents from Release 1 who did not respond
until a final reminder with an attached paper questionnaire are excluded. Robust standard errors
in parentheses (couple-level clusters).
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Table 4.6: Means of selected outcomes, with and without propensity score weights
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Web- Web Web-adjusted Web-adjusted
Sample mail unadjusted (No cognition)
Mean Diff. Mean Diff. Mean Diff. Mean Diff.
Diabetes 0.155 *** 0.135 -0.020 0.156 0.002 0.148 -0.006
High blood pressure 0.484 *** 0.428 -0.056 0.488 0.004 0.480 -0.003
Cancer 0.130 *** 0.107 -0.023 0.140 0.010 0.126 -0.004
Lung disease 0.057 ** 0.045 -0.012 0.075 0.018 0.062 0.005
Heart condition 0.187 *** 0.143 -0.044 0.188 0.001 0.168 -0.018
Stroke 0.050 *** 0.034 -0.016 0.057 0.007 0.048 -0.001
Arthritis 0.450 *** 0.416 -0.034 0.475 0.025 0.457 0.007
Fallen last 2 years 0.299 0.273 -0.026 0.269 -0.030 0.290 -0.009
Ever smoked 0.523 0.521 -0.002 0.562 0.039 0.536 0.013
Currently smoke 0.200 ** 0.170 -0.031 0.151 -0.049 0.156 -0.044
Memory disease 0.019 * 0.012 -0.007 0.011 -0.008 0.013 -0.006
Psychological problem 0.133 0.144 0.011 0.133 0.000 0.145 0.012
Trouble sleeping 2.495 * 2.520 0.025 2.513 0.018 2.506 0.011
Incontinence 0.211 0.200 -0.011 0.233 0.022 0.220 0.009
Work for pay 0.505 *** 0.615 0.110 0.497 -0.008 0.530 0.025
Own home 0.895 *** 0.916 0.021 0.896 0.001 0.893 -0.002
Retirement wealth 184 *** 225 23% 189 3% 192 5%
Total wealth 909 ** 1118 23% 996 -11% 1013 2%
Each cell is a separate estimates of the mean of the variable specified in the row. Columns specify
what sample is used and what weights are used. For web-mail differences in column (1), ∗ significant
at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%; ∗∗∗ significant at 0.1%. Retirement wealth and total wealth are reported
in thousands of dollars, and their respective full sample / web sample differences are reported as
percents. Own home, retirement wealth (thousands of dollars), and total wealth (thousands of
dollars) means were calculated using only the CogEcon sample. All others were calculated using
the CogUSA sample with the sample sizes specified in the table.
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
This dissertation is an empirical examination of human capital and aging. While
the three essays are separate and distinct, in all three I consider the role of cognition,
which can be interpreted as the ability parameter of a human capital accumulation
equation. In the first two essays, I focus on human capital investments related to
the household division of labor–specifically for the task of managing family finances.
I find empirical patterns that initially appear to reflect sub-optimal human capital
decisions, but I show how these patterns actually reflect rational responses to incen-
tives. First, I provide a life-cycle interpretation of the gender gap in financial literacy
and show that women do indeed respond to the risk of widowhood by acquiring fi-
nancial human capital. Second, we find that households often do not switch their
financial respondent even after s/he has become demented. However, households
with personally invested retirement wealth are much more responsive to a diagnosis
of a memory-related disease like Alzheimer’s disease relative to those without such
wealth holdings. In the third essay, we find that an internet-only survey of older
Americans will select highly on both quantitative and verbal forms cognition, even
after controlling for age and education. Together, these three essays shed light on
aspects of the accumulation and deterioration of human capital as individuals age.
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